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Abstract 
This thesis explores the merits of applying a marketing model, the product life-
cycle model, to a political party. The product life-cycle model details a product 
during its introduction, growth, maturity and decline cycles. For this thesis I 
apply this model to the British Labour Party between 1994 and 2010 under the 
leadership of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. The product life-cycle model, 
adapted to political science from the political marketing literature, shows that a 
political party does go through an introduction, growth, maturity and decline 
phase. To avoid moving into the decline phase, a political party must learn how 
to rejuvenate during the maturity cycle. This thesis concludes that the product 
life-cycle model does have merits when applied to political parties. In the case of 
the British Labour Party, it began with a strong market-orientation, but the 
longer it stayed in power this market-orientation shifted. The New Labour brand 
and its primary brand agent, Tony Blair, were both strong assets to the party. 
However, during the lifetime of the product these assets became liabilities. The 
longer that New Labour stayed in power, the more it shifted away from its 
relationship with the political market. The product life-cycle model should be 
tested in other political systems to further strengthen its explanatory power. 
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 Introduction  
At a basic level political marketing is about putting the political consumer, or 
voter, at the centre of the political process. Political products, such as political 
parties or candidates, that, in theory, best reflects the views of the political 
consumer succeed at elections and remain in government compared to those who 
do not. This thesis examines how the relationship between the political consumer 
and a political product develops and changes over the life of a government. 
 
Generally when a political product enters office it is greeted with cheers and 
celebrations and when it loses power it sneaks out the back door. Why does the 
relationship that a political product built up with the political consumer go sour 
in the end? Do political consumers and political products simply fall out of love 
with each other? Is there a design flaw with the political products? Or do 
political products get distracted by the responsibility of government and forget 
their primary relationship with the political consumer? 
 
The political marketing literature focuses on how political marketing is used to 
get a political product elected. While this is an important part of political 
marketing, this study is also just as interested in the maturity and decline of a 
political product. Can political marketing offer an insight for political products to 
extend their life and time in office?  
 
For this study I adapt the product life-cycle model, which is a marketing model, 
and apply it to the British Labour Party. The aim of merging a marketing model 
to a political organisation is to gain a different understanding of how New 
Labour gained support and won government in 1997; how it built and 
maintained support and, then; how it lost its support, leading to its decline and 
eventual defeat in 2010. Looking at the New Labour case study using this model 
may give political scientists a different perspective of what was right and what 
went wrong with New Labour. 
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In adapting the product life-cycle model to politics this thesis covers the creation 
of New Labour, its growth into a governing party, its maturity as a party that 
was in office long term, and its decline as it lost support in its later office. This 
thesis aims to: 
 
• Make a contribution to political marketing literature which, as far as my 
research shows, has not examined the product life-cycle in much detail.2 
• Examine and evaluate if an adapted version of the product life-cycle model 
can be applied to political parties. 
• Ask if an adapted version of the product life-cycle can reveal something 
new about political parties. 
 
Why New Labour?  
New Labour has been a popular case study for political marketing studies. As 
Lees-Marshment has noted, this is because of a large concentration of political 
scientists, interested in political marketing, in the United Kingdom.3 New 
Labour is an ideal case study for applying a product life-cycle model to a party. 
Visually it is easy to see the contrasting images of a fresh-faced Tony Blair 
arriving at Number 10 Downing Street in 1997 and the drained and older 
looking Blair leaving in 2007. New Labour hung on with its new leader, Gordon 
Brown, for three more years until it was ousted from office in 2010.  
 
The main reason why I chose New Labour as my case study is simply because it 
is a topic that interests me. I was 17 when Blair was elected in 1997 and I 
remember vividly watching the campaign on Sky TV with great interest, despite 
being in New Zealand. As an undergraduate student I researched and wrote 
about New Labour at any given opportunity. I wrote essays, from an analysis of 
the third way as a political movement, to comparing New Labour’s first term in 
government with Lionel Jospin’s Socialist Government in France. In 2010 I lived 
                                                          
2
 Jennifer Lees-Marshment (2009), Political Marketing: Principles and Applications, Routledge, Oxon, pp. 110-
111, briefly covers the Product Life-Cycle Model in her book and suggests that the model could be applied to 
politics. 
3
 Lees-Marshment (2009), p.2 
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in London and worked for the Department of Health in Whitehall (across the 
road from Downing Street) during the general election campaign. I fanatically 
followed the election, from the three televised debates to the Browns leaving 
Number 10 at dusk before David Cameron’s arrival hours later. 
 
The other main advantage of using New Labour as a case study is that there is 
plenty of information on the topic. At the time of writing this thesis many key 
players in New Labour have published their autobiographies, including Tony 
Blair and Peter Mandelson. Philip Gould, before his death in 2011, updated his 
1998 book The Unfinished Revolution, which includes a strategic analysis of New 
Labour in government. Political scientists and journalists alike, notable Andrew 
Rawnsley, have also published their works and analysis on New Labour in 
government.  
 
Structure of the thesis  
Chapter one of this thesis is an introduction to political marketing. I examine 
current definitions of political marketing and discuss what political marketing is. 
Then I outline why political marketing has emerged and review current political 
marketing literature.  
 
Chapter two discusses, in detail, the models that is used in this thesis and 
applied to the case study. The main models used are: 
• The product life-cycle model which is a marketing model and is the basis 
of this thesis. This model looks at the life of a product during its life-cycles. 
It has five cycles: ‘product development’, ‘introduction’, ‘growth’, ‘maturity’ 
and decline.  
• Comprehensive political marketing model (CPM) which was developed by 
Jennifer Lees-Marshment, and which argued that political parties and 
candidates can have three types of orientations, ‘product’, ‘sales’ and 
‘market’. 
• The market positioning model developed by Neil Collins and Patrick 
Butler, which argued that a party has different competitive strategies 
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dependant on the position they are in; there are four positions: ‘market 
leader’, ‘challenger’, ‘follower’ and ‘nicher’. 
• Brand narrative and brand agent models developed by Laurence Vincent. 
 
Chapter three is a backgrounder to the New Labour case study. To understand 
why the New Labour product developed the way it did it is important to take a 
look back at the failed Labour products that preceded New Labour. Before Tony 
Blair came to office the Labour Party had experienced 18 years in opposition and 
had lost four elections. Through the 1980s the party was divided and was 
plagued by division and infighting. 
 
Chapter four looks at the ‘product development’ and ‘reintroduction’ part of the 
product life-cycle model. Looking at the product created by the New Labour 
founders in 1994 and how it was introduced to the political market as an 
opposition party and how they gained momentum and support to move to the 
next cycle. 
 
Chapter five examines New Labour during the ‘growth’ part of the product life-
cycle model. This is New Labour’s transition from the opposition to government 
and its early years in office, around 1997 until 2001, its years of political 
ascendency. 
 
Chapter six examines New Labour during the ‘maturity’ part of the product life-
cycle. In this period the New Labour product had been around for some time. 
Support for the party had peaked and was starting to decline. This chapter 
provides evidence that New Labour attempted to reinvent itself during this part 
of the cycle. Can the New Labour experience offer lessons to other political 
parties in the maturity cycle. During this part of the cycle Blair faced much 
controversy during and after the Iraq war. To renew New Labour the party also 
changed leaders from Blair to Gordon Brown. 
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Chapter seven outlines New Labour during the ‘decline’ cycle. At this point 
Labour moved away from the ‘New Labour’ model under the leadership of 
Brown. It eventually moved back into opposition. 
 
I conclude this thesis by discussing whether or not the product life-cycle model 
can be appropriately transferred to political parties. If so, what lessons can it 
offer political parties and how can this research add to current political 
marketing thought. 
6 
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1.  Political Marketing 
Political marketing is a topic that generates much controversy amongst people. 
When telling people that I am writing a thesis on political marketing I would 
often receive lectures on how political marketing has destroyed politics and that 
politics is more about spin and style over substance. However, political 
marketing is much broader than communications, which is the common 
misconception. This chapter outlines definitions and concepts of political 
marketing. The chapter is divided into four parts: 
 
• What is political marketing? I examine current definitions of political 
marketing. 
• Why has political marketing emerged? This section looks at what social 
changes have made political marketing more prominent. 
• The development of political marketing as an academic discipline. This 
section looks at how political marketing emerged as an area of research 
and look at how the research has been developed. 
• Criticisms of political marketing. Finally this section examines the 
common criticisms made about political marketing. 
 
1.1 What is Political Marketing? 
Political marketing is a new discipline that has emerged from the joining of 
political science and marketing. Since the field is still in its infancy academics 
are trying to establish research areas in the subject. Political scientists and 
marketers alike have different perspectives and tend to focus on different aspects 
in political marketing. The American Marketing Association defines marketing 
as, ‘the process of planning and executing the conception, pricing, promotion and 
distribution of ideas, goods and services to create exchanges that satisfy 
individual and organisational objectives.’4  . 
 
                                                          
4Quoted from Margaret Scammell (1999), ‘Political Marketing: Lessons for Political Science,’ Political Studies, 
vol.47, p.725 
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Currently there is no uniform definition of political marketing. Lees-Marshment 
stated that, ‘political marketing is about political parties adapting business 
concepts and techniques to help them achieve their goals.’5 Scammell observed 
that since the research area is so new there are many different labels for political 
marketing, rightly or wrongly. It has also been called ‘political management’, 
‘packaged politics’, ‘promotional politics’ or more broadly ‘modern political 
communications.’6 
 
The central focus of any political marketing definition should focus on the 
marketing concept. The marketing concept stresses a consumer-oriented 
approach to marketing where ‘the customer [is] at the beginning rather than the 
end of the production-consumption cycle.’7 In political terms, appealing to the 
voter should begin at the start of the political process rather than later on. For 
example, a political party, when developing its policies should be considering the 
views of the voter at the very beginning rather than creating a policy programme 
and then asking the voters for its approval at an election.  
 
Scammell stated that the ‘marketing concept’ is the key to understanding 
political marketing; ‘Without it, we are still talking about essentially a modern 
form of propaganda [when relating political communications to politics]. With it, 
we are dealing with a transformation of political organizations and fundamental 
relationships between leaders, parties, members and voters.’8 Political marketing 
is about placing the voter at the beginning of the political cycle, using marketing 
tools to determine the needs and expectations of the voter, and attempting to 
deliver these goals. Other aspects of political marketing such as political 
communications and management, even though they are valid, are subsets of 
political marketing.  
 
                                                          
5
 Jennifer Lees-Marshment (2001a), Political Marketing and British Political Parties: The party’s just begun, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester, p.22 
6
 Scammell (1999), p.718 
7
 Quoted from Scammell (1999), p.725 
8
 Scammell (1999), p.726 
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Because marketing and politics are different in many ways, simply applying a 
marketing model to politics without considerable adaptation may not work. Lees-
Marshment described political marketing as a ‘marriage’ between politics and 
marketing; it ‘is created by applying marketing concepts from business to 
politics, but not by simply imposing one over the other.’9 
 
1.2 Why has political marketing emerged? 
This change towards voter-centred politics has coincided with social changes in 
the later part of the twentieth century. This section covers: 
 
• Voters becoming political consumers. 
• Changes to political parties. 
 
Political consumers 
People have become more like consumers when making their political choices. As 
Lees-Marshment stated, political consumers are not only concerned about whom 
to vote for but they also have a different attitude towards politicians, they want 
to be more involved and consulted, question authority and they scrutinise 
outcomes.10 
 
Scammell argued that citizenship can now be found in consumptions. As 
consumers we have greater power, ‘we have options in how to spend our hard-
earned cash….We are better informed shoppers than ever before. Consumer 
rights and interest groups and their advice are now daily in our mainstream 
mass media.’11 The Body Shop founder Anita Roddick has also commented on the 
importance of the consumer to force political change: 
 
Business has overtaken politics as the primary shaping force in 
society, which means consumers are voting every time they flex 
                                                          
9
 Lees Marshment (2009), p.26 
10
 Lees-Marshment (2009), p.9 
11
 Margaret Scammell (2000), ‘The Internet and Civic Engagement: The Age of the Citizen-Consumer,’ 
Political Communication, vol.17,  p.351 
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their spending muscle, and that in turn makes the vigilance 
consumer into a powerful consumer, capable, as we have seen, of 
humbling even the likes of Shell and Monsanto.12 
 
Lees-Marshment identified five effects of consumerism on politics: 
 
1. Voters want a more tangible, rather than a rhetorical, product: 
hence the rise of pledge cards or contracts between the 
government and the people. 
2. Voters want more evident and instant delivery. 
3. Voters prefer achievement to aspiration, and pragmatic 
effectiveness to moral principal. 
4. Parties and politicians need to convey their governing capability. 
5. Political promises need to be costed and realistic.13 
 
Changes in political parties 
At the centre of democracies are political parties. In a parliamentary system 
parties are organisations that seek representation in parliament; they also 
compete with other parties for public office. Parties are made of individuals who 
broadly share a common view on policies and ideology. Traditionally, the role of a 
party is to simplify choices for the electorate; since different parties offer 
different policy programmes and visions to the electorate, voters choose the set of 
policies they favour by voting for a certain party.  
 
Parties also historically informed and educated citizens by providing them with 
information on policies. This role has been taken over by the media, who now 
acts as an intermediary between parties and the electorate. In recent years the 
increased availability of information through the internet has allowed voters to 
bypass the media and go directly to the party’s website for information. Parties 
also mobilise the electorate to participate in the democratic process through 
                                                          
12
 Quoted from Scammell (2000) p. 351 
13
 Lees-Marshment (2009), p.10 
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election campaigns. Parties recruit leaders and provide training for future 
leaders. Parties determine who forms the government and once in office they can 
implement their policy objectives. 
 
Even though the goals and functions of political parties have remained the same 
for generations, the organisation itself has transformed throughout the 
twentieth century. At the beginning of the twentieth century parties were old 
boys’ network that essentially represented the interest of the rich and middle 
classes. The larger working classes were disenfranchised. However, in the early 
twentieth century this changed with the introduction of universal suffrage. 
 
The Mass Party 
The mass party model was devised by Duverger in 1954; it observed that 
political parties had emerged to represent different classes in society. Originally, 
the mass party was dominated by the newly enfranchised masses who had 
recently been allowed to participate in the political system. A party’s mass 
membership legitimised a party’s policy programme. A mass membership gave 
the party a source of funds as well as an army of volunteers to participate in 
election campaigns. 
 
Due to the large working class base the mass party was originally a product of 
the left, but parties of the centre-right such as the British Conservative Party 
and the New Zealand National Party began to adopt a mass party appearance. 
The National Party, at its peak in the 1940s and 1950s, had 300,000 members, 
making it, per capita, the most successful mass party in the western world. The 
New Zealand Labour Party had 200,000 members, which meant that nearly one 
in three voters were members of political parties.14 The mass party was 
ideological in character and tried to advance the demands of the class group it 
represented rather than what the whole nation wanted. 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Raymond Miller (2005), Party Politics in New Zealand, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.73-74 
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The Catch-All Party 
In 1966, Otto Kirchheimer observed the rise of the catch-all party in the post-
World War II decades. After the war, strong ideological leanings were declining 
and parties responded by downplaying ideology.15 Parties changed their focus by 
trying to ‘catch’ the support of as many groups in society as possible.16  
 
To become a catch-all party it needs to; (i) drastically reduce its ideological 
baggage.17 This frees the party from ideological constraints and gives it more 
flexibility in policy making; (ii) strengthen the leadership positions while 
reducing the role of the individual party member.18 Party members ‘may obscure 
the newly built-up catch-all party image;’19 (iii) de-emphasis the party’s special 
relationship with certain classes or groups and instead appeal to voters from the 
electorate at large,20 and; (iv) secure the support of a variety of interest groups 
for financial benefit.21 
 
Kirchheimer understood that voters were now ‘consumer-goods oriented’ and the 
old politics that talked of drastic political changes was out of fashion.22 He wrote 
that for parties to maximise their vote on election day: 
 
the catch-all party must have entered into millions of minds as a 
familiar object fulfilling in politics a role analogous to that of a 
major brand in marketing of a universally needed and highly 
standardized article of mass consumption….There is need for 
enough brand differentiation to make the article plainly 
recognizable, but the degree of differentiation must never be so 
                                                          
15
 Otto Kirchheimer (1966), ‘The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems’, in J. LaPalombara & 
M.Weiner (eds.) Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton University Press, New Jersey p.184 
16
 Kirchheimer, p.186 
17
 Kirchheimer, p.190 
18
 Kirchheimer, p.190 
19
 Kirchheimer, p.190 
20
 Kirchheimer, p.190 
21
 Kirchheimer, pp.190-191 
22
 Kirchheimer, p.191 
13 
 
great as to make the potential consumer fear he will be out on a 
limb.23 
 
Kirchheimer noted that the main problem for a catch-all party is that party 
loyalty is fickle, any event or factor could change voters’ minds like a television 
event or a speech.24 In 1988, Panebianco added to the catch-all party model by 
proposing an electoral-professional party. Panebianco accepted Kirchheimer’s 
model of the ‘catch-all’ party but he criticised Kirchheimer for not giving 
adequate attention to the increase of profesionalisation within party 
organisations.25 He stated that an electoral-professional party has professionals 
running the party at the centre.26 The party has weak ties to the grassroots 
members in order to catch as many voters as possible.27 This party is funded 
though the public and interest groups.28 The party focuses on issues and 
leadership instead of ideology as with the mass party.29 
 
Market-Oriented Party 
A market-oriented party is the next step in the development of political parties. 
The market-oriented party has the same features of the catch-all party, for 
example the party is centralised and appeals to the centre. The market-oriented 
party goes one step further where it uses marketing techniques to find out what 
the voters wants. The key difference with this type of party is that the 
voter/political consumer is now placed at the beginning of the design process. 
The party shows ‘this in the way they behave – or in the political product they 
design, offer and implement, in order to ensure the product satisfies market 
demands in order to achieve the desired goals.’30 I go into further detail about 
the market-oriented party in Chapter two. 
 
                                                          
23
 Kirchheimer, p.192 
24
 Kirchheimer, p.193 
25
 Angelo Panebianco (1988), Political Parties: Organization and Power, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p.264 
26
 Panebianco, p.264 
27
 Panebianco, p.264 
28
 Panebianco, p.264 
29
 Panebianco, p.264 
30
 Lees-Marshment (2009), p.41 
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1.3 The Evolution of Political Marketing as an Academic Discipline 
Originally political science and marketing were two separate academic 
disciplines that had very little in common. Marketing is part of management 
science, which tends to focus on the goals, the organisation and the techniques of 
commercial businesses.31 Political science looks at areas such as party 
development, the structure of parties as well as elections, interest groups, 
government structures, leadership, political theory, etc. 
 
In 1969 the idea that political science and marketing could come together as a 
sub-discipline was suggested, but not developed for some time afterwards. Kotler 
and Levy published an article suggesting that marketing could be applied to non-
profit organisations.32 This caused controversy among management scientists, 
some argued that such ‘a combined semantic and territorial expansion may 
threaten the conceptual integrity of marketing, add to the confusion in 
terminology, and widen the gulf between marketing theory and practice.’33 
However, during the 1970s marketing scientists starting developing theories and 
frameworks in which marketing could be applied to non-profit organisations.34 
Political scientists then attempted to apply marketing concepts to political 
communications, which had it flaws because ‘it focuses on political 
communication: on how politicians sell themselves, not how they behave; [and] it 
does not use marketing theory.’35 
 
In 1999, Scammell reviewed political marketing literature and concluded that 
studies on political marketing could be divided into three categories: Campaign 
studies, political communication and marketing management.36 Campaign 
studies are an area dominated by political scientists, focusing on electioneering 
and how campaigns have moved away from being labour-intensive and amateur 
                                                          
31
 Lees-Marshment (2001a), p.2 
32
 Lees-Marshment (2001a), p.3 
33
 Quoted from Lees-Marshment (2001a), p.3 
34
 Lees-Marshment (2001a), p.3 
35
 Lees-Marshment (2001a), p.4 
36
 Scammell (1999), pp. 719-723 
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exercises to a capital-intensive and professional operation.37 It is agreed that 
campaigns have been influenced by marketing and public relations consultants 
as well as advertising agencies, but criticisms about campaign studies stress that 
no theoretical framework has been devised to understand the effect of the 
campaign process.38 
 
Political communications is another research area dominated by political 
scientists who investigate the effects of the media on civic engagement. In recent 
years the media has become a major influence in the lives of citizens; political 
organisations have attempted to adapt to this by changing, by focusing on media 
as an avenue to get their message out. This area of research focuses on political 
advertising as well as image creation.39 Political communications is important 
because it examines the transformation of the media from a minor political role 
to the major player in campaigning.40 Scammell noted that political 
communications is primary concerned about a ‘media effect’ on the political 
process.41 Both campaign studies and political communications treat political 
marketing as one part of a much broader process.42 
 
Marketing management is an area of research dominated by management and 
marketing scientists.’43 Here the emphasis is shifted from ‘techniques of 
promotion to the overall strategic objectives of the party/organization.’44 
Marketing management is primarily concerned with marketing strategies in 
order to understanding the political market.45 Marketing management sees 
political communications as just one part of political marketing.46 
 
                                                          
37
 Scammell (1999), pp.719-720 
38
 Scammell (1999), p.720 
39
 Scammell (1999), pp. 721-722 
40
 Scammell (1999), p.721 
41
 Scammell (1999), p.722 
42
 Scammell (1999), p.720 
43
 Scammell (1999), p.722 
44
 Scammell (1999), p.723 
45
 Scammell (1999), p.723 
46
 Scammell (1999), p.723 
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These areas of political marketing, campaign studies and political 
communications, which focused on empirical research, failed to produce proper 
academic frameworks. They also overlooked the marketing concept in their 
analysis. Lees-Marshment took political marketing to a new level of theoretical 
abstraction; in her analysis she saw the short comings of the above areas of 
political marketing and developed a comprehensive political marketing model.47 
This model brings marketing and political science literature together in one 
theoretical framework.48 Chapter two provides further detail of the 
comprehensive political marketing model. 
 
1.4 Criticism of Political Marketing 
Many academics and commentators are still sceptical about political marketing 
as an area of study; Hennneberg observed that political marketing is ‘under an 
obligation to justify itself and to defend itself against criticism of its research 
ethos, i.e. the use of marketing concepts and instruments in the political 
sphere.’49 He also noted that ‘research on political marketing is sometimes 
condemned per se purely due to its link with political marketing practice that is 
seen as harmful to our democratic party political systems.’50 The section below 
explains why political marketing is an important area of research. 
 
Political Marketing is all about spin 
In his 2004 article, Henneberg evaluated the common criticisms that 
commentators and academics have made about political marketing. He observed 
that academics and commentators alike argue that ‘political marketing has 
transformed politics into being obsessed with ‘spin’ and ‘packaging.’’51 This is a 
common criticism about political marketing; critics have accused it of being 
primarily concerned with image creation and the maintenance of that image. The 
consequence of this is a hollowed-out party/candidate who is all style with no 
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content. It is true that there has been an increase of consultants within 
governments and political parties, but this is a reaction to the 24 hour seven 
days a week media environment. 
 
Henneberg observed that in the electoral market parties/candidates offer a 
programme to voters; voters vote for the party/candidate that they prefer and 
they then gain political office; if they fail to deliver that programme voter 
dissatisfaction occurs and voters will then change their behaviour by not 
participating in the electoral market or by supporting another party/candidate.52 
Henneberg argued that it is naïve to assume that the electorate is ignorant 
enough to ignore broken promises because sophisticated marketing tools have 
‘tricked’ them into forgetting its record.53 Political marketing techniques, which 
are still unsophisticated, should not ‘have a much stronger influence on 
behaviour and attitudes than (extremely sophisticated and optimised) 
commercial marketing.’54 
 
This criticism argued that packaging is a central feature of political marketing. 
Indeed, image does play an important role in the political communications side of 
political marketing as Scammell observed: 
 
Parties/candidates…must attend to political image if they want 
to be serious players in the political market. This is not an 
optional extra, nor simply a response to media power nor an 
effect of American influence; it is a strategic imperative of the 
political market. Reputation, based on record and credible 
promises, it the only thing of substance that a party can promote 
to potential voters. Thus, the marketing perspective not only 
explains the apparent political obsession with image, it more 
clearly locates the significance of the media. In this view of 
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promotion and image-building do and must respond to the 
specifics of media systems and reporting styles.55 
 
As mentioned above, if the package does have substance to it, it simply would not 
succeed in the long term. Political image created though rhetoric and style is 
nothing new. Rhetoric and oratory has been a feature of political life from 
ancient Greece through to the modern era. Even Machiavelli stressed the 
importance of having the right style and image (even though he does advocate 
style over substance): 
 
A prince, therefore, need not necessarily have all the good 
qualities I mentioned…but he should certainly appear to have 
them. I would even go so far as to say that if he has these 
qualities and always behaves accordingly he will find them 
harmful; if he only appears to have them they will render him 
service.56 
 
Political packaging through image and rhetoric is a historical and modern reality 
of politics; political marketing did not create this. 
 
Henneberg’s statement also accused political marketing of being obsessed with 
‘spin’ the accusation that candidates and parties manipulate the media by 
moulding their messages through an emphasis on the positive, regardless of how 
good or bad the situation is. Political parties and other political institutions face 
a different media environment to that of commercial businesses. O’Shaughnessy 
argued that ultimately the media is more powerful, ‘with their own agendas of 
information manufacture the media are often more influential on public opinion 
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than political advertising and other communications techniques of commercial 
derivation.’57  
 
In contrast, according to O’Shaughnessy, spin is a stranger to commercial 
marketing, ‘it is comparatively rare that a business will need the arts of ‘spin’ in 
communicating with its public.’58 Therefore, spin is not a concept that marketing 
has given to politics, it is rather, a political reaction to the more hostile media. 
 
This criticism can be taken a step further where people do not distinguish the 
difference between political marketing and political propaganda. O’Shaughnessy 
stated that: ‘Propaganda is not synonymous with persuasion and is a distinctive 
branch or high-pressure advocacy.’59 It ‘simplifies and exaggerates; it often is 
propelled by a clear, purposive, and coherent ideology. Idealism, even 
utopianism, may motivate its sponsors and often may characterize its imagery.’60 
 
O’Shaughnessy argued that there are some minor similarities between 
marketing and propaganda, but these two are extremes of a continuum.61 Both 
marketing and propaganda focus on ‘the presentation of utopian vistas or ideal 
types to satisfy the aspirations of reference groups.’62 But O’Shaughnessy’s main 
argument in his 1999 article is that the term political marketing in too narrow to 
look at this area. He argued that the term ‘political marketing-propaganda’ 
maybe a more useful term when focusing on this area of political marketing.63 In 
commercial marketing situations there are few cases where negative advertising 
on similar to negative political advertising would take place, political advertising 
can place an ‘emphasis on polarities, vilifications of enemies, and value conflicts, 
coupled with its need to create and sustain social discontent, [it] has 
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recognizably far more in common with war propaganda than the selling of a 
product or service.’64 
 
O’Shaughnessy observed that political marketing and political propaganda is 
different because political marketing ‘replicate[s] most of the processes involved 
in consumer research, market research, advertising, personal selling, product 
management and so on – and this would make it an almost exclusively post – 
second world war phenomenon.’65 Political propaganda does not place the citizen 
first; rather political propaganda is designed to manipulate and shape citizens 
opinions by using emotive and nationalistic language. At the Nuremberg trials, 
Hermann Goering remarked that:  
 
people don’t want to go to war….But, after all, it’s the leader of 
the country who determines the policy and it’s always a simple 
matter to drag the people along whether it’s a democracy or a 
fascist dictatorship….Voice or no voice, the people can always be 
brought to do the bidding of the leaders. This is easy. All you 
have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the 
pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to 
greater danger. It works the same in any country.66  
 
Goering’s remarks illustrated the stark difference between political propaganda 
and political marketing. Goering talked about the leadership making the choices, 
then using manipulation to get the citizenry on board. Political marketing is 
centred on the marketing concept where the citizenry is consulted first in every 
step of the process.  
 
Politics is above marketing 
Another anti-political marketing comment made by Henneberg stated that: 
‘parties and politicians that use political marketing are using the wrong 
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reference/mindsets. Politics is essentially not about ‘selling’ but about something 
completely different.’67 This criticism argued that one cannot equate electoral 
politics to selling soap power, for example, and that politics is a process that is 
different.68 Even though political parties have few similarities to normal 
consumer products, like televisions and iPhones, there are similarities between 
the promotion of parties and service marketing. Scammell outlines the 
similarities between a service and a political party: 
 
the product is often intangible, complex and not fully understood 
by its customers….The buyer cannot physically see the product 
ahead of purchase, which in marketing terms means a relatively 
high uncertainty factor. Therefore s/he is heavily dependent on 
information, and depending on the cost/significance of the 
purchase, likely to seek out trusted information sources such as 
consumer watchdog media and persona recommendations from 
friends and colleagues.69 
 
Service marketing is about building a relationship of trust and loyalty with 
consumers as well as selling a service. As a result political parties can and have 
found value in applying these concepts to politics because ultimately the aim of a 
political party is to build a long-term relationship with voters. 
 
Since there are similarities between service marketing and political parties, 
what are the differences? In their analysis Lock and Harris have identified seven 
reasons why political marketing differs to conventional service and product 
marketing: 
 
(1) The majority of voters cast their votes on election day. There is 
no equivalent purchasing decision in which consumers all have 
to make their purchase in one day. 
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(2) The price of voting for one party is constant, while the price of 
purchasing varies depending on other factors. Every voter is 
entitled to one vote and one vote only, while in the consumer 
market price or purchasing is dependent on budget constraints 
and availability. 
(3) The voter has to live with the collective decision of the 
electorate, regardless of who they voted for. 
(4) In First Past the Post countries such as the UK, the winner 
takes everything, whether or not it is a local constituency of 
government. The market is fairer, in which companies still 
retain a market share. [When applied to proportional systems 
like New Zealand the electoral market is fairer and produces a 
proportional result; even though parties do have to cross a 
threshold of five per cent of the party vote or win one electoral 
seat to gain representation.] 
(5) A political party or a candidate is a ‘complex and intangible 
product that the voter cannot be unbundled.’ Even though in 
service marketing the product is also complex, the consumer 
can change their minds about the performance of the service 
provider at a cost, while voters have to wait until the next 
election. 
(6) It is harder for new parties to enter the party system then it is 
for a new product to enter the market. 
(7) In marketing the brand or market leader constantly stays in 
front (if you consider sales an indicator of support), while in 
politics the governments support tends to fluctuate during its 
term in office.70 
 
Service marketing and political parties have similar goals, and it is fair to argue 
that politics is about selling/promoting a service to the electorate.  
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In recent years academics have started building theoretical frameworks for 
political marketing. Jennifer Lees-Marshment has developed a theoretical 
framework called ‘comprehensive political marketing’, which applies both 
marketing and political ideas to parties, and moves beyond political 
communications by looking at how marketing influences the whole party as an 
organisation.71 In The Idea of Political Marketing, contributors theorised 
different models on how marketed parties compete with each other, how they 
interact with the political market, and why such models emerged.72 After 
establishing why political marketing is an inherently worthy topic to study, the 
next chapter turns to the product life-cycle model and how it can be adapted for 
political parties. 
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2. The Product Life-Cycle Model 
Political parties have difficulties renewing themselves in office, especially after a 
long period of time in government. Eventually voters get bored or frustrated with 
a government and replace them with another party. There are numerous 
governments that failed to renew themselves, for example in New Zealand the 
Labour Government of Helen Clark, which was popular in its early days, failed 
to successfully regenerate itself and was removed. The preceding National 
Government of Jim Bolger and Jenny Shipley also failed to successfully 
regenerate despite changing its leader two years before the 1999 general 
election. 
 
I use political marketing models and concepts and integrate them into the 
natural product life-cycle model of growth and decay. I adapt this model into a 
model that looks at the long term impact of political marketing on a party. I 
focus on these key questions: 
 
• Can a market orientation be sustained during long periods in government?  
• Can an adapted product life-cycle model be adapted to political parties? 
• Does this model tell us anything new? 
• What is the role of a party leader in this model? 
 
Much of the literature about political marketing focuses on how marketing tools 
and marketing communication tools have been used to get a party elected to 
government or increase support. Even though these studies have added value to 
political marketing they only focus on a short period of time and do not have the 
scope of embracing the product life-cycle. For example the comprehensive 
political marketing model looks at a ‘political product’ during a term of office 
which is around three to five years, and then the cycle is repeated. My thesis 
builds on the political marketing models and concepts already developed by other 
academics and marketers. 
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This chapter outlines the product life-cycle model. Secondly, I outline a number 
of political marketing models and concepts which is used in my New Labour case 
study. The models and concepts discussed are: 
 
• Comprehensive political marketing. 
• Marketing positioning. 
• Brand narratives. 
• Brand agents. 
 
Finally, this chapter brings together the essence of these ideas and outline a 
product life-cycle model which incorporates political parties. This proposed model 
is then be tested by my case study to follow.  
 
2.1 The Product Life-Cycle Model 
When a product is launched, marketing managers know that their product will 
not sell forever and successful products go through a life-cycle that consists of 
five stages: product development, introduction, growth, maturity and decline. A 
successful political party or political ‘product’, generally speaking, goes through 
similar stages, being introduced and gaining support, becoming the opposition, 
becoming government, losing support in government and returning to opposition. 
 
Kotler and Armstrong described these cycles in greater detail: 
 
Product development begins when the company finds and 
develops a new-product idea. During production development, 
sales are zero, and the company’s investment costs mount. 
 
Introduction is a period of slow sales growth as the product is 
introduced in the market. Profits are non-existent in this stage 
because of heavy expenses of product introduction.  
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Growth is a period of rapid market acceptance and increased 
profits. 
 
Maturity is a period of slowdown in sales growth because the 
product has achieved acceptance by most potential buyers. 
Profits level off or decline because of increased marketing 
outlays to defend the product against competition. 
 
Decline is the period when sales fall off and profits drop. 73 
 
This model is illustrated below: 
 
Figure 2.1 The Product Life-Cycle 
 
Source: Kotler and Armstrong (2012) 
Kotler and Armstrong observed that not all products follow the above cycles 
equally.74 Some products are introduced then decline; others may mature for a 
long time. 
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The product life-cycle model can be related to a political party by assuming that 
the ‘product’ is a political party. A political party develops when a community 
with common ideals come together and they have another view to offer the 
political market. At first its ‘sales’ or support is very low. For instance the 
British Labour Party was formed by groups like trade unions and the Fabian 
Society. It had low support in the 1900 general election where it stood just 15 
candidates and won only two seats. In 1906 the party stood 50 candidates and 
won 29 seats. The ‘cost’ for a new party to break into an established political 
market is high. This fits in with the product development stage and the 
introduction period described by Kotler and Armstrong. The party is developed 
but had a typical slow introduction to the political market. 
 
The growth stage is when the party becomes a serious player. It is the 
‘challenger’ in the political market and eventually gains enough support to 
become the market leader. For example, the New Zealand Labour Party became 
a serious player between the 1931 and 1935 elections, picking up support from 
the governing coalition during the depression. Labour won government in 1935 
with 53 seats compared to 24 seats from the previous election. Labour’s growth 
into suburban and provincial New Zealand enabled it to become the ‘market 
leader.’ 
 
The maturity stage is the market leader in government. A party has gained 
enough support or ‘profit and market acceptance’ to govern and deliver its 
programme and policies. It continues to build its relationship with political 
consumers by delivering on promises it could not deliver in earlier stages. 
However, the market leader faces the realities of being in government. Its 
relationship with the political consumer is in ‘competition’ with other players, 
domestic as well as foreign governments, or in response to unforseen events like 
an economic downturn or disaster. Support for the market leader becomes static 
and eventually declines. In the maturity stage the product should be thinking 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
74
 Kotler and Armstrong (2012), p.273 
29 
 
about rejuvenation, to stay fresh it should introduce new features, in politics this 
could include introducing a new leader, a major cabinet reshuffle or a new policy 
direction. 
 
The decline stage is when a market leader loses its position and is overtaken by 
the challenger. This is the period when it is certain that the market leader is 
about to leave government. Its decline may continue further while in opposition 
and electoral rules may influence the degree or magnitude of its decline (for 
example, First Past the Post vs Mixed Member Proportional). 
 
At this point a political party may be rejuvenated by being reintroduced into the 
introduction cycle, or by going through another growth period, which is the 
common occurrence in systems like Australia, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom. For example the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom lost office 
in 1997 in a landslide, it stayed in the wilderness for two more elections before it 
regained its position as market leader at the 2010 election. Or a party may face a 
sharp decline and death, such as the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada 
which was booted out of office in 1993 after it went from 169 seats to two, before 
being dissolved in 2003. 
 
2.2 Comprehensive Political Marketing 
By merging political science and marketing theories, Lees-Marshment developed 
a framework she calls, Comprehensive Political Marketing (CPM). This 
framework is useful because: 
 
1. CPM views marketing as more than simply political 
communications. 
2. CPM applied marketing to the whole behaviour of a 
political organisation. 
3. CPM uses marketing concepts, not just techniques: the 
product, sales and marketing orientation as well as 
market intelligence, product design and promotion. 
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4. CPM integrates political science literature into the 
analysis. 
5. CPM adapts marketing theory to suit the differing nature 
of politics.75 
 
CPM is focused around three types of political organisations derived from 
business organisations. In the business world an organisation may be classified 
as one of the following: product-orientated business, which is where a business 
designs a product and believes that the strength of that product will sell itself.76 
A sales-oriented business has the same attitude about the design of the product, 
but it uses marketing techniques such as advertising to draw people towards 
that product.77 A market-oriented business uses market research to design the 
product, and like the Sales-Oriented Business, it uses marketing to promote the 
product to consumers.78 Lees-Marshment applied this frame work to political 
parties and theorised about three types of party: the product-oriented party, the 
sales-oriented party and the market-oriented party. 
 
The Product-Oriented Party (POP) 
The product-oriented party, like its business counterpart, is primarily focused on 
its product. It believes that the strength of its product will sell itself and will not 
be altered to gain electoral support.79 The party develops its policies and 
programmes on its own accord. This is a traditional approach made by political 
parties where they develop a party product that is based on ideological 
convictions and principals, rather than finding out what the electorates wants 
through market research. For example, a party like the Green Party would 
develop its product on its beliefs about environmentalism; they trust that the 
electorate, sharing their concerns, sees the merit of their product for what it is. 
The British Labour Party historically took this approach, relying on the voters of 
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its traditional coalition of the working class and trade unions at a time when 
these two groups were well represented in British society. Lees-Marshment 
described the British Labour Party’s 1983 campaign as the most recent example 
of the party using a product oriented campaign where the leader, Michael Foot, 
was more concerned about party unity than reflecting voter opinion.80 
 
The Sales-Oriented Party (SOP) 
The sales-oriented party is similar to a product oriented party because the 
product is developed by what the party thinks is ideal, but it uses marketing 
techniques like advertising to attract and persuade voters.81 After the party 
determines its own product it then uses market research to test how the 
electorate feels about the party’s product. Market intelligences can be 
determined informally or formally. Informal intelligences involves ‘keeping an 
ear to the ground’; talking to party members; creating policy groups; and holding 
general meeting with the public. Since the party knows how people are going to 
react to the party’s programme they can develop a communications strategy to 
sell and persuade the electoral market. 
 
Lees-Marshment used the example of the British Labour Party under Neil 
Kinnock (1983-1992) as an example of a sales-oriented party. Following the 1983 
election the party adopted a professional image using the red rose as its logo. 
The party conducted qualitative research and centralised its communications.82 
Lees-Marshment concluded that Labour’s version of a sales-orientated party 
failed because the party ‘needed to pay more attention to the product it was 
conveying, and more attention to the desires of the voters that it was seeking to 
govern.’83 
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The Market Oriented Party (MOP) 
This party is different to the other two parties because it used market research 
to develop its product, but like the sales-oriented party it does use marketing 
techniques to communicate its message. According to Lees-Marshment’s 
framework, a market-oriented party:  
 
•  Gains market intelligence from informal sources such as town hall 
meetings and having discussions with party members and voters so they 
can find out what the electorate wants and get a feel of why people may or 
may not vote for them;84 
• Uses formal market intelligence by quantitative sources, such as polling, 
or qualitative sources, such as focus groups, to help reveal voter’s long 
term demands;85 and 
• ‘Design its ‘product’ according to the findings from its market intelligence 
to suit electoral demand.’86 At this stage of the process the party looks at 
changing itself to reflect the findings of its market intelligence, these 
changes can be small changes or dramatic changes, depending on the state 
of the original party. 
 
The product is adjusted in order to suit the party, keeping in mind: 
 
1. Achievability: the party should not promise what it cannot 
deliver in government. 
2. Internal reaction: the party should change the design to 
ensure that it will obtain the support of enough MPs and 
members to ensure its implementation. 
3. Competition: the party should find out the opposition’s 
weakness and highlight its own corresponding strengths. 
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4. Existing/needed support: the party should focus on 
winning the support of voters it does not have but needs 
to win power.87 
 
If the market-oriented party wins office it needs to deliver on its policies. Lees-
Marshment observed that: 
 
Delivery is crucial to the ultimate success of marketing and 
therefore political marketing. In their discussion of business 
organisations, Moynihan and Titley note that production is not 
complete until the good or service reaches the consumer, who is 
likely to want to receive it as quickly as possible and warn that 
an ‘organisation that is unable to satisfy these desires will not 
achieve its aims of expanding market share…There will be no 
repeat sale or customer loyalty from a dissatisfied customer.’ In 
politics, if parties fail to deliver on policy promises, voters 
dissatisfaction is unlikely to decrease. In fact it may increase 
because voters were offered what they wanted but did not 
receive it.88 
 
Out of the three party types, the sales-oriented party and the market-oriented 
party both embrace political marketing. The sales-oriented party only partially 
uses marketing; it uses marketing for promotion, but not for determining the 
product. For a party to fully embrace political marketing, where the market 
concept is at the central place of the party’s campaign and design a party would 
follow the strategies set out for a market-oriented party. Lees-Marshment’s 
market-oriented party model gave a framework which a party follows to develop 
market-orientated policies and reflect the needs and the wants of political 
consumers. She stated that during the product design period that the market-
oriented party should follow the findings of its market intelligence, the party: 
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creates a model product design or picture as to how the party 
would behave if it followed voters’ demands. This means 
changing, where necessary, not just the policy of a party but 
aspects such at its leader (or leadership style), the behaviour of 
the party’s MPs and/or candidates for officer, organisational 
structure and membership rights.89 
 
Lees-Marshment wrote that a common criticism of her model is that parties do 
not have a sole market, sales or product orientation. Instead, ‘parties often adopt 
a hybrid approach, implementing either sales or market-orientation, depending 
on the individual policy area.’90 This criticism can be addressed in a product life-
cycle model, which assumes that parties have different orientations at different 
points in the cycle; during the introduction phase a new political product would 
have a more market oriented approach, as it matures, the market orientation 
may continue but parts of the product may have more of a sales orientation. As 
the party declines it may then even develop a product orientation.  
 
For my version of the product life-cycle model, I apply the concepts of market 
orientation, sales orientation and product orientation to the party’s product 
(policies and party structure) and the party’s promotion (branding).  
 
2.3 Market Positioning 
A party’s position in the political market determines the competitive strategic 
behaviour of that party. According to Collins and Butler there are four positions 
that a party can find themselves in: market leader, challenger, follower and 
nicher, these positions are determined by a party’s market share in the political 
market.91 Collins and Butler pointed out that there are far less participants in 
the political market than in the commercial market.92 
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The Market Leader 
In the business world the market leader is the player with the highest market 
share, companies such as Coca-Cola, Nike and Apple, etc. A player that has the 
position of market leader has three main competitive strategies; to expand the 
market, expand its market share or defend its market share.93 Parties in the 
position of market leader may find it hard to increase the political market, or 
find it difficult to expand its own market share because by virtue of being market 
leader it has already grown a broad voter base.94 But in politics it is vital for the 
market leader to develop strategies to defend its market share; the market 
leader is under consistent attack from other challengers in the market.95 The 
market leader also has to defend itself from attacks from external players like 
interest groups and the media, who are more hostile in the political market than 
they are in the commercial market. 
 
The Challenger 
The challenger is an organisation that aims to replace the market leader, in the 
commercial market there could be several challengers in the market, but in a 
Westminster style political market the challenger is the official opposition party. 
Collins and Butler stated that the challenger ‘is a player that has chosen to 
attempt to depose the leader and has a realistic chance of so doing.’96 The main 
strategy of the challenger is to become the market leader; the challenger 
attempts to take some of the market share away from the market leader, but it 
may also try and take support from others in the market. For example, in the 
2005 New Zealand General Election, National, as the challenger attempted to 
not only take votes away from the market leader Labour, but also took votes 
away from other players such as Act, United Future and New Zealand First. 
 
There are different ways in which the challenger can try and position themselves 
as market leader; they can target the market leader directly, which Butler and 
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Collins argued this is a high-risk strategy but can provided high-payoffs. The 
challenger may adopt the strategies that the market leader had when it became 
market leader itself.  There could be a head-on challenge which occurs when the 
competing products are very similar with each other. The ‘back-door’ strategy is 
when a party ‘may identify issues on the horizon which become important and 
‘brand’ these early.’97 
 
The follower and the nicher are competitive strategies for smaller parties which 
are not relevant for my case study. However, for a complete view of Collins and 
Butler’s model I outline them below: 
 
• The follower occurs in industries where ‘the differentiation possibilities 
are limited’ but the returns are satisfactory for companies to take part in 
this market.98 The follower clones the leader but they make a slight 
variation to the leading product.99 In the political world this situation 
occurs in multi-party systems where smaller parties seek to become a 
suitable partner for the market leader in order to gain some polices and/or 
cabinet positions. 
• The nicher is a type of business/party that attracts only a small amount of 
business/votes through conceptual targeting. They have a high profile, but 
can easily disappear or get overtaken by other businesses or parties.100 
 
In the product life-cycle model a political product may either be a challenger or 
the market leader. During product development, introduction and decline cycles 
the product would most likely be in opposition and a challenger in the political 
market. The growth stage is where the political product gets the momentum to 
become the market leader. The maturity stage is where the political product’s 
support starts declining and it makes the transition from market leader back to 
challenger.  
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Collins’ and Butler’s analysis of the ‘market leader’ and ‘challenger’ is only 
applicable to a broad appealing market-oriented party. A market-oriented party 
would behave differently depending on its current position in the political 
market. Collins and Butler stated that the market positions in the political 
market are defined by the last election and are therefore fixed until the next 
election.101 They argued that even though opinion polls are an important 
reflection of the electorates view, the market positions do not change until an 
election.102 
 
2.4 Branding 
This section looks at the branding of a political product. Lees-Marshment’s 
comprehensive political marketing model focused on the design of the political 
product. Collins and Butler’s model looked at the product’s strategy and 
branding is about the product’s communications. This section examines the 
following areas: 
 
• What is branding and how can it be applied it to politics? 
• What makes a successful brand? 
• Applying branding to the product life-cycle model. 
• Brand narratives / brand agents. 
 
It is important that a political product, whether it is in opposition or in 
government, portrays an image of a competent party that has the ability to 
deliver its policies. In marketing terms a political party has more in common 
with a service than it does with a consumer item. Services are intangible and 
complex, the consumer does not know what they are getting until the service is 
delivered, they are ‘sold on trust – the belief that the supplier will offer future 
satisfaction.’103 Since services are delivered by people the quality of the service 
varies from provider to provider, even if the provider works for the same 
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organisation. Essentially a party is the same; it is intangible, it is voted for on 
voters’ trust about the party’s ability to deliver, and parties need to invest effort 
and use marketing techniques to create a credible image so that voters feel 
confident voting for that party.  
 
Harrop argued that when choosing who to vote for, political consumers ‘venture 
round the political supermarket, settling on the party which provides the most 
items from their shopping list.’104 Political consumers are also concerned about a 
party’s ability to realistically deliver its policies; ‘What most clients want from 
service companies is not policies but results. As long as an investment manager 
produces a good return, who cares what the investment philosophy is?’105 This 
means that political consumers are more interested in having their own concerns 
looked after than a party’s ideology. Branding can be used to reassure political 
consumers that their vote will not be wasted and policies to address their 
concerns can be delivered by a political product.  
 
Branding was developed in the nineteenth century to identify mark ‘property 
and ownership, and identify the origin and content of goods.’106 However, 
recently brands have become more sophisticated with ‘different values, meanings 
and reputations.’107 Moor noted that: ‘Branding has also come to act as the basis 
for the launch of new products and as a focus for consumer identification and 
aspirations, and has been extended outwards from the product into a wider 
range of materials and environments.’108 
 
A brand is not tangible and in some cases it can takes years for a brand to build 
a positive reputation. Branding can also be applied to political products. Lees-
Marshment described branding as being:  
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about how a political organisation or individual is perceived 
overall. It is broader than the product; whereas a product has a 
functional purpose, a brand offers something additional, which is 
more psychological and less tangible. It is concerned with 
impressions, attitudes and recognition. Branding helps the party 
or candidate to help change or maintain reputation and 
support.109 
 
Branding has also been used by governments. Van Ham stated that: 
 
Brand managers offer four arguments why branding is both 
necessary and beneficial for commercial and political actors 
alike: (1) products, services and locations have become so alike 
that they can no longer differentiate themselves by their quality, 
reliability and other basic traits. Branding adds emotion and 
trust to these ‘products’, thereby offering clues that make 
consumers’ choices somewhat easier; (2) this emotional 
relationship between brand and consumer ensures loyalty to the 
brand; (3) by creating an aspirational lifestyle, branding offers a 
kind of Ersatz for ideologies and political programmes that have 
lost their relevance; and (4) the combination of emotions, 
relationships and lifestyles (values) allows a brand to charge a 
price premium for their products, serves and locations, which 
would otherwise hardly be distinguishable from generics.110 
 
Needham added that not only does a political brand need to gain a good 
reputation before it is elected, but once elected the party needs to maintain a 
good relationship with the political consumer in order to reassure the voter that 
they had made the right choice at the last election.111 Needham argued that even 
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though relationship marketing is useful in image creation, branding is a more 
useful concept because it: 
 
combines three elements – internal values, external 
presentation and consumer perception – whereas alternative 
terms such as reputation and image are less encompassing. 
Reputation is a blend of internal values and consumer 
perception, but gives little insight into external presentation. 
Image is a combination of external presentations and consumer 
perception, but does not have a values component….Branding is 
a more robust concept because the elements of effective branding 
can be distilled from commercial literature and utilised in 
political analysis. Branding is relevant to election campaigning, 
but is particularly helpful in understanding efforts to sustain 
relationships and maintain loyalty during the period between 
elections.112 
 
Needham identified six attributes of a successful brand which can be transferred 
to politics113 Brands: 
 
1. simplify information so that the consumer do not have to go through 
detailed product information when making a decision. 
2. are distinctive and different from their competitors, especially in a market 
where there are two similar products. In some cases the product is almost 
identical with the competitor, but the attributes of the brand made it 
unique. 
3. minimises the possible of risk, ‘an effective brand is reassuring, a 
guarantee of standardisation and replicability….Reassurance given by a 
brand is one of the explanations for people’s willingness to pay more for 
branded goods than non-branded’.114 
                                                          
112
 Needham, p.347 
113
 Needham, pp.347-348 
114
 Needham, p.348 
41 
 
4. ‘are aspirational, evoking a particular vision of the ‘good life’ and holding 
out the promise of personal enhancement based on a set of values.’ 
5. represent the values of the product or the company ‘providing clear and 
consistent reasons why consumers should buy that product rather than 
another.’115 
6. ‘are perceived as credible, delivering on their brand promise.’116 
 
Needham applied these attributes to Blair and Clinton and found that their 
brands did attempt to simplify, be unique, reassure, aspire, show values and 
show credibility.117  
 
Applying branding to the product life-cycle model 
Through my research, I have found brand concepts that could be applied to a 
political version of the product life-cycle model. In the first model focuses on the 
brand strategies that a product can use during the product life-cycle. The second 
looks at brand narratives used by a product, which varies between different 
points of the cycle and also identifies the role of brand agents and their 
relationship with the brand. 
 
1. Brand Strategies 
Rajagopal and Sanchez applied the product life-cycle model to their review of 
brand management. Their model is as follows118: 
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Figure 2.2 Brand strategies 
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The above model is a marketing model and ‘pricing’ and ‘distribution’ do not 
easily fit into a political context. However, ‘objectives’, ‘product’ and ‘promotion’ 
can be applied to a political model. As a political product is introduced in the 
political market, its brand is being developed, its goal is to establish itself a 
position in the political market by attracting support and through its 
communication channels it is informing the political market of this. The political 
product at this point already has some support from party members and loyal 
supporters.  
 
When the political product enters into the growth stage, it seeks to expand its 
support, for example to try and take voters away from the market leader. As the 
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product has been in the market place for some time weaknesses should be 
identified. Further information about the product should be provided to voters. 
For example, New Labour expanded its support by targeting policy areas that 
the Conservative Party was considered strong in, such as law and order. The 
brand is re-enforced and weaknesses in the product should be appearing.  
 
During the maturity phase, the goal of the brand is to reposition itself. In 
political terms this would be a government that has been in power for a while. 
The objective in this part of the cycle is to maintain the support that has already 
been built for the political product. However, the product needs to be readjusted 
and those new features need to be communicated. These adjustments should be 
done after market research and could consist of a change in policy direction or 
change in leadership. 
 
During the decline part of the cycle, the product has lost its position as market 
leader and needs to start preparing itself for re-entry in the market. The weak 
features of the product need to be changed. Political parties are large, complex 
organisations, so the decline and successful re-entry from opposition to 
government can take a long time. This phase can unleash tensions within a 
political party, for example it took the British Labour Party 18 years to get back 
into power after its 1979 defeat, likewise, it took the Conservative Party 13 years 
to get back into power after its 1997 defeat. 
 
2. Brand narratives / brand agents 
In his 2002 work, Legendary Brands, Laurence Vincent wrote about how some 
brands become legendary while other brands are just ordinary product brands. 
The difference between these two kinds of brands is that legendary brands use a 
brand mythology which: 
 
uses narrative to convey a worldwide, set of sacred beliefs that 
transcend functional and epistemic product attributes. This 
narrative, which connects the consumer and the brand in a kind 
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of existential bond, is the foundation of the brand’s strength. 
Brand mythology operates in a self-fulfilling cycle that engages 
consumer participation.119 
 
Vincent’s work can be applied to the product life-cycle model. Political products 
use narratives to emphasis the attributes of the product and these narratives 
change during the different stages of the product life-cycle. Vincent’s work on the 
brand agent is an important concept because it deals with the relationship 
between a political brand and a political leader, this relationship changes, at 
some points in the cycle the political brand / leader is stronger while the brand 
agent / leader is weaker and vice versa.  
 
Brand narratives 
As stated above, branding can be applied to a political product, Vincent agreed 
with this statement and he went further by arguing that narratives can be 
attached to political campaigns because ‘political campaigns are stories. They are 
specifically stories about a Legendary Brand – the candidate [or party].’120 He 
further stated that: 
 
Any good political consultant knows that the difference between 
the client and the opposition is often miniscule. It is no surprise 
that the first angle of attack in a political campaign is to build a 
story around the candidate that provokes emotion from the 
constituency121. 
 
Vincent identified the difference between a story and a narrative. A story is in 
chronological order, it has a three-act structure with a situation, complication 
and resolution; the aim of the structure is not to create conflict but resolve that 
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conflict.122 On the other hand, narrative is told by a narrator and ‘adds a point of 
view to the story.’ This means that ‘one story could have multiple narratives, 
each depending on the voice recounting it, and the point of view they select to 
frame the sequence of events. Narrative is the tool of the marketer; story is the 
tool of the reporter.’123 
 
This is similar to psychologist, Howard Gardner who argued that narratives are 
an important dimension in leadership because they: 
 
speak to both parts of the human mind – its reason and emotion.  
And I suggest, further, that it is stories of identities – narratives 
that help individuals think about who they are, where they come 
from, and where they are headed – that constitute the single 
most powerful weapon in the leader’s literary arsenal.124 
 
Gardner added that human beings subconsciously absorb stories, but whether or 
not the story gets embraced by the audience is dependent on the skill of the story 
teller.125  
 
When applying brand narratives to political marketing a market-oriented party 
and sales-oriented party should use market research to develop narratives that 
interest and present the political consumers beliefs, and then attempt to reflect 
that narrative back to the political consumer, or, as Vincent stated: ‘You need to 
listen to your brand audience through consumer research. Most importantly, you 
must nurture the culture around your narrative.’126 Vincent further stated that 
narrative can be important, especially when the consumer / voter is included in 
that narrative: 
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Arguably, the most important character in your brand narrative 
is the consumer. Consumers populate the landscape of your 
brand narrative, but they also integrate your brand as a 
character or element within their personal narrative, or life 
movie. A symbiotic relationship exists that requires your 
understanding because it is a relationship that will be integral 
to your marketing planning.127 
 
Below, I outline Vincent’s example of Bill Clinton’s use of narrative. First explain 
what a brand agent is. 
 
Brand agents 
Vincent stated that brand agents can also be used to reinforce sacred beliefs and 
the brand’s narrative. A brand agent can be a ‘person, place or thing’.128 A 
human brand agent can either be the company’s founder and/or CEO, celebrities, 
spokespeople or fictional characters.129 ‘Republican and Democrat are Legendary 
Brands. Candidates are brand agents. And political parties are brand cultures of 
conflicting, organized social philosophies – or sacred beliefs. Campaigns are story 
arcs and thematic devices that execute on the narrative foundation.’130 
 
Party leaders have many similarities to a company’s founder or CEO, ‘these 
individuals’ objectives are most aligned with the objectives of the brand. The 
brand’s success is their fortune. They also provide the brand with authenticity 
that resonates with consumers.’131 A party leader is also tied to the success or 
failure of the party; if the party fails to get into power then the party leader will 
have no real political power. 
 
Vincent’s work about the role of brand agents and how they work with a brand is 
useful for my New Labour case study. When looking at the brand of a political 
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party it can be difficult to work out how the party leader fits into the brand. 
Party leaders can also be considered as a brand on their own, for example, 
Needham’s 2005 article looks at Bill Clinton and Tony Blair as ‘brand leaders’ 
and in the case of Blair she focuses more on the leaders rather than the dynamic 
with the party.132 Also, in a parliamentary case the leader is the primary brand 
agent but other cabinet ministers, members of parliament and other party 
officials are also brand agents. An MP or a candidate is the party’s brand agent 
for an electorate for example.  
 
Vincent uses Clinton as an example of a politician who used a brand narrative 
successfully to be elected president in 1992 but failed to transfer this to office 
once elected. The Clinton brand narrative was described by Vincent as a ‘hero’s 
journey.’133 Clinton came from a poor upbringing in Arkansas, he met President 
John F. Kennedy at the White House as a 16 year old then went to Georgetown, 
Yale and Oxford before entering public service.  
 
Fundamentally, the Clinton campaign was such a success 
because of the same factors that make Legendary Brands a 
success: a set of sacred beliefs that resonate strongly with 
consumers, linked inextricably to an inspirational brand agent. 
Bill Clinton did not just stand for a worldview. He was the world 
view.134 
 
Clinton was the primary brand agent in this campaign; however, he was not the 
only agent. Clinton’s running mate Al Gore cancelled out some of his flaws as a 
candidate, Gore was the son of a respected senator, he was analytical while 
Clinton was inspiring.135 
 
Vincent identified three successful brand narratives that the Clinton campaign 
used in the 1992. Firstly, Clinton was an ordinary American who worked hard 
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and will bring hope to the nation. Secondly, the Clinton presidency brought a 
generational change to the presidency; Clinton was the first baby boomer 
president. Thirdly, Clinton had a partnership with Gore, and also Hillary 
Clinton. This team of smart people were going to Washington to represent the 
peoples’ interest. The Clinton campaign succeeded because: 
 
Sacred beliefs, brand agent, brand narrative were all there, 
supported by the patriotic symbols and cultural attributes that 
accompany a presidential campaign. We could construct the road 
to the White House in a three-act form, or according to the hero’s 
journey. It was a campaign filled with dramatic conflict, each 
one more challenging to the hero, and each one propelling him 
forward. It communicated a narrative that supported the 
personal identity of millions of Americans. Finally, it contained 
themes that were not only inspirational, but highly relevant.136 
 
However, once taking office, the President move away ‘from the sacred beliefs 
that gave his campaign its brand foundation.’137 The brand agent moved away 
from the New Democrat brand that Clinton established in the 1992 campaign. In 
1994 the Republicans followed the techniques used by Clinton in 1994 with its 
‘Contract with America.’ Newt Gingrich and Dick Armey were the brand agents 
and were able to successfully win control of Congress in the mid-term elections.  
 
During the introduction and growth stages Clinton was a strong brand agent 
who represented the brand’s values. However, in the later parts of the growth 
cycle, there was a disconnection between Clinton (the brand agent) and Clinton’s 
New Democrat brand. The brand narrative was well communicated but was not 
being delivered and maybe rejuvenation was required.  
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Vincent’s Legendary Brand work can be applied to the product life-cycle. There is 
relationship between a brand and a brand agent and at some points the brand 
agent is stronger than the brand and vice versa.  
 
Figure 2.3 Brand Narratives138 
 
 
As illustrated in figure 2.3 above, the strength of the brand and of the brand 
agent does change. The product life-cycle model suggests that this relationship 
changes. At some points in the cycle, both the brand agent and the brand itself 
are strong; at other points they can be week. I test this in my New Labour case 
study. When for example, New Labour first entered office the brand agent was 
stronger than the actual party but the brand agent eventually became a liability 
to the brand.  
 
Kirchheimer and Harrop warned that the leader (brand agent) becoming big or 
bigger than the brand itself is unfavourable. Kirchheimer argued that the leader 
should provide enough ‘brand differentiation to make the article plainly 
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recognizable, but the degree of differentiation must never be so great as to make 
the potential customer fear he will be out on a limb.’139 As Harrop warns: 
 
Yet at the same time the party must avoid becoming identified 
with its current leader. What passengers want from British 
Airways is not just that the pilot of this particular flight should 
be competent but a conviction of the airline’s other pilots would 
have been equally competent had they been crewed for the 
journey. Similarly with parties, leaders come and go; therefore a 
reputation for leadership matters as much as the quality of the 
team.140 
 
2.5 A Product Life-Cycle Approach to Politics 
In the above sections I outlined the models and concepts that I use in developing 
a product life-cycle model for a political party. The original model as outlined by 
Kotler and Armstrong is a simple model but to be applied to politics some 
adjustments need to be made. 
 
For this thesis, I apply the produce life-cycle model to a party parliamentary 
democracy. Further research is needed to determine whether or not this model 
can be applied to a candidate-based model with term limits, like the United 
States of America. In a parliamentary democracy a party could be in power for 
many generations. It can also regenerate in office by changing leaders during a 
parliamentary term. For this thesis I focus on a major political party (market 
leaders and challengers). Potentially this model could also be used for minor 
parties (followers and nichers).  
 
Instead of using the five steps (product development, introduction, growth, 
maturity and decline) as outlined by Kotler and Armstrong, I have adopted their 
model to better fit the political domain. 
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The ‘Introduction’ has been changed to ‘re-introduction’ because political parties 
like the British Labour Party, the British Conservative Party, and the New 
Zealand National Party are well established parties and have all previously held 
office in the past. I have also merged the ‘product development’ and ‘re-
introduction’ phase into one. Unlike a product, a political party does not have the 
luxury of completely leaving the political market to ‘sort’ itself out and ‘reinvent’ 
itself. The party still has a role to play as the opposition party. For example, 
during British Labour’s 18 years in opposition, between 1979 and 1997, despite 
all the infighting and policy disagreements during the 1980s, the party still had 
a reasonable number of seats parliament and was still the official opposition.  
 
Also, in the Kotler and Armstrong model, the product has zero sales during the 
product development stage, it starts attracting sales during the introductory 
stage, but it starts from zero. An established political party going through a 
‘product redevelopment / introduction’ stage would not have zero support in the 
political market. For example, during the 2002 election campaign the opposition 
New Zealand National Party was attempting to reintroduce itself to the political 
market with its leader Bill English. The result was one of National’s worst 
election performances in its history, it only won 20.93 per cent of the party vote 
(compared to 30.50 per cent in 1999). This suggests that even when a political 
product is at the low point of the cycle (in this case, reintroduction then decline) 
it still has a number of core supporters who would vote for the party out of 
loyalty to the party.  
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An adapted version of Kotler and Armstrong looks like: 
 
Figure 2.4 Adopted Life-Cycle Model 
 
 
I changed ‘sales’ to ‘support’ because this is appropriate in a political context. 
Maximised support is what a political party is after, especially through votes on 
election day, but also through support in opinion polling. I also included a 
horizontal line which represents the point when the product is in or out of 
government: above the line represents when the product is in government, below 
the line when it is not. This is a theoretical model and the time a party spends in 
each cycle is not be the same; in real life a party may spend five years in the re-
introduction stages, three years in the growth stage and eight years in the 
maturity stage and ten years in decline.  
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Figure 2.5 Adapted Product Life-Cycle Model  
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In the product development/reintroduction stage a successful political product’s 
policies is market orientation, the party itself is strong, united and cohesive. In 
its position as the challenger it aims to take support from other players in the 
political market, especially the current market leader. At this stage the brand 
narrative is developed, but like the actual product itself the brand narrative also 
it is market orientation. The primary brand agent is also strong. 
 
In the growth stage, the political product continues to have a market orientation 
and the party will be strong. At this point the party gains enough support from 
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the previous market leader to become the new market leader. The brand 
narrative is reinforced and the primary brand agent is tested in office.  
 
In the maturity stage, the product still has a market orientation but also has 
some sales oriented features and starts to rejuvenate. The party would still be 
united but there would be some small divisions. The brand narrative also starts 
to rejuvenate to maintain its position as market leader. The primary brand agent 
may be weakened from years in office and another brand agent may become the 
leader of the party. 
 
In the decline phase policies become more sales or product orientated and the 
divisions within the party occurs. The party loses its position as the market 
leader and becomes the challenger again.  
 
The following chapters test the assumptions I made in this chapter about a 
product life-cycle model, using the New Labour case study. The next chapter is a 
background chapter to the New Labour case study. Chapter four examines New 
Labour in the product development / re-introduction cycle, chapter five examines 
the party in the growth stage, chapter six looks at the maturity stage and 
chapter seven looks at the decline stage. 
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3. Failed Labour products (1979-1994) 
This chapter examines the previous Labour products available to the political 
market before the creation of New Labour in 1994. The purpose is to provide a 
background to the New Labour case study because the lesson learnt from the 
failed preceding Labour products shaped the thinking of the creators of New 
Labour. None of the pre-New Labour products were successful; they moved from 
the introduction cycle to the decline cycle. They never gained solid support. 
 
Labour’s historical support base, the working class, declined in the second half of 
the twentieth century. In 1964, the working class made up 51 per cent of the 
electorate. By 1992 it had decreased to 35 per cent.141 By 1983 more than half of 
all working class fathers had non-working class sons.142 As the class dynamics 
changed within Britain, the Labour Party remained the same. Even though 
there was an 11 per cent decline in the working class, Labour’s decline was far 
greater. Between 1951 and 1983 Labour’s support fell by 18 per cent.143 The 
party’s resistance to change, which exacerbated party divisions, also contributed 
to Labour’s decline. 
 
Philip Gould’s criticism about the effectiveness of previous Labour governments 
focused on the party’s resistance to modernise. He argued that the historical 
forces that formed the Labour Party, ‘[f]abianism, trade unionism, religion and a 
defensive working-class culture – blended to produce a party intrinsically 
resistant to change.’144 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section one focuses on the Labour 
Party under Michael Foot, section two focuses on the Labour Party under Neil 
Kinnock and, finally, section three looks at the party under John Smith. 
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3.1 Labour under Michael Foot (1980-1983) 
In terms of the product life-cycle, the Labour Party, between 1979 and 1983 was 
going through a very dramatic decline. In the 1979 election Labour got 36.9 per 
cent of the vote, which fell to 27.6 per cent in 1983. Even though the party was 
out of office in this period its behaviour contributed to the party’s decline. 
 
For the 1979 and 1983 elections the Labour Party had a product orientation. The 
policies that the party offered voters was what Labour thought was best for the 
electorate, regardless of whether the electorate wanted it or not. Using Lees-
Marshment’s comprehensive political marketing approach, the Labour Party was 
a typical product-oriented party. It offered its product to the electorate because 
the party thought that the product’s merits would sell itself. Labour’s defeat in 
1979 and 1983 showed, as Lees-Marshment noted, that ‘the politics of conviction 
no longer seemed a viable approach for a major political party in Britain.’145 
 
Baggage from the previous Labour government 
The ‘winter of discontent’ was a series of strikes that took place in early 1979. 
Callaghan’s Government tried to control wage levels in order to control inflation, 
but this was unacceptable to the trade unions. In January 1979 one million 
people went on strike in reaction to the government. These strikes hurt Labour 
because it discredited the party’s claim that it was the only party that could deal 
with the trade unions.146 The strikes also impacted on the everyday life of 
ordinary people far more so than an ordinary strike,  with food shortages, 
rubbish piling up on footpaths as well as, school and hospital closures.147 
 
Ordinary people were suffering from the strikes and it appeared that Labour 
could not do anything about it. In the past Labour prided itself on its special 
relationship with the trade unions, but now the unions were declining in 
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numbers, becoming more militant and were generally falling out of favour with 
the public at large.148  
 
The ‘winter of discontent’ damaged Labour’s image for a generation, even after 
the 1992 general election. Focus groups still associated Labour as the party 
responsible for the ‘winter of discontent.’149 Labour also failed to prove itself to be 
a competent economic manager.150 
 
Civil war within the party 
The election defeat allowed brewing divisions within the party to become more 
open and the party became publically divided. When Labour was in government, 
the government could get away with ignoring the wishes of conference and the 
National Executive Committee (NEC) by claiming they are working in the 
‘national interest’ but when the party went into opposition, the extra-
parliamentary party became more powerful.151 
 
While the parliamentary party was coming to terms with the election defeat, 
members of the radical left had the motivation to shift ‘the party policy leftward 
providing the impetus for changes in the party constitution. As a result of these 
changes the balance of power between the party’s different institutions shifted 
from the parliamentary party to the extra-parliamentary bodies.’152 
 
The NEC took charge of the party from the parliamentary party and moved it to 
the left.153 The left also gained control of the trade unions which gave them 
ultimate policy power at the annual conferences.154 Butler and Kavanagh 
observed that: 
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The years 1979 to 1983 were among the most momentous in the 
history of the Labour Party. For much of the parliament it was 
in turmoil. Its constitution was overturned, it elected a new 
Leader, it split and saw the departure of major right-wing 
figures, it experienced collapse in support in opinion polls and 
by-elections.155 
 
Groups emerged within the party such as Tony Benn’s Campaign for Labour 
Party Democracy (CLPD) which ‘argued that the Parliamentary Party must be 
made more accountable to the party conference and activists to ensure 
socialism.’156 CLPD managed to force some major constitutional changes, such as 
the election of the party leader by the party as well as MPs, the mandatory 
reselection of MPs and that the NEC should have control of the manifesto.157 
 
The Militant Tendency also emerged; it was a Trotskyite group that followed the 
ideals of the Russian Revolution and was trying to work within the party.158 
Despite the efforts of the party hierarchy to expel the ‘Militant Tendency,’ they 
managed to maintain their presence in the party, which ultimately scared off 
voters.159 
 
In reaction to the constitutional changes, a group of right-wing moderates within 
the party broke away to form the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The ‘gang of 
four’ that left Labour to form the SDP were former members of previous Labour 
governments. At first they were determined to fight the left inside the party, but 
eventually they became more disillusioned.160 In the 1983 General Election the 
SDP and the Liberals formed the Alliance to unite against Labour and the 
Conservatives. Divisions within the party, however, made it unelectable in the 
eyes of the electorate. 
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Policy 
The policy programme that Labour proposed in the 1983 election has been 
described by Labour Politician, Gerald Kaufman as ‘the longest suicide note in 
history.’161 It proposed: 
 
• substantial Nationalisation; 
• greater union influence in economic policy making; 
• a non-nuclear defence policy under which it would cancel 
Trident and refuse to have cruise missiles stationed in the 
United Kingdom; 
• the two sides of industry and government would decide the 
nation’s economic priorities, including pay; 
• any assets privatised by the Conservatives would be 
renationalised; 
• there would be public investment in industry; 
• unemployment would be reduced to under a million in 5 years; 
• to remove Britain from the EEC; 
• to make local authorities buy back any council houses already 
sold; 
• to freeze rents for one year; 
• to increase spending on housing by 50 per cent.162 
 
Labour’s promises were not in line with what the electorate actually wanted; for 
example, despite the promises of nationalisation and withdrawal from the EEC, 
a 1983 poll showed that only 16 per cent supported Britain leaving the EEC, and 
that only 18 per cent agreed with a return to nationalisation.163 
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In his autobiography, Tony Blair, who was first elected in 1983, reflected on the 
state of the Labour Party in 1983. He believed that the party appealed to two 
sections of society:  
 
From early on, even before my election to Parliament in 1983, I 
had realised that the Labour problem was self-made and self-
induced. We were not in touch with the modern world. We could 
basically attract two sorts of people: those who by tradition were 
Labour, and those who came to a position of support for 
socialism or social democracy through intellectual progress. 
Many trade union activists were in the first category; I was a 
member of the second.164 
 
In terms of the product life-cycle model, the Labour Party in this period was 
going through the decline stage. The party was transitioning from being the 
market leader to the challenger. As discussed above, losing office meant that the 
extra-parliamentary party gained more power and vented its disappointment 
about the previous Labour government. The party in this period had no interest 
in the marketing concept. It was an inward looking party that showed the 
following characteristics: 
 
• Product Orientation. 
• The primary brand agent focused on party unity not the wider political 
market. Arguably other brand agents, such and Tony Benn, Arthur 
Scargill and Ken Livingstone, had higher profiles. 
• Open divisions within the party. 
• Policies appealed to core Labour supporter but not the wider political 
market. 
• Negative baggage from the previous Labour government still lingered.  
  
                                                          
164Tony Blair (2011), A Journey, Arrow Books, London, p.40 
61 
 
 
3.2 Labour under Neil Kinnock (1983-1992) 
After the 1983 defeat, Neil Kinnock was elected party leader. Kinnock and his 
successor, John Smith, both made fundamental changes to the Labour Party that 
allowed it to become a sales-oriented party in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
These reforms laid the foundations for Blair and his team of modernisers to 
transform the party. This section looks at the major constitutional, presentation 
and policy changes that Kinnock made. 
 
Constitutional Changes 
As mentioned above, Labour had historically been the political arm of the trade 
unions. Labour Party structure was based on the trade union notion of 
delegatory democracy, where branch members select delegates and these 
delegates had a mandate to vote as they pleased on issues concerning the party. 
Kinnock and Smith managed to transform this, so that power would rest with 
the members of the party instead of the party activists who attained mandates 
by being elected delegates. Before these reforms the delegates had the power of 
selecting and reselecting parliamentary candidates, electing the leader and 
deputy leader and the election of representatives to the NEC. To bypass the 
dominance of the activists, reforms were set up. 
 
Kinnock faced his first hurdle in 1984 when he proposed a move away from 
delegatory democracy to a system where the greater membership would have 
more power. He proposed a system called One Member One Vote (OMOV) where 
individual party members would be balloted instead of delegates making the 
decisions, but although this was rejected by the party he managed to make 
gradual changes. The selection of parliamentary candidates was changed in 1987 
with the introduction of partial ballots; constituency members’ preferences were 
taken into account for parliamentary selection and reselection of candidates, but 
ultimately power resided with delegates. This eventually led to the introduction 
of OMOV in 1993 by Kinnock’s successor John Smith. Also the powers of the 
unions were decreased in 1993 when unions were denied the power to vote as a 
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bloc and instead had to ballot their paid members the same way that 
constituency members were. 
 
The election of party leader was also reformed. Before 1980 the parliamentary 
Labour Party elected their leader and deputy leader. The Bennite changes set up 
an electoral college which consisted of MPs, constituency and trade union 
delegates, and which was used in the 1983 and 1988 leadership contests. In 1992 
constituency delegates were made to ballot individual members on their 
preferences, but delegates made the final decision. In 1993, the Trade Unions 
and the constituency delegates were required to ballot their membership and 
then vote on their behalf. This was first used in 1994 with the election of Blair 
and John Prescott. 
 
The NEC was also reformed. Previously the seven representatives of 
constituency parties on the NEC were elected by constituency delegates at the 
annual conference. Now these posts were elected by individual party members. 
The membership also increased their power at Conference with their vote being 
increased from 9 to 30 per cent, at the expense of the Trade Unions. 
 
Kinnock managed to gain some party unity by removing radicals from the party. 
He managed to persuade people within the party that the presence of extremists 
risked Labour’s electoral success.165 The Militant Tendency was expelled and 
action was taken against a group of radical Liverpool City Councillors. The party 
took greater control over its membership and by 1992 the NEC had expelled over 
100 members.166 
 
Presentation Changes 
In December 1985, Philip Gould presented a report that stated that Labour’s 
political communications strategy was poor and needed dramatic changes. He 
recommended the establishment of the Director of Communications, who would 
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primarily focus on the party’s communications.167 He also recommended the 
establishment of a Shadow Communications Agency (SCA), ‘[i]ts role would be to 
draft strategy, conduct themes, and provide other communications support as 
necessary.’ The SCA would partake in monthly qualitative research projects, and 
the SCA would change the Labour Party’s image to resemble a ‘corporate 
appearance.’168  The SCA was approved by the NEC in 1986. Peter Mandelson 
became the first Director of Communications. The SCA undertook some ‘mini-
campaigns,’ which were a response to market research. 
 
The SCA did what the Gould strategy intended it to do; it changed the Labour 
Party’s image from amateurish to professional with the adoption of the red rose 
as Labour’s logo. The SCA conducted qualitative research and centralised 
communications began to become a reality in the Labour Party. Communication 
became more planned. For example, in July 1991 the party launched their 
‘Ready for Government’ campaign, getting ready for the 1992 general election. 
Even though no one took it seriously, it did show a shift in the party’s campaign 
organisation.169  In the 1987 campaign they tried to counteract the electorate’s 
perceived negatives of Neil Kinnock with the biographical advert Kinnock: the 
Movie that revealed a softer more compassionate Kinnock.170 This showed that 
the party’s communications were better organised than they had been in the past 
and that it had begun to embrace marketing ideas. 
 
After the 1987 and 1992 elections Gould’s research remained the same; Labour 
was a bitterly divided party, run by extremists, dominated by trade unions, weak 
on defence and with poor leadership.171 Even though the SCA did its best to 
change Labour’s image, it did not manage to convince the electorate. More 
drastic change was needed. 
 
                                                          
167
 Gould (1998a), p.55 
168
 Gould (1998a), p.55 
169
 Lees-Marshment (2001a), p.158 
170
 Lees-Marshment (2001a), p.158 
171
 Gould (1998a), p.87 
64 
 
Even though Kinnock’s Labour Party had worked at giving itself a good public 
image, Kinnock himself had a poor relationship with the media. This was 
illustrated in the 1987 election where it was ‘estimated that 73 per cent of the 
Sun’s election coverage, 54 per cent of the Daily Mail’s and 46 per cent of the 
Daily Star’s was ‘Labour Knocking.’’172 This was repeated five years later when 
Labour was hammered by the press on the eve of the 1992 General Election. 
Gould reflected: 
 
The Sun destroyed Neil [Kinnock] and Labour with an eight-
page attack entitled “Nightmare on Kinnock street’, warning, 
‘He’ll have a new home, you won’t’ ;’A threat to a proud history’, 
‘My Job will go’, ‘Prices set to jump’, ‘Do not trust his judgement 
or his promises,’ and ‘Lest we Forget – Hell caused by the last 
Labour Government.’  It delivered the final knock-out blow a day 
later with its front-page headline: ‘If Kinnock wins today will the 
last person in Britain please turn out the lights’.173 
 
The attacks continued with The Mail’s headline ‘Warning: a Labour Government 
will lead to higher mortgage payments,’174 and The Express with ‘Can you really 
afford not to vote Tory?’175 These attacks on Kinnock left their mark on Tony 
Blair. When he was elected leader in 1994 he went out of his way to woo the 
Conservative press, primarily owned by Rupert Murdoch. 
 
Policy Changes 
From 1983-87, Kinnock began taming Labour policy from the 1983 manifesto. He 
managed to reduce the party’s objection to the European Community, reduce its 
calls for public ownership and allow the sale of council houses.176 After the 1987 
election the party undertook, a major review of policy; first they decided to 
abandon the party’s nuclear policy; secondly, the party decided to move away 
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from protecting unions to protecting the rights of the individual worker, and 
finally the party declared that it was committed to the market economy.177 
Labour’s policies before the 1992 election were more mainstream and acceptable 
to the electorate but, as Lees-Marshment observed, the party was resistant to 
respond to the findings of market intelligence.178 
 
One issue that illustrated this was taxation. When it was revealed to the Shadow 
Cabinet that 70 per cent of people surveyed believed that they would pay more 
tax under Labour, the Shadow Chancellor, John Smith, replied that ‘he wouldn’t 
be lectured by admen and pollsters.’179 The Shadow budget of 1992 confirmed 
this position with the party’s commitment to increase income tax, which was fuel 
used against the party by the Conservatives in the 1992 election campaign.180  
 
Even if Kinnock wanted to turn Labour into a Market Oriented Party he would 
have been unable to do so. As Lees-Marshment observed, even if the leadership 
knows that the party needs to change to become more electable there needs to be 
internal support within the party for it.181 
 
Labour failed because the electorate still did not trust the party. The voters still 
remembered the ‘Winter of Discontent’ and all the divisions within the party, 
they were also worried about Labour’s ability to manage the economy. As market 
research showed after the 1992 election, people associated the phrases ‘union 
influence,’ ‘strikes,’ ‘inflation’ and ‘[Tony]Benn/[Arthur]Scargill’182 with the 
Labour Party.183 Gould noted that even though the Labour Party had changed its 
communication techniques, it was not enough to outweigh the party’s 
negatives.184 Despite Kinnock’s changes to the party 67 per cent of respondents 
                                                          
177
 Seyd and Whiteley, p.5 
178
 Lees-Marshment (2001a), p.155 
179
 Lees-Marshment (2001a), p.150 
180
 Lees-Marshment (2001a), p.156 
181
 Lees-Marshment (2001a), p.144 
182Tony Benn is a well know left winger within the Labour party, like wise Arthur Scargill is a well-known left 
winger within the Labour party as well as a militant trade unionist. 
183Philip Gould (1998b),,’Why Labour Won,’ in Ivor Crewe, Brian Gosschalk and John Bartle (eds), Political 
Communication: Why Labour Won the General Election of 1997, Frank Cass, London, p.5 
184
 Gould (1998a), p.72 
66 
 
in a 1992 British Electoral Studies survey still considered Labour to be a divided 
party compared to 28 per cent who perceived the Conservatives to be divided.185 
 
Despite Labour’s policy review and the moving away from the 1983 manifesto, 
the electorate still did not want Labour’s policies, for as Lees-Marshment noted; 
‘the Policy Review removed Labour’s most apparent weaknesses, but did so 
without creating any new strengths.’186 One of the major reasons for Labour’s 
1992 defeat was taxation; Labour ignored the voters’ fear that the party was a 
‘tax and spend’ party by proposing tax increases in the 1992 shadow budget. A 
majority of voters did not want tax increases because they thought this would 
increase inflation and industrial action.187 
 
Kinnock created a new Labour product that was different from the previous 
Labour product offered in 1983. However, this Labour product failed to win two 
elections. In terms of the product cycle model, the Labour Party under Kinnock 
went through the ‘product development’ and ‘re-introduction’ stage of the cycle. It 
failed to win enough support to push itself to the growth stage of the cycle. The 
features of Kinnock’s Labour Party include: 
 
• Changes made to the product itself. More power was given to ordinary 
members and extreme elements of the party were removed. 
• Presentation became more professional. 
• The primary brand agent was considered weak and received negative 
press from the Murdoch press. 
• There was a policy shift within the party. Policies were tamed compared to 
the 1983 election. 
• The party’s brand narrative was still tainted by its past. 
• The party failed to win support from the Market Leader to become the 
Market Leader itself.  
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The Kinnock Labour Party failed to win office in the 1987 and 1992 elections. 
The party had made changes since the last Labour product, but this product 
failed to get elected into office.  
 
3.3 Labour under John Smith (1992-1994) 
The difference between this product and the Foot and Kinnock products 
discussed above was that it was introduced to the political market, but it was 
never tested in a general election. Instead this product went into a quick decline 
after Smith’s death.  
 
After the 1992 defeat Kinnock stood down as the party leader and was replaced 
by his Shadow Chancellor, John Smith. Smith saw little value in the 
communications changes that were made under Kinnock. He dismantled the 
SCA and downgraded the importance of communications, so the pace of 
modernisation slowed down. Smith was popular with the electorate and people 
were starting to tire of the Conservatives, in a Gallop poll, in 1994, 74 per cent of 
respondents were unhappy with Major’s performance compared to the 34 per 
cent who were unhappy with Smith’s.188 Smith was a much stronger Primary 
Brand Agent than Kinnock, but, as stated, this was never tested in a general 
election due to Smith’s death. 
 
Blair viewed the Kinnock and Smith products as an improvement on Labour’s 
earlier ones but ignored the negative brand narrative left by Labour’s turbulent 
recent history: 
 
Under Neil Kinnock and John Smith we had of course 
broadened, deepened and become more popular, but it felt to me 
– and more importantly to the public – like a negotiation 
between us and our past. We were talking in an upbeat way, but 
there was a tinge of reluctance about it, a reverence for the old 
days that smacked of denial about how bad it had been. There 
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was a care in speaking about the way things were that indicated 
an uncertainty, a lack of thorough conviction about the way 
things would be in the future.189  
 
In terms of the product life-cycle, the Labour Party product presented by John 
Smith was only developed and introduced into the political market. However, 
because of Smith’s death, the product was never fully introduced into the 
market, nor fully tested. 
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4 Product Development and Re-Introduction 
This chapter applies the product life-cycle model to New Labour and focuses on 
the product development of New Labour and its reintroduction into the political 
market. For the purpose of this thesis, I have identified this phase as being 
between 1994, when Blair became leader of the Labour Party, and April 1997, a 
month before New Labour was elected to office. The election campaign of 1997 
gave New Labour the momentum to move into the ‘growth’ phase of the product 
life-cycle model.  
 
The previous chapter documented that Labour was considered unelectable 
between 1979 and 1992. By 1997 the party under Tony Blair managed to defeat 
the Conservatives in a landslide. Crewe observed that: 
 
No party leader in modern British history prepared his party for 
an election with as thought-through, coherent and radical an 
electoral strategy as Tony Blair did between his becoming leader 
in 1994 and the general election three years later. No party 
leader in modern times has attempted, let alone succeeded, in 
persuading a reluctant party to abandon long-established 
policies and structures for the sake of electoral victory. After 
four successive election defeats, the acute disappointment of 
1992 and eighteen years in opposition, a desperate party was 
ready to respond.190 
  
As outlined in chapter three, the Labour Party in the 1980s and early 1990s was 
unelectable. By 1992 the negative attributes that had haunted Labour in the 
1980s were still attached to the party. Market research conducted after the 1992 
election show that the party was still judged by its past, people associated 
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phrases like, ‘winter of discontent,’ ‘union influence,’ ‘strikes,’ ‘inflation,’ 
‘disarmament,’ and ‘miners’ strike/three day week’ with the party.191 
 
People thought ‘Labour’s values are negative, aimed at depriving people of: 
wealth, in the form of taxes, choice in education and health, and ownership, in 
the form of council houses.’192 Likewise people saw Labour as being hostile to 
‘People who have money/savings/even pensions, people who want to start their 
own business: and people who want the best for their kids.’193 People were saying 
that ‘I’ve left the Labour Party and the Labour Party has left me.’ And, ‘it’s 
obvious isn’t it: the better you are doing, the more money you have got, the more 
likely you are to vote Tory. It’s hardly surprising.’194 
 
As outlined in chapter two, I have altered the product life-cycle model into four 
different parts, product, strategy, brand narrative and brand agent. In this 
chapter I look at the product development and re-introduction from these parts. I 
also look at the support for New Labour during this time. Before getting into the 
case study I discuss the influence that the Democrats in the United States had 
on the creation of New Labour. The modernisers created New Labour by learning 
the lessons from Labour’s failures in the 1980s and early 1990s (as outlined in 
the last chapter); the success of the Democrats in 1992 gave the modernisers a 
road map of how to be electorally successful. 
 
4.1 Democrats influence on New Labour 
As part of the product development of New Labour, the modernisers used 
techniques and lessons from the Democrats in the United States under Bill 
Clinton. Seldon argued that Blair’s trips to the United States in 1991-1993 were 
a turning point for him because it showed him and Brown that Labour needed to 
attract middle-ground voters to win and ‘the Clinton campaign in 1992 gave 
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them a road map for how to achieve this.’195 Philip Gould also forged links with 
the Democrats and worked with the Clinton campaign during the 1992 election.  
 
In January 1993, Brown and Blair went to Washington and met with key figures 
from the Clinton team, pollster Stan Greenberg, President of the Democratic 
Leadership Council (DLC) Al From, and Elaine Kamarck from the Progressive 
Policy Institute (PPI). Seldon noted that the DLC and the PPI had been credited 
for repositioning the Democrats so it was in tune with mainstream America.196 
Karmack recalled: 
 
I was invited with Al and Stan to the British Embassy to meet 
Tony Blair for tea. We had no idea who he was….Tony Blair 
looked like a kid to us. He took out a small notebook and asked 
us some question about how we begun in 1989 and we talked 
him all the way through it. He took furious notes about 
everything we said. He was very courteous, very humble, very 
focused.197 
 
In 1989 the Democrats were in a similar situation as Labour, they were 
perceived as being the party of ‘tax and spend’ policies; it was perceived as weak 
on defence and soft on law and order and had not won a presidential election 
since 1976. The main lesson that New Labour learnt from the Democrats was to 
identify the issues that the governing party was strong on and then develop a 
plan to become strong on those issues. For New Labour these issues included 
economic credibility, law and order and patriotism.198 
 
On a practical level, Gould attained the idea of moving the campaign to a central 
office space or ‘war room’ from the Clinton campaign in 1992 because he noticed 
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that a concentrated open-plan office floor would be better for campaigning rather 
than people running down corridors to different offices.199 
 
4.2 Product 
This section examines the Labour party product and is divided into two parts. 
Firstly, I outline the policy products that New Labour offered. These policies 
were market-oriented and reflected the political consumer. Secondly, I look at 
the actual Labour Party itself. During this phase of the product life-cycle model 
the party became more centralised giving the leadership more scope to pursue 
market-oriented policies 
 
Market-Orientation of policy 
One way New Labour showed that it had developed more market-oriented 
policies was through the use of pledges and pledge cards. According to Gould, the 
pledges were developed over a long period of time following meetings with 
colleagues and focus groups.200 These pledges reflected the concerns of the voters 
addressing education, law and order, health, youth unemployment and the 
economy. Gould reflected that: 
 
The pledges worked better than anything else I have ever tested 
in politics….They worked because they connected immediately 
to people’s lives; because they were relatively small, which gave 
them credibility; because they were costed; and because they 
were an explicit contract between the voter and Tony Blair. The 
fact that it was he who made the promise, he who offered the 
contract, added enormously to their power.201 
 
Gould stated that a lot of market research went into developing the pledges, but 
this research was important because in the past Labour had always offered 
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better schools and hospitals and this was not believed.202 However, these pledges 
were more concrete and were costed and ‘presented in the form of an accountable 
contract.’203 
 
The pledges were: 
• ‘We will cut class sizes to 30 or under for five-, six- and seven-
year-olds by using money from the assisted places scheme.’ 
• ‘We will introduce a fast-track punishment for persistent young 
offenders by halving the time from arrest to sentencing.’ 
• ‘We will cut NHS waiting lists by treating an extra 100,000 
patients as a first step by releasing £100 million saved from 
NHS red tape.’ 
• ‘We will get 250,000 under-25-year-olds off benefit and into work 
by using money from a windfall levy on the privatised utilities.’ 
• ‘We will set tough rules for government spending and borrowing 
and ensure low inflation and strengthen the economy so that 
interest rates are as low as possible to make all families better 
off.’204 
 
These pledges were placed onto a credit card sized card. The idea was borrowed 
from California which was used for a state-wide referendum on healthcare, the 
back of that card stated the benefits of voting yes in the referendum. The Labour 
card contained the words: ‘Keep this card, and see that we kept our promises.’205  
 
At this stage of the product life-cycle, great care was taken to develop market-
oriented policies that reflected the concerns of the political market. These 
policies were also costed and showed political consumers that these policies were 
achievable. 
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Centralisation of the party 
The leadership of New Labour built upon changes to the party structure made by 
Kinnock and Smith. The leadership increased its power at the expense of party 
activists and the trade unions. They did this, as previously discussed, by 
increasing the power of the individual party membership; this has 
‘marginalis[ed] representative procedures inside the party, introducing 
plebiscitarian techniques, going over the heads of the party conference and the 
activist layer in favour of widespread membership ballots.’206 Seyd and Whiteley 
argued that New Labour fits in a plebiscitary model where the party ‘has an 
organization and a membership, but the leaders concentrate power in their own 
hands and the role of the members is to endorse periodically fairly general policy 
statements and to legitimize whatever the leadership wants to do.’207 
 
New Labour had become a more leader-centred plebiscitary party. The 
movement to a plebiscitary party gave the Labour leadership more flexibility and 
the opportunity to develop market-oriented policies. Since the leadership can 
determine policy it can easily respond to the needs of the electorate and offer the 
electorate a programme that suits them. A plebiscitary model suits the 
leadership, but Seyd and Whiteley warned, the leader can become too powerful 
and if there is no party mechanism to question the leader then he/she can get too 
corrupted by power as was the case with Margaret Thatcher in the late 1980s.208 
 
I have identified three features of the New Labour’s plebiscitary model: 
 
Membership and recruitment drive - money was spent on marketing the party 
through broachers, newspapers and magazines.209 Initially this drive was 
successful, at the ‘1995 conference it was reported that 100,000 people had joined 
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in the previous year.’210 Widen Labour’s membership added more moderate and 
mainstream view to the party removing influence from trade unionists and 
activists.211 The recruitment drive also suggested that New Labour needed 
members to legitimise the decisions already decided by the leadership.212 
 
Policy reform – the policy process was extensively reformed to cut out activist 
members and strengthen the leadership. The leadership of the party was highly 
critical of the party’s traditional policy making process through the party 
conferences; they argued that the policy making process only included a few 
conference delegates, therefore did not represent the views of the party as a 
whole.213 The policy that was produced was poor and failed to see the big picture 
of complex issues; also, the policy making process was divisive and arguing about 
policy openly in public damaged the party’s image.214 During the 1997 election, 
manifestos were sent to party members for their endorsement, the members 
could either say yes or no, but could not propose changes to the manifesto.  
 
Unity from Labour MPs and candidates – New Labour MPs and candidates were 
well behaved and united. Labour MP Helen Liddell said that ‘the discipline that 
was imposed on the party by the leadership in the period 1994-97 was 
formidable….shadow ministers and backbench MPs equally had to be 
consistently ‘on message.’’215 Likewise Butler and Kavanagh observed that the 
party put up with Blair’s personal style of leadership because they knew that 
disunity would spoil the party’s chances in the election.216 
 
Lees-Marshment argued that even though Blair was taking a market-oriented 
approach to the general electorate, he was taking a product-orientated approach 
to the party membership.217 This was a necessary strategy considering the 
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history of Labour, a market-oriented approach might have exacerbated divisions 
within the party. Lees-Marshment also observed that New Labour, ‘alienated 
traditional supporters and critiques contend it has lost its ideology and beliefs 
and stands for nothing….Blair did not give much attention to adjusting the 
product to suit internal support.’218 However, Blair knew that traditional 
supporters would always buy Labour’s product, Labour could neglect responding 
to their views and still achieve electoral success.’219 
 
At this stage of the product life-cycle, the modernisers made changes to the 
Labour Party structure making it more centralised and limiting the power of 
activists and the trade unions. Centralising power allowed the leadership more 
flexibility to adopt and implement more market-oriented policies; this is a 
similar approach to Kirchheimer’s catch-all party that needed to be flexible to 
catch a large group of voters rather than a loyal membership.220 Also, this move 
showed the political market that the party had moved on from its historical 
perception that its controlled by trade unions and activist. 
 
4.3 Positioning 
In this section I discuss how New Labour behaved as the challenger and what it 
did to position itself as the market leader, to replace the incumbent Conservative 
government. At what point does a party become the market leader and the 
challenger? New Labour was leading the Conservatives in the polls in the lead 
up to the 1997 election; did this make Labour the market leader? For this thesis, 
I argue that even though New Labour did have the support of the political 
market, because it did not have a majority in Parliament to influence policy, nor 
did have the authority of government; it was still the challenger. Opinion polling 
is a good indication of how people are going to vote and how the political market 
feels about the parties at a given point of time. However, the result of a general 
election carries more weight because it delivers the market-leader real power to 
deliver policies. Rawnsley also noted that during the 1980s there were times 
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where old Labour under Foot and Kinnock had large leads over Thatcher in 
opinion polling but this support was fickle and never translated into seats in 
Parliament.221 
 
As the challenger, New Labour focused on taking support away from the market 
leader. Firstly, I look at the state of the market leader at this point in time. 
Secondly, I examine what New Labour did to take ground from the market 
leader. 
 
The Market Leader (Conservative Party - 1994-1997) 
While New Labour was going through the product development and re-
introduction phase of the product life-cycle model, the Conservatives were going 
through a decline phase. In summary: 
 
• The Conservatives lost its reputation as being economically competent 
when Britain was ejected from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
in 1992. 
• There was division within the party over the country’s relationship with 
the European Union. 
• Conservative MPs were tainted by scandal and sleaze. 
• There was a call for a change in government, the Labour Party was ahead 
and maintained a lead in the polls.  
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Figure 4.1 Satisfaction of John Major’s Conservative Government 1992-1997222 
 
Figure 4.1 shows, satisfaction for John Major’s government was low. After the 
1992 election satisfaction reached 42 per cent, but after the EMR crisis, 
satisfaction remained low, and dissatisfaction grew. The low point was reached 
in December 1994, during the honeymoon of Blair’s arrival as Labour leader, 
where satisfaction with Major’s government was eight per cent and 
dissatisfaction was 86 per cent. 
 
New Labour as the Challenger 
Butler and Collins state that the strategies of a challenger are to ‘target the 
market leader directly in a high-risk but potentially high-payoff strategy, attack 
competitors of its own size, or attack small local regional competitors.’223 I have 
identified three strategic moves that New Labour made as the challenger. The 
aim of New Labour at this point in time was to become the market leader and 
they did this by challenging the Conservatives head-on by attracting the centre 
voters that had voted for them. Firstly, New Labour accepted the consensus 
                                                          
222
 Ipsos MORI, ‘Political Monitor Satisfaction Ratings 1988-1997’ (1997), Ipsos Mori Website, Accessed 23 
March 2013, <www.ipsos-
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemID=2438&view=wide> 
223
 Collins and Butler (2002), p.9 
Satisfaction of the Major Government 1992-1997
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1/
05
/1
99
2
1/
07
/1
99
2
1/
09
/1
99
2
1/
11
/1
99
2
1/
01
/1
99
3
1/
03
/1
99
3
1/
05
/1
99
3
1/
07
/1
99
3
1/
09
/1
99
3
1/
11
/1
99
3
1/
01
/1
99
4
1/
03
/1
99
4
1/
05
/1
99
4
1/
07
/1
99
4
1/
09
/1
99
4
1/
11
/1
99
4
1/
01
/1
99
5
1/
03
/1
99
5
1/
05
/1
99
5
1/
07
/1
99
5
1/
09
/1
99
5
1/
11
/1
99
5
1/
01
/1
99
6
1/
03
/1
99
6
1/
05
/1
99
6
1/
07
/1
99
6
1/
09
/1
99
6
1/
11
/1
99
6
1/
01
/1
99
7
1/
03
/1
99
7
Date
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 
Po
in
ts
Satisfied 
Dissatisfied
79 
 
established by the market leader. Secondly, New Labour positioned itself as 
being strong in areas that the Conservatives were traditionally strong in. 
Finally, the party modernised the way it responded to the media. 
 
Accepting the market leader 
New Labour accepted the market leader’s stance on issues such as privatisation, 
the free market and crime and move onto new battles were New Labour could 
frame the debate.224 Blair was determined to show that New Labour had moved 
on from the Labour of the past and made it clear that there would be ‘no return 
to old union laws; no renationalisation of the private utilities; no raising of the 
top rate of tax; no unilateralism; no abolition of grammar schools.’225 
 
Blair did this by accepting some of the changes that Margaret Thatcher made as 
Prime Minister in the 1980s. Blair stated that by acknowledging and supporting 
the changes that Margaret Thatcher had made would appeal to those who voted 
for the Conservatives in that era. Blair wrote: ‘I knew the credibility of the whole 
New Labour project rested on accepting that much of what [Thatcher] wanted to 
do in the 1980s was inevitable, a consequence not of ideology but of social and 
economic change.’ He argued that Thatcher was ideological, however. ‘Britain 
needed the industrial and economic reforms of the Thatcher period.’226 Thatcher 
returned the compliment by saying ‘I see a lot of socialism [in Labour] but not in 
Mr Blair. I think he genuinely has moved.’227 
 
Taking ground from the market leader 
Gould identified this strategic position as both taking the Conservative’s ground 
and taking back ground that Labour had lost when New Labour presenting itself 
as the party of business, family, responsibility, enterprise, and aspiration.228 The 
party accepted the findings of its market research; it accepted new positions on 
issues that they had been traditionally weak on.  
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New Labour established itself as a party that embraced the market, it had 
shown this by abolishing clause four of its constitution (discussed below) and 
making policy commitments in its manifesto like ‘We will provide stable 
economic growth with low inflation, and promote dynamic and competitive 
business and industry at home and abroad.’229 This would neutralise any 
Conservative attack that accused Labour of being traditional Labour socialists. 
Voters also perceived Labour as a tax and spend party. New Labour cancelled 
this out by stating that it will not increase taxes and attacking the Conservatives 
for their twenty-two tax rises.230 
 
In July, 1995, 35 per cent surveyed stated that they preferred New Labour’s 
policies on the economy to 20 per cent who preferred the Conservative’s. By 
April, 1997, 44 per cent preferred Labour to 29 per cent who preferred the 
Conservative.231 This showed that New Labour was able to maintain its lead on 
the economy to the lead up to the 1997 election. New Labour also took on the 
Conservatives in traditional areas of strength such as law and order. The Labour 
Manifesto advocated a tougher stance of crime, being ‘tough on crime and tough 
on the causes of crime.’232 Labour stated that under the Conservative 
government, crime had doubled, the manifesto stated that Labour would ‘insist 
on individual responsibility for crime, and will attack the causes of crime by 
measures to relieve social deprivation.’233 
 
As Gould noted, New Labour’s repositioning re-established Labour’s links with 
the electorate; he stated that ‘most people believe in punishment, they believe in 
right and wrong, they believe in discipline and order. That for so long Labour 
denied this, that they sought to excuse the inexcusable on grounds of education, 
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class or other disadvantages.’234 Gould stated that Blair’s speech was common 
sense and had a huge impact within the electorate.235 This stance was reflected 
in the rhetoric of the 1997 manifesto: ‘On crime, we believe in personal 
responsibility and in punishing crime, but also tackling its underlying causes - 
so, tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime, different from the Labour 
approach of the past and the Tory policy of today.’236 
 
In July 1995, 33 per cent of people polled thought that New Labour had the best 
policies for law and order, compared to 25 per cent who thought the 
Conservatives were better. By April 1997, 30 per cent thought Labour’s policies 
were best compared to 32 per cent who preferred the Conservatives.237 Even 
though the poll suggested that the Conservatives had a better policy on law and 
order, New Labour had neutralised the issue. 
 
Working with the media 
Gould identified that working with the media was another strategic way to 
become the market leader. ‘Broadcasting news has its own agenda and it is 
pointless fighting it.  Shape the agenda certainly, but also exploit the agenda 
that is in place.’238 To work with the news, the party moved its headquarters to 
Millbank Towers. Here the party set up a professional campaigning organisation 
based on Bill Clinton’s ‘war room’ in the 1992 campaign. The purpose of Millbank 
Tower was to be a media centre which ‘was open 24 hours a day, showcasing 
such new propaganda delights as the 24-hour rebuttal units. ‘Pre-buttals’, 
another idea from the Clinton team, were also arranged. Campaigners were 
linked: pagers, the internet and faxes helped keep its candidates ‘on message.’’239 
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The computerised Excalibur system contained ‘documents, speeches, statistics 
and press cuttings’ which could be accessed easily.240 
 
Blair also made great effort to get Newscorp’s Rupert Murdoch on his side. 
Murdoch’s newspapers had traditionally supported the Conservatives, Blair was 
invited to make the keynote speech at Newscorp’s 1995 conference on Hayman 
Island. Powell argued that ‘Murdoch likes to back the winning side, and he could 
read the opinion polls as well as anyone else, and so in the course of that year 
into 1996 a number of his titles shifted in favour of New Labour. Tony put great 
efforts into maintaining the relationship right through his time in government 
and thereafter. It paid off.’241 
 
In this stage of the product life-cycle model the New Labour was the challenger. 
To become the market-leader it directly took on the current market-leader, the 
Conservatives, by arguing that New Labour was as strong or stronger in policy 
areas that the Conservative Party was traditionally strong in. This was an 
attempt by New Labour to take the centre ground and gain support from voters 
who voted Conservative in the previous election. It also professionalised its 
media operation with the creation of a rapid rebuttal media. 
 
4.4 Brand narrative 
The New Labour brand narrative focused around the idea that it was new and 
was different to the party of the past.  
 
According to Rajagopal and Sanchez at this point of the product life-cycle the 
brand is being developed.242 However, in the case of New Labour the brand and 
narrative was developed early in 1994 and 1995, and from 1996 the focus of the 
brand’s narrative was to reassure people that New Labour had actually changed.  
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This brand narrative was emphasised with symbolic changes to the party 
structure and a narrative built around the primary brand agent Tony Blair, and 
is similar to the narrative that Vincent identified for Bill Clinton – the selfless 
hero who transformed Labour and brought it to power. As part of the narrative, 
effort was made to reassure voters that there was little risk voting for New 
Labour. 
 
As part of its brand narrative that New Labour is new, it also presented a 
positive vision of the future and that the party was above traditional bipartisan 
politics. In a speech Blair said that ‘New Labour is neither old left or new right. 
We understand and welcome the new global market. We reject go-it-alone 
policies on inflation and the macro-economy. We stand for a new partnership 
between government and industry.’243 New Labour was inclusive of all people 
when Blair said: 
 
Let’s build a new and young country that can lay aside the old 
prejudices that dominated our land for generations. A nation for 
all the people, built by the people, where old divisions are cast 
out. A new spirit in the nation based on working together, unity, 
solidarity, partnership.244 
 
This showed that New Labour had not only moved on from old Labour and what 
was holding it back in the past. New Labour’s also attached itself to the ‘Cool 
Britannia’ wave that was sweeping through Britain in the mid-1990s. During 
this period there was increased pride in British pop culture with bands such as 
the Spice Girls, Oasis, Supergrass and Blur. Blair associated New Labour to this 
movement by using a ‘Britpop’ song ‘Things can only get better’ by D:Ream as its 
campaign song. 
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As Vincent stated in his brand narrative work, a successful brand narrative 
must reflect the culture of the audience and New Labour does this. The brand 
narrative that New Labour portrayed at this time was it was a new product, it 
was different to the previous Labour products and it was different to the 
incumbent Conservative Government. This narrative was reinforced by: 
 
• A leader who personifies the values of the brand. 
• A symbolic battles with the party. 
• Policies that reflect the political market. 
• Reassurance that the brand will deliver 
 
Below I outline examples of how New Labour used the above tactics to reinforce 
its brand narrative.  
 
Leader that personifies the brand 
Tony Blair personified the New Labour brand, at the beginning of his leadership 
focus groups liked ‘his charisma, his message of pulling together, and the sense 
of a new kind of politics and a new politician.’245 Blair’s personal narrative was 
similar to the ‘hero’s story,’ Gould recalled when he first met Blair that he had ‘a 
sense of the destiny of the nation, and of the pulse of the people’246 Blair did not 
have the traditional background of a Labour politician, he was not involved with 
the unions and was a barrister. He became leader after John Smith’s death and 
reformed and challenged the trade unions, and changed the party to bring 
change to the country. Compared to John Major and the Conservatives, Blair 
was a younger and far more charismatic politician; he did not have any political 
baggage. He managed to bring unity to the party and lead them to victory in the 
1997 election.  
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Symbolic battles with the party 
New Labour used pseudo-events, such as the battle with the party to remove 
clause four of the party’s constitution to reinforce the brand narrative that the 
party had changed. Pseudo-events are created events that are made to be 
reported on by the media, they are not ‘spontaneous, but comes about because 
someone has planned, planted, or incited it.’247 
 
The modernisers believed that ‘without high-profile internal battles [which are 
reported in the media] the public simply would not notice reform.’248 Similarly 
Gould argued that real events, such as the removal of clause four and the 
balloting of the manifesto create ‘real tension, genuine uncertainty: that is what 
is necessary to persuade a modern voter.’249  
 
The removal of clause four was an important and symbolic change that showed 
that New Labour was making a real shift from its past. The clause was a 
commitment to socialism and nationalisation and its removal was one of Blair’s 
first major acts as leader in 1994. The original clause was a socialist 
commitment for nationalisation that originated in the party’s 1918 constitution. 
Clause four stated that the party aimed: 
 
To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of 
their industry and the most equitable distribution thereof that 
may be possible, upon these basis of the common ownership of 
the means of production, distribution, and exchange, and the 
best obtainable system of popular administration and control of 
each industry and service.250 
 
Even though the clause had not been followed by the party for some time, people 
in the party saw it as ‘an emblem of an earlier idealism, a status it shared with 
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the party’s commitment to equality – once again an unattainable goal but a 
cherished ideal.’251 However, Mandelson believed that ‘It prevented the party 
from proclaiming clearly what it did stand for, and it confused the voters about 
Labour’s intentions.’252 
 
At the 1994 party conference Blair, with the support of key shadow cabinet 
members, proposed the abolition of clause four. When it came to the vote the 
party rejected the proposal 50.9 per cent to 49.1 per cent.253 Blair approached the 
NEC, which agreed to hold a special conference in early 1995. 254 By going over 
the heads of activists and trade unions Blair appealed to the party membership 
directly.255 The campaign gave Blair an opportunity to meet his party, he showed 
his calm relaxed style of leadership, which only his Sedgefield constituents had 
seen before, and he realised that Labour voters throughout Britain were like his 
constituents.256 The special conference in April 1995 passed the new clause four 
stated that: 
 
The Labour Party is a democratic socialist party. It believes that 
by the strength of our common endeavour we achieve more than 
we achieve alone, so as to create for each of us the means to 
realise our true potential and for all of us a community in which 
power, wealth and opportunity are in the hands of the many, not 
the few, where the rights we enjoy reflect the duties we owe, and 
where we live together, freely, in a spirit of solidarity, tolerance 
and respect.257 
 
The campaign to remove clause four allowed Blair to meet his party and show 
his party what kind of leader he was, but more importantly, clause four showed 
that Blair was prepared to ballot members of the party to overcome objections 
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from the unions and party activists. The campaign and change was widely 
reported on and showed people that New Labour was making real changes. It 
also showed that Blair was determined to change the party, he even threaten to 
resign if the party did not abolish the clause because he would argue that the 
party was not serious about change.258 I call the removal of clause four a pseudo-
event because even though the constitutional change was important, the 
reporting of the event was more significant. 
 
Another significant pseudo-event that New Labour used was taking the 
manifesto to the party and balloting members to endorse it. This event showed 
voters that the New Labour project had the support of the party.259 This event 
also helped ‘break through the wall of cynicism surrounding the voters. They 
were not impressed by words alone, they wanted actions and preferably actions 
involving conflict and opposition. Only then would they believe something had 
actually happened.’260 
Reassurance 
During this period New Labour constantly reassured voters that it had changed 
and that it had modernised and had actually changed. Greenberg’s focus groups 
observed that ‘change voters’ were dissatisfied with the Conservatives and it was 
New Labour’s task to ensure that a vote for Labour was an easy and ‘safe’ 
choice.261  
 
Gould identified 1996 as the year that New Labour needed to gain the voters’ 
trust – they had modernised the party in 1995, but needed to reinforce the brand 
narrative through 1996 until the general election.262 By the end of 1995 New 
Labour was defined by voters as Blair’s ‘willingness to take on the unions.263’ 
Research found that voters still did not believe that New Labour on taxes, 42 per 
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cent of people surveyed believed that the party would raise taxes.264 Others 
believed that one of the problems with old Labour was that it did not address 
issues that affected ordinary people, instead it focused on issues like 
‘homosexuals, immigrants, feminists, lesbians, boroughs putting their money 
into peculiar things.’265 
 
Blair wrote that he was obsessed with reassurance and that between 1995 and 
1997 he: ‘was in a perpetual motion of reassurance. The more the poll lead went 
up, the more I did it. Members of the Shadow Cabinet would frequently say: 
Come on, enough, we are miles ahead. Each time they said it, I would get hyper-
anxious, determined not for a single instant to stop the modernising 
drive….Reconnection was great and policy change was essential, but above all, 
people need to know that when I was tested, I would stay true to the 
modernising appeal.’266 
 
Policies that reflect the brand and the political market 
As stated in earlier discussions about the product and positioning, New Labour’s 
policies reflected the narrative that New Labour was different from old Labour. 
As well as proposing policies Blair took a different approach in the media when 
questioned about the economy. For example in September 1994, when interest 
rates were increased by 0.5 per cent, Blair moved away from the standard 
Labour response of criticising the Chancellor’s decision. Instead Blair told the 
Financial Times that ‘inflation is the symptom not the disease’. He told Radio 4’s 
Today programme that ‘he could run the market economy better than the 
Conservatives.’ The interviewer replied that ‘it is a long time since a Labour 
leader has said: ‘Vote for me because I know more about a market economy than 
the Tories.’ Blair didn’t flinch: ‘But it is absolutely true,’ he said.267 
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4.5 Brand agent 
In this section, I look at the primary brand agent, Tony Blair, and how he relates 
to the New Labour brand. In the introduction part of the product life-cycle, the 
primary brand agent, Tony Blair, was strong and he personified the New Labour 
brand. Like New Labour, Blair was different to old Labour, he was young and 
charismatic and as Gould stated he had ‘the pulse of the people.’268 Figure 4.2 
shows that more people were satisfied with Blair’s performance as opposition 
leader than dissatisfied.  
 
Figure 4.2 Tony Blair’s Satisfaction Rating as Opposition Leader (1994-1997)269 
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Figure 4.3 ICM Polling Data 1992-1997270 
 
 
The data in figure 4.3 shows that New Labour had a large lead over the 
Conservatives, even before Tony Blair was elected leader in 1994. However, after 
Blair’s election as leader, Labour’s share of the vote was between 50 and 60 per 
cent, until November 1996, closer to the general election. Figure 4.3 suggested 
that the creation of New Labour gave the party a boost in the polls, and it could 
be argued that it was Blair’s leadership that gave the party this boost. However, 
figure 4.2 shows that Blair’s personal rating, even though high, was lower than 
the party’s rating. Using this analysis, both the New Labour brand and the 
primary brand agent were strong during this phase. 
 
Using Vincent’s brand narrative chart, (Figure 2.3) when both the brand 
narrative and the primary brand agent are strong, it has a symbiotic 
relationship. As this chapter has shown New Labour needed a modernising 
figure like Blair to succeed, and Blair needed to be able to modernise the party to 
establish his credibility. Therefore in this part of the product life-cycle the brand 
                                                          
270
‘Guardian / ICM Polls: everyone since 1984’ accessed 19 April 2013 
<www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2009/oct/21/icm-poll-data-labour-conservatives> 
91 
 
and the primary brand agent had a symbiotic relationship and were dependent 
on each other.  
 
4.6 Summary 
New Labour in the product development and repositioning cycle of the product 
life-cycle is summarised as: 
 
Product 
• New Labour’s policies were market-oriented. 
• The party used detailed pledges to outline policy. 
• The party itself was reformed giving the leadership more control over 
policy. 
• The party was unified. 
 
Position 
• New Labour was the challenger and challenged the market-leader (the 
Conservatives) head-on. 
• New Labour accepted the changes that the Conservatives had made in the 
past. 
• New Labour took on policies that the Conservatives had traditionally been 
strong in, such as law and order and the economy. 
• New Labour professionalised the way it worked with the media. 
• The market-leader was in the decline phase of the product life-cycle model.  
 
Brand narratives 
• The narrative that ‘New Labour is different to old Labour’ was established 
in 1994-95 and was reinforced in the lead up to the 1997 election. 
• The primary brand agent personified New Labour. 
• Pseudo-events were used to show that the party had changed. 
 
Brand agent 
• Symbiotic relationship between New Labour and Tony Blair. 
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5. Growth 
During the 1997 election campaign New Labour maintained the momentum that 
it gained during the introduction cycle, which enabled it to push through to the 
growth cycle of the model. I have identified the period between May 1997 and 
September 2001 as the time when New Labour moved into the growth cycle of 
the product life-cycle model. During that time New Labour was given the 
opportunity to test the product and to maintain the support that it had gained in 
the election. 
 
During the growth cycle: 
 
• The political product makes the transition from opposition to government. 
• The political product is expected to deliver on the promises that it made. 
• The brand established in the previous cycle is reinforced. 
• The political product is at its strongest. 
• The brand agent is also at his/her strongest. 
 
When Tony Blair entered Number 10 on 2 May, 1997, the transition of power to 
New Labour was shown with the symbolism of cheering crowds waving flags, 
with Blair and his wife, Cherie, walked heroically down Downing Street. On the 
doorstep of Number 10, Blair declared and reassured voters that ‘I say to the 
people of this country – we ran for office as New Labour, we will govern as New 
Labour.’271 
 
The growth cycle, as described by Kotler and Armstrong, is ‘a period of rapid 
market acceptance and increased profits;’272 figure 2.1 also suggested that there 
is a large increase in profits during this time. In terms of a political product, 
there is acceptance of the product because it has gained enough support to 
become government, which means that the party is now able to deliver on its 
promises. However, unlike the product life-cycle model, there is no rapid increase 
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in profit or support throughout the growth phase. New Labour received a rapid 
increase in support when it was elected in 1997, this support increased during its 
honeymoon phase but by the 2001 election, when New Labour was re-elected 
with a small dip in support. For example in 1997 Labour received 13,518,167 
votes (43.2 per cent) winning 418 seats and in 2001 it received 10,724,953 votes 
(40.7 per cent) winning 418 seats. 
 
This chapter analyses New Labour’s product, positioning, brand narrative and 
brand agent during its growth phase. In my model the growth cycle is where the 
party makes its transition from ‘challenger’ to ‘market leader’. At the beginning 
of the cycle it is the challenger and quickly becomes the market leader.  
 
5.1 Product 
In this stage of the product life-cycle the New Labour product that was developed 
in the previous stage, was tested for the first time. This section looks at the 
difficulties that New Labour faced when its product was first tested as well as 
the further changes that were made to the party as well as changes to governing. 
This section is divided into four parts: 
 
• Further changes to the party. 
• Changes to 10 Downing Street. 
• Delivery of policies. 
• Sales-oriented approach to foreign policy. 
 
Further changes to the party 
During this part of the cycle New Labour still had a use for members at the 
grassroots; their function was to legitimise the decisions already decided by the 
leadership.273 However, the party continued to its centralisation by creating a 
plebiscite party where the leadership had the ease and ability to implement 
market-oriented policies (as well as sales and product oriented policies) without 
resistance from the party membership.  
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In office New Labour has continued to reform the party; this included: 
 
• Downgraded the role of party activists in the selection of candidates, 
giving the NEC and party membership greater power. 274 
• Candidates who were selected ‘sign a form agreeing to abide by the code 
and conduct of the Parliamentary Labour Party.’275 
• The leadership also had a greater say with the selection of candidates to 
the European and Scottish parliaments.276 
• The establishment of policy forums where party policies were developed by 
committees and were developed and reviewed. The conference acted as a 
‘final reading’ for policy. Once a policy was endorsed by conference, it was 
eligible to become a part of the next manifesto, but the final decision on 
the manifesto was left to a forum of Cabinet and NEC representatives. 
 
Party members were willing to change their party for electoral gain. In 2002 
Seyd and Whiteley conducted a study looking at the attitudes of party members 
towards the party’s strategy. Party members were ‘uneasy about the Blair 
strategy of capturing the votes of middle England.’277 However, they did not want 
to lose an election by ‘rigidly standing by their principles.’278 Membership did 
believe that the leadership was too powerful and did not pay attention to the 
views of ordinary members, but 71 per cent were satisfied with Blair as leader 
and 62 per cent approved the of the government, those who had less enthusiasm 
with the government identified with the party’s left.279  
 
Likewise the new Labour MPs showed loyalty to the party, Nicholas Jones 
observed that the new MPs were ‘dutiful [in the] way which they responded to 
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the pager messages sent out by Millbank and for their willingness to parrot the 
party lines that were faxed to their offices each morning in the Daily Brief.’ 280 
 
In the growth part of the life-cycle, the Labour remained relatively united. 
Reforms to the party continued to centralise the party reducing voter’s fear of a 
Labour Party in government divided by activists as was the case of the previous 
Labour government. Party members appreciated that changes to the party were 
needed and it was better for the party to be in government delivering than in 
opposition rigidly sticking to its principals.  
 
Changes to Downing Street 
In addition to the changes made to the Labour Party itself, Blair also made 
changes to the Prime Minister’s Office. In opposition New Labour was a 
centralised organisation which was centred on the leader and his inner circle and 
Blair was keen to keep this arrangement when as prime minister.281 Just after 
becoming Prime Minister, the following changes were made:  
 
• The ministerial rulebook, Questions of Procedure for Ministers was 
changed and reorganised as The Ministerial Code. The code reinforced 
that ministers needed to ‘consult Number 10 before releasing information, 
undertaking major media interviews, launching policy initiatives or 
making appointments.’282 
• In November 1997, the Strategic Communications Unit was created – The 
united was created so that the government had a clear message. Its task 
was ‘coordinating the release of departmental statements so as to 
eliminate clashes and ensure effective take-up in the media.’283 
• Blair’s style of government was different; he used face-to-face contact with 
ministers and was not as involved with cabinet committees.284 
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However, it was not realistic for Blair to make changes to Downing Street to 
replicate Millbank. Gould observed that before coming into government the New 
Labour modernisers worked closely together. But now that they were in 
government they were separated by different departments. Gould stated that ‘a 
meeting with Tony Blair took place within one kingdom, a meeting with Gordon 
Brown within another.’285 As opposition MPs, the leaders of New Labour could 
easily work together, but when they got into office, this became difficult due to 
the responsibilities of being in office and each minister running their own 
department. 
 
After the 2001 election Blair made further changes to his office by creating a 
Strategy Unit and a Delivery Unit, which worked alongside the Policy Unit. The 
Strategy Unit focused on long term policy and according to Hyman the unit used 
data from ‘competitor’ countries, ‘trawled the latest research and data, 
interviewed ministers and civil servants about the key challenges in their area, 
and came up with a view about what Britain needed. Party polling and 
information from other social research gave us a detailed sense of what the 
public wanted’286 The unit looked at medium and long term issues and tried to 
keep on top of ‘looming but no imminent’ issues.287 In terms of political 
marketing, and putting the voter and customer first, the above quote from 
Hyman suggest that the unit did use party polling and there was a real attempt 
to find out what political market wanted.  
 
The Delivery Unit was initially headed by Professor Michael Barber. Goal of the 
unit was to monitor the performance of four departments – Department of 
Health, the Home Office, the Department of Education and Skills and the 
Department of Transport. In 2007 Barber wrote his own book where he ‘outlined 
the need for delivery reports, setting targets, consideration of delivery chains, an 
                                                          
285
 Gould (2011), p.417 
286
 Peter Hyman (2005), 1 Out of 10: From Downing Street Vision to Classroom Reality, Vintage London p.246 
287
 Blair (2011) p.339 
98 
 
assessment framework and simple presentations to the media.288 Blair found the 
unit ‘utterly invaluable’ because it ‘focused like a laser on an issue, draw up a 
plan to resolve it working with the department concerned, and then 
performance-manage the solution.’289 
 
The above changes that Blair made to the way his personal office in Downing 
Street suggests that he did have political marketing in mind. By reigning in 
government announcements, New Labour ensured that the brand was focused 
and was delivering clear and simple messages. A focus on delivery ensured that 
the government was able to make real change. The Strategy Unit using social 
research and party opinion poll data also suggests that the views of the political 
consumer were taken into account in the development of medium and long term 
government policy. 
 
Delivery 
In the previous stage of the product life-cycle, New Labour developed a product 
that was market-oriented; its policies best reflected the political market. 
However, it was not in government and was not able to deliver its policies. In the 
growth stage of product life-cycle New Labour was in government and had the 
power to deliver. According to Lees-Marshment, delivery is difficult in politics; ‘It 
involves not just delivering policy goals through legislation and system changes 
but maintaining the overall brand and product communicated before the 
election.’290 This section is divided into two parts. First, Blair found that the civil 
service was resistant to change and delivery. Secondly, I ask to what extent was 
New Labour market-oriented at this time. 
 
The pace of change 
Blair was frustrated at the pace of change, stating that in his first two years 
there had been progress but it had been slow, he stated that the reason of this 
was due to money but there was also ‘a structural problem that money alone 
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couldn’t solve. Across the piece – in schools, universities, the NHS, law and order 
and criminal justice – we were still only tinkering, not transforming.’291 The 
government’s declared, 1999 the ‘year of delivery’, did not produce results, and 
he became frustrated. At a conference he stated “You try getting change in the 
public sector and public services, I bear the scars on my back after two years in 
government.”292 Blair further stated that: 
  
As we began to try and drive change in the public service, in 
welfare, in law and order, it became obvious that there were 
major ‘c’ conservative interests within the services that were 
hostile to change, essentially vast vested interests that were 
pretty unscrupulous about defending themselves on the spurious 
grounds of defending the public interest.293 
 
During its first year in government, people where positive about New Labour. 
However, in the second year there was some concern from voters: ‘focus groups 
held among switchers to Labour from the Conservatives were divided between 
the promise of hope and the pace of delivery.’294 Some of the comments from the 
focus groups were: 
 
• Blair has charisma. 
• More modern. 
• Hope for the future. 
• Maybe a slow start on some issues. 
• Very slow on education, health service, seem to have ideas they do not 
follow through. 
• Talk but does not deliver.295 
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Lees-Marshment noted that even if a political party succeeds in delivering what 
the political consumer wants, political consumers may not give them credit.296 
This was the case with New Labour, half way through its first term Gould’s 
public opinion research showed that the public criticised the government for not 
delivering, but they could not say what it had failed to deliver nor say what it 
had achieved.297 Lees-Marshment further noted that in 2006 a poll showed that 
voters thought that under Labour ‘services got worse and not better.’298 However, 
a survey showed that 71 per cent of people had a good experience using the 
NHS.299 
 
During this part of the cycle, political consumers have high expectations that the 
new government will deliver. But in the case of New Labour there were factors 
that stalled delivery of products, such as the resistance of the civil service and 
the ministers were new to government, they had a strong mandate, but did not 
know how to govern. On coming into power people did have high expectations of 
New Labour. This might have been a deliberate strategy of New Labour, or 
perhaps the leaders of New Labour had no idea of the challenges they would face 
delivering on policy in government.  
 
Delivery in the growth cycle 
Labour did succeed in areas like constitutional reform and the introduction of 
the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, but Labour did not make 
substantial improvements to public services.300 In 2000, Gould produced a memo 
called ‘recovery and reconnection’ it showed that people thought the government 
was doing well with the economy and education, but was making slow progress 
on anything else, which made Blair frustrated.301 However, Labour did achieve 
the following changes: 
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• Independence for the Bank of England. 
• Belfast Agreement. 
• Human Rights Act. 
• Freedom of Information Act. 
• Scottish Parliament. 
• Welsh Assembly. 
• Introduction of a minimum wage. 
 
Without an in-depth analysis of New Labour’s policies and their delivery it will 
be hard to determine how many policies were market-orientated. However, 
opinion polling data before 2001 does suggest that New Labour did have a 
market-orientation. Or that it was closer to the market than the opposition. For 
example, in a Mori poll in the lead up to the 2001 election, voters identified the 
following issues as important to them and most likely to determine their vote: 
 
• Healthcare (59 per cent) 
• Education (50 per cent) 
• Law and Order (41 per cent) 
• Pensions (31 per cent) 
• Taxation (28 per cent).302 
 
The next question asked which party had the best policy for the above issues and 
it showed that Labour dominated the Conservatives on health, education and 
pensions. For example 43 per cent believed Labour’s policy on health care was 
the best, compared to 15 per cent for the Conservatives. Forty per cent believed 
Labour’s policy was the best on Education compared to 15 per cent for the 
Conservatives. However, Labour and the Conservatives were close on Law and 
Order and Taxation, with 29 per cent saying Labour had the best policy on Law 
and Order compared to 31 per cent for the Conservatives. And both parties were 
tied on taxation at 32 per cent. This data suggests that New Labour’s policies for 
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the main issues were in-line with the political market, or more in-line to the 
political market when compared to the Conservatives. This perception would 
have been created by Labour’s 2001 campaign promises as well as from its record 
in office.  
 
In conclusion, Labour did have trouble delivering market-oriented policy and this 
experience showed Blair that more attention needed to be placed on public sector 
reform.303 Also evidence suggests that even if New Labour followed a 100 per 
cent market-orientation and delivered on every aspect of the political consumers’ 
demands, it probably would not be noticed, or they would receive little credit for 
it. However, by the 2001 election polls showed that New Labour’s policies were 
still closely aligned to the political market, more so than the Conservatives. This 
does not necessarily show that New Labour had a market-orientation, but it does 
show that they were more close to the market than the Conservatives.  
 
Sales-Oriented approach to foreign policy  
As stated above, New Labour had problems delivering some of its market-
oriented policies. In the area of international relations, Blair undertook a sales-
oriented approach. Lees-Marshment identified the factors that may challenge a 
government’s market-orientation. These include the ‘realities and constraints of 
government’ and the ‘increased knowledge, experience and information among 
leaders, encouraging feelings of invincibility, arrogance and superiority.’304 In 
this section, I argue that Blair’s experience in foreign policy during the growth 
phase of the cycle shifted his style of leadership from a market-orientated 
‘consensus building’ politician to a conviction politician. Gould argued that Blair 
made the shift from a consensus politician to a conviction politician in 1999.305 
 
Blair admitted that the 1997 election campaign was fought on domestic policy 
and that despite knowing a lot about history he did not know much about foreign 
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affairs on taking office.306 Blair’s Chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell, later wrote 
that when elected, new prime ministers have little intention on spending time on 
foreign policy, they are more concerned about domestic policy. Over time prime 
ministers ‘find themselves dragged into foreign policy, usually in their first term, 
and over time they come to enjoy it more than domestic policy.’307 In his first 
term Blair dispatched British Forces into three arenas: Iraq (1998), Kosovo 
(1999) and Sierra Leone (2000). This section focuses on Kosovo.  
 
Kosovo 
The conflict in Kosovo was an 11 week NATO aerial war against Yugoslavian 
President Slobodan Milošević, whose Serbian forces were carrying out a 
campaign of ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians. Blair stated that the Kosovo 
conflict gave him many lessons about leadership and that his position on foreign 
policy evolved during the crisis.308 
 
During the conflict, Blair believed that the ‘primary instinct of the international 
community was to act,’ and he advocated a military solution, including the use of 
ground troops.309 However, as the conflict unfolded Blair and his advisors saw 
the limitations of polling and market orientated politics when confronted with 
the idea of sending ground troops to Kosovo. Rawnsley observed that: 
 
The heart of the problem was that Clinton was terrified of 
American public opinion, which the White House was polling 
daily. There was a blackly comic side to this. At Clinton’s feet 
had New Labour been tutored in the use of polling to give the 
people what pleased them. His ability to flex the public mood 
had been admired by New Labour as it had been aped. Now, 
Tony Blair was confronted with the limits of governing by 
opinion poll. He was doing some polling himself. Philip Gould 
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was sampling public opinion to define how the conflict was 
playing with the British electorate. But even the focus group 
guru regarded his results as of dubious value. ‘Ignore it,’ Gould 
advised Blair. ‘The only important thing is to win.’ The British 
public would tolerate anything except a defeat.310 
 
The conflict showed a shift in Blair from a market-oriented politician of 
consensus to a more sales-oriented conviction politician. During the conflict in a 
speech in Chicago in April 1999 Blair outlined ‘A Doctrine of the International 
Community’ which basically outlined the grounds in which international 
intervention should be justified on dictatorships ‘on the grounds of the nature of 
that regime, not merely its immediate threat to [national] interests.’311 Blair set 
out five major considerations: 
 
• Are we sure of our case? 
• Have we exhausted all diplomatic options?  
• On the basis of a practical assessment of the situation, are there military 
options we can sensibly and prudently undertake?  
• Are we prepared for the long term?  
• Do we have national interest involved?312  
 
The above speech shows there was a shift away from a market-oriented 
approach, especially with foreign policy. Of Blair’s five major considerations 
there was no mention of the voter or political consumer. Their views were 
ignored and the speech show’s Blair’s shifted away from consensus politician to a 
conviction politician, especially in foreign affairs. However, on the other hand, it 
can be noted that Blair did fulfil the role of a strong and decisive leader, which is 
a quality that the political consumers often demand. 
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However, Blair’s shift to a conviction politician did not mean that Blair 
abandoned political marketing in this conflict; he still placed importance on 
communicating his policies to the political market and adopted a sales-
orientation. For example, during the crisis a clone of Millbank election machine 
was created at NATO headquarters to ensure that the war was properly 
communicated. As observed by Rawnsley, Blair: 
 
dispatch[ed] Downing Street’s elite company of para-spinners to 
Brussels. Jamie Shea, the NATO spokesman, who had been 
floundering trying to reconcile the contradictory information 
about the refugee bombing, received a warning call from a friend 
in Washington to brace himself for an imminent appearance by 
Alistair Campbell. When he got to NATO headquarter on 
Thursday, the press secretary was horrified. NATO, never before 
having fought a war, was hopelessly inadequate to a propaganda 
battle.313 
 
Gould’s focus groups showed that there was no ‘public acclaim’ for Blair’s success 
in Kosovo, instead the public were concerned about Blair’s ‘passion for war’ and 
that he was not as passionate about domestic affairs. People were not concerned 
about the situation in Kosovo, instead they wanted ‘their own country fixed.’314 
However, during the conflict a MORI Poll indicated that 70 per cent of Britons 
polled thought that Britain’s aerial campaign against Yugoslavia to stop ethnic 
cleansing was the right thing to do.315 Even 51 per cent supported the use of 
ground troops.316 This may suggest that the sales-oriented approach to the 
conflict paid off for the government. 
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Kosovo gave Blair a false understanding of the reality of war. In the case of 
Kosovo, Blair was proved to be correct, even though the political market never 
specifically sought military intervention in Kosovo. Blair felt that his actions 
were justified because there was a quick resolution to the conflict and an end to 
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The war did not show a complete departure from 
political marketing due to the emphasis on communications. 
 
Conclusion 
In the growth part of the product life-cycle, reform of the Labour Party continued 
when New Labour entered government. It also extended its centralisation 
reforms to Downing Street. In domestic policy New Labour did try to implement 
market-oriented policies, but this was not always easy due to the civil service. In 
foreign policy there was shift from a market-orientation to a sales-orientation. 
Also Blair made the shift to a politician of conviction. As Gould observed: 
 
The relationship between the public and politicians is complex. 
Modern government, probably all government, requires a 
balance between conviction and consent; you cannot lead 
effectively without both. The public want leadership with 
purpose, leadership that can be believed in, but they also want 
to be listened to and to be involved in the process of 
government.317 
 
It is easier for a political product in opposition to be market-orientation because 
it does not have to deliver on policies, nor does it have to be reactive to 
international event. In power a political product like New Labour still had a 
market-orientation and best represented the political market, while it also took 
on a sales-oriented approach in other areas like foreign affairs. This supports the 
above quote from Gould that argued that a government needs a balance between 
conviction and consent. 
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5.2 Positioning 
New Labour became the market leader in the political market in 1997 by 
becoming the government. Labour won 418 seats, 43.2 per cent of the popular 
vote which translated to a majority of 179 seats. An estimated 1.8 million 
Conservative voters switched to Labour between 1992 and 1997.318 The nature of 
the first past the post electoral system gave the new market-leader a boost. Even 
though it did not receive a majority of the popular vote, it did have an 
overwhelming majority of seats in the new Parliament.  
 
The goal of a market leader is to expand ‘the total market, expanding market 
share further and defending [its current] market share.’319 Butler and Collins 
concede that it is difficult for it to expand a market share when the market 
leader already has broad appeal, therefore the market leader will mainly be on 
the defensive.320 Gould emphasised that the goal of New Labour was not just 
winning the next election, but building long-term support so that the parties 
long-term goals could be achieved.321 Gould saw parallels with the Conservative 
Party which successfully showed its pragmatism and adaptability, which allowed 
the party to reinvent it to suit the current political climate.322 Gould’s analysis 
implies that constant rejuvenation was required to defend its market share.  
 
Four factors that helped New Labour defend its market share in the first term. 
Firstly, it placed a lot of effort and emphasis on building consensus, being a 
government that included everyone in the country. Secondly, in government the 
party continued to have policies that appealed to the centre. Thirdly, it placed 
emphasis on communication management, or ‘spin’. Finally, New Labour faced a 
weak opposition. 
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Building Consensus  
In the first term, the government placed an emphasis on building consensus, 
even with those who traditionally voted for the Conservatives. Rawnsley argued 
that this approach was tactical: by drawing in the moderate Conservative it left 
the opposition front bench looking like extremist Tories.323 
 
In contrast to Thatcher’s ‘divide and rule’ policies in the 1980s, New Labour 
made attempts to show that it was an inclusive government for all Britons. Blair 
did this by working with moderate members of the Conservative Party, for 
example former Conservative Cabinet Minister and Deputy Prime Minister 
Michael Haseltine was a regular visitor to Number 10, discussing the 
Millennium Dome project and former Conservative Chairman and the last 
Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, became the chairman of the Commission 
of Inquiry into the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It was also noted that Blair was 
always inclusive in his speeches, he often used the word ‘we’ which was a similar 
tactic used by the Conservatives such as Rab Butler and Edward Heath that 
historically spoke about ‘one nation’ which has a ‘sense of the organic unity of a 
highly differentiated body politic or used it in opposition to divisions between two 
nations of rich and poor.’324 
 
Policies 
As stated in the previous section, New Labour continued to have market-oriented 
policies during this part of the cycle, with the exception of foreign policy. As the 
market-leader Labour defended its market-share by retaining its market-
orientation.  
 
Spin 
As the market-leader, New Labour in government changed the way that a 
government communicated. It continued ‘the grid of media announcements, 
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parcelling out released to fit the government’s narrative. The grid, held at 
Downing Street, metered out policy, controlling the agenda.’325 The Strategic 
Communications unit found ways to get Blair ‘beyond the headlines to enhance 
the prime minister’s message, by trying to reach, for instance, women’s 
magazines.’326 Alistair Campbell, ‘the prime minister’s official spokesman’, was 
also known for his combative briefings to the media which within time became 
part of the story.327 
 
As the market-leader New Labour was criticised by its communications strategy 
which was also known as ‘spin.’ Labour’s communication strategy was defined by 
its past, it still remember the aggressive media attacks that Kinnock received as 
leader and also it needed to find a way to adapt to the 24 hour news cycle. Also 
Hyman observed that a focus on communication strategy is important because 
‘ordinary people are too busy dealing with their lives ‘without much thought for 
the ins and outs of politics.’328 People do not notice most government 
announcements because most they ‘last less than twenty-four hours in the 
media.’329 
 
Gould stated that it was aiming to meet the ‘challenge of governance in a 
frenzied and relentless media age…good government requires consent, 
communication and the capacity to act quickly and decisively in the face of 
continuous media and incredibly fast-moving events.’330 
 
The Opposition 
The Conservatives were not an effective challenger to Labour. The opposition 
was weak, divided and poorly led by William Hague. In the 2001 election 
campaign it focused on Britain’s relationship with the European Union. Their big 
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election slogan in the election was ‘ten days to save the pound.’331 Pre-election 
surveys showed that only 18 per cent believed that Europe was an issue that 
helped determine their vote.332 Gould’s opinion polling in 2000 showed that the 
public thought the Conservatives were ‘weak, divided and useless’ but the party’s 
hard line stance on Europe, crime and welfare was noted.333 
 
Without going into too much detail about the weaknesses of the Conservative 
Party at this time, in terms of the life-cycle model the party was still going 
through its decline phase and trying to introduce a new product to the political 
market that did not appeal to political consumers. As the previous chapter 
showed, a challenger needs to have sorted out its own internal divisions before it 
can become an effective challenger. In the 2001 election the Conservatives were 
focusing on retaining its own base and not challenging the government for the 
middle ground. 
 
The 2001 election 
During the growth period of 1997-2001, New Labour dominated the political 
market as the market leader. It continued and built on its success as the 
challenger. In the 2001 election, Labour went from 43.2 per cent to 40.7 per cent 
of the vote. It retained a healthy majority of 167 seats. Even though the goal of a 
market-leader’s goal is to build on the support it received, realistically a political 
party will only be at its height after its first election to office and after that it is 
trying to retain power. That was the case of New Labour, the 1997 election was 
the best result it would receive while in government. The low turnout in the 2001 
election of 59.4 per cent could be seen as a sign of voter apathy. However, Blair 
argued that the turnout was not a reliable reflection of the government and that 
in elections that are close, voter turnout is much higher, while in elections where 
the incumbent is a shoo-in, turn out is lower.334 
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Interestingly, in Blair’s biography, he stated that even though it was certain that 
Labour was going to win the 2001, Clinton advised Blair to ‘fight the campaign 
as if it were neck and neck, to show the people how much you want it, how much 
you are prepared to fight for it, and how grateful you are for every last vote you 
are going to get.’335 This suggests that even when the market-leader is in a 
comfortable position, it should still behave like a challenger during an election 
campaign.  
 
Conclusion 
As the market-leader, New Labour retained its position in the growth cycle. It 
successfully defended its market share by being more in touch with the political 
market than its main challenger. It also maintained this position by maintaining 
market-oriented policies, building a consensus with the community and focusing 
its attention on its communications.  
 
5.3 Brand narrative  
In the growth cycle New Labour’s brand narrative had the political consumer in 
mind. In the growth cycle, the party continued to use symbolism as part of its 
narrative. The brand narratives that were created in opposition were centred 
around trust and the idea the New Labour would be different in government and 
that it could deliver. The government used symbolism to present its narrative to 
political consumers. 
 
Symbolism 
In the previous chapter, I stated that New Labour used pseudo-events as part of 
its narrative. In the product development and reintroduction cycle New Labour 
had certain key stories that it wanted to tell the electorate, and they did this 
through events and symbolism. New Labour continued the use of pseudo-events 
and symbolism in government. Government by symbolism is when a government 
uses devices such a media releases or speeches or staged events to show that it is 
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making progress on an issue. These initiatives may not actually work or deliver 
any change. However, the appearance that action is being taken is just as 
valuable. O’Shaunessy stated that ‘symbol[ism] has a flexibility of meaning to 
whichever the viewer can bring his or her imagination – an openness to 
interpretation. Symbols resonate.’ 336 
 
As stated above, New Labour did have problems with delivery in its first term. 
Also, its ability to deliver in its first two years in power was limited due to its 
promise to keep to the Conservative’s spending plans. The challenge was to make 
improvements without spending new money. To do this the government used 
symbolism as Rawnsley observed: ‘There was a frenetic wave of announcements, 
high on symbolism and low on cost, from the restoration of trade union rights at 
GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) to the banning of 
handguns.’337 
 
New Labour’s use of symbolism has been criticised by O’Shaunessy. He stated 
that in the first term it used such symbolism to show it possessed authoritarian, 
radical, populist and liberal credentials:  
 
authoritarian sounding threats were made – punishment for 
juvenile delinquents, claims that teachers would be able to be 
sacked in four weeks if they were incompetent and curfews for 
under-tens. And the liberal conscience was assuaged with claims 
that there would be a selective ban on weapons sales (but not 
Indonesia), adoption of the European Social Chapter, and 
adoption of the minimum-wage (but at a low rate). Their critics 
accused them of seeking instant policy answers to every crisis, 
such as Mr Blair’s demand that policemen should be able to take 
miscreants to cash machines and fine them instantly; or of 
taking no decisions at all.’338  
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New Labour in the first term produced an annual report to outline its progress 
on key policies.339 These reports have been described, by Blair as ‘holding the 
government to account, about charting our progress against the clear promises 
we made.’340 However, as Needham observed these reports were criticised for 
being public relations material or propaganda.341 
 
Comparing the annual reports of 1998, 1999 and 2000 with the 1997 election 
manifesto illustrates the use of symbolism and narrative by New Labour; looking 
at prosperity, the 1997 manifesto promised to ‘Deliver economic prosperity for 
the many not the few.’ The 1998 annual report stated that the government had 
received a bad economic situation from its predecessor and claims that it had 
started reforms to stop the ‘boom and bust’ economic cycle to create long term 
stability. In 1999 the report stated that the government has been working with 
business. Again the report talked about how bad the ‘boom and bust’ economic 
cycle (created by its predecessors) had been bad for these business that the 
government was working with. In 2000 the report had more substance, talking 
about 970,000 more people who were in work and that the government had 
‘public finances under control’ and had invested in the NHS ‘which provides the 
base on which to build a stronger, fairer Britain where opportunity and 
enterprise are open to all.’342 
 
The above example is rich in both symbolism and narrative. It tells the story 
that over four years the economy had improved and that the government had 
worked on eliminating the ‘boom and bust’ style of economics. It is creating a 
fairer Britain with opportunity for all. The narrative shows that the government 
fixed the UK economy from the mistakes of its predecessor. The above example 
does not say a lot about what New Labour did for the economy, it talked more 
about intention rather than delivery. For example, on Law and Order the 2000 
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annual report stated that ‘the rate of recorded crime in England and Wales rose 
by 3 per cent. But crime can be beaten. The government has increased the 
resources available to fight crime. Police budgets have risen on average by 3.6 
per cent.’ 343 
 
This narrative of economic progress was market-oriented given Labour’s historic 
weakness on the economy in the past. This narrative was successful, by the 2001 
election, 48 per cent of people believed that Labour was the best party to manage 
the economy, compared to 22 per cent for the Conservatives.344 This use of 
symbolism to represent the government’s narrative did have its problems, in a 
leaked memo in 2000, Gould wrote that the New Labour brand was ‘badly 
contaminated…undermined by a combination of spin, lack of conviction and 
apparent lack of integrity.345’ In a MORI poll in 2000 43 per cent of respondents 
believed that Labour would promise anything to win votes.346 
 
5.4 Brand agent 
During the growth period, New Labour’s primary brand agent was more popular 
than the party itself. Throughout the first term Blair showed himself to be a 
formidable politician who knew how to capture the mood of the people during a 
crisis, for example his speech after the death of Princess Diana in 1997. He was 
also regarded as a competent leader. Blair had proved himself in war and on the 
world stage through the Kosovo crisis. However, there was a perception that 
Blair was ‘willing to jump on every bandwagon.’347 Rawnsley described Blair as: 
 
The most accomplished communicator of his era, a talent not to 
be dismissed in the age of 24/7 media where a leader is 
constantly on show. At times of national drama or international 
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crisis, he displayed a high facility for capturing public sentiment 
and weaving it into a political narrative. When the royal family 
froze in self-endangering silence after the death of Diana, Blair 
took on the role of spokesman for the national emotion, stepping 
into the position vacated by the mute head of state, and helping 
to save the royal family from itself. With his word wreath about 
a ‘people’s princess’, he expressed the feelings that Britain – or 
at least a large part of it – wanted to hear. It was a significant 
episode in his early development as Prime Minster.348 
 
As the brand agent, Blair was always more popular than his own party as the 
graph below illustrates: 
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Figure 5.1 Satisfaction of Blair vs Labour  
 
The above graph (figure 5.1) also suggests that even though Blair was more 
popular than his party, the trend lines followed a similar pattern. Throughout 
the growth cycle, overall popularity in New Labour and in Blair decreased.  
 
However, as outlined earlier in the chapter, Blair’s style of leadership shifted 
during this period. As he gained more experience in office he shifted away from a 
market-oriented politician to a conviction politician.  
 
5.5 Summary 
New Labour in the growth cycle of the product life-cycle is summarised as: 
 
Product 
• Reforms to centralise the party continued and were extended to the 
operation of Number 10. 
• New Labour’s policies were market-oriented, but there were problems 
with delivery. 
• New Labour’s foreign policy was sales-oriented. 
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Position 
• New Labour became the market leader and successfully defended its 
market share. 
• The challenger was weak and failed to adequately challenge the market 
leader.  
• New Labour retained its support with centrist policies and its 
communications strategy.  
 
Brand narratives 
• Symbolism was used to show the brand narrative.  
 
Brand agent 
• Blair was slightly more stronger than the New Labour brand. 
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6. Maturity 
In the maturity stage a political product has built up its reputation in the 
political market where it is still the market leader and the dominant player. 
Maturity is a challenge for a political product because at this stage the product is 
at risk of decline. As Kotler and Armstrong state: maturity is a time when the 
product has ‘achieved acceptance by most potential buyers’ and that ‘profits level 
off or decline because of increased market outlays to defend the product against 
competition.’349 
 
In Rajagopal and Sanchez’s model that adapted branding into the marketing life-
cycle model, it revealed that at this stage a product’s objective is to ‘secure new 
market segments.’350 To do this, features of the product are adjusted and these 
new features are communicated to the market.351 In political marketing terms, a 
party’s objective in this cycle is to keep and maintain the support gained in the 
previous two cycles because its support has now peaked and will start to decline 
without rejuvenation.  
 
Realistically political parties do not increase their support base in the third or 
fourth term. Generally electoral support for a government will peak in its first or 
sometimes second election and then decline. An example of this is the New 
Zealand Labour government of 1999-2008. In its first election it won 38.74 per 
cent of the vote, it won 41.26 per cent in 2002 and 41.10 per cent in 2005 with a 
decline to 33.99 per cent in 2008. New Labour also followed a similar trend to 
New Zealand Labour. 
 
In the maturity stage to maintain its support a party should start rejuvenating 
itself to maintain its link with the political consumer. This is an opportunity for 
a party to readjust to prevent political consumers from switching to its 
competitors. Rejuvenating at this stage is important to prevent the challenger 
from taking ground away from the market leader. Rejuvenation can be done by 
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changing the party leader, having a generational change in the party or making 
a major shift in policy. 
 
This chapter argues that instead of continuing its relationship with political 
consumers, New Labour became more consumed with international relations, 
especially the Iraq war and internal conflicts such as the dysfunctional working 
relationship between Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Around the 2005 election, 
efforts were made to reengage Blair with political consumers. New Labour did 
attempt to regenerate in 2007 when Brown became prime minister and at first 
this was successful. (The next chapter discusses New Labour’s attempt to 
regenerate in 2007).  
 
I identify the end of 2001 as the start of New Labour entering the maturity cycle. 
After the terrorist attack of 9/11 there was a shift in Tony Blair’s focus towards 
international relations at the expense of domestic policy.352 The maturity cycle 
ended in late 2008 when it became clear that New Labour’s rejuvenation under 
Brown had failed and the party then shifted into a decline stage.  
 
6.1 Product 
The New Labour product between 2001 and 2008 was a different product from 
what was previously offered to political consumers. This section is divided into 
three parts. First I outline the changes in the party’s membership, as New 
Labour moved into the maturity phase, its membership numbers continued to 
fall. Then examine further delivery problems that New Labour faced. Finally I 
analyse Blair’s continued sales-orientation to foreign policy by examining the 
consequences of the Iraq War on New Labour.  
 
Party Membership 
In previous chapters, I discussed New Labour’s shift to a plebiscitary model 
party, before entering office in 1997 there was a big push in recruiting new 
members. However, when Labour entered office the number of members 
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declined. There was a big decrease in party membership during the growth 
period between 1997, where there were 405,000 members and 2001 where there 
were 272,000.353 The downward trend continued in the maturity stage so that by 
the 2005 election party membership decreased to 258,000 and by 2008 there 
were only 250,000 members.354 Whiteley surveyed the former members of the 
Labour Party and identified two main reasons why party numbers declined. 
Firstly, people left in protest to the Iraq war and secondly the new recruits to the 
party from after 1994 were not loyal grassroots members and eventually left the 
party.355 Whiteley also observed that since coming to power in 1997 the party 
paid little attention to the party membership.356 
 
The decrease in the party’s membership suggests that when a party is in its 
maturity stage party members are decreasing. When a political product is new it 
is more likely to attract new members, as New Labour did when it was in 
opposition. But once it starts making real decisions and focuses on governing 
people start to leave the party.  
 
Further problems with Delivery 
During the maturity cycle of the product life-cycle model there were divisions 
within the product that prevented effective delivery. The major division between 
Gordon Brown and Tony Blair impacted on the direction of the government. Also 
Labour had been relatively united in the first two cycles (with the exception of 
minor opposition from old left Labourites such as Ken Livingstone and Tony 
Benn), in this cycle there was some opposition from Labour MPs in Parliament 
which nearly derailed some government policy. 
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Blair and Brown 
The dysfunctional relationship between Brown and Blair was the main obstacle 
for the government to deliver on its policies in the maturity cycle. The 
relationship was a good illustration that a political product is not just building 
and maintaining a relationship with the political consumer. There are other 
factors and relationships that a political product needs to manage, such as 
internal and other external relationships. 
 
After the 2001 election, Blair wanted to do more as Prime Minister while Brown 
was becoming obsessed with becoming Prime Minister.357 Blair was concerned 
with his place in history; he wanted to be bigger and bolder and focus on public 
service reform, he started to take control of the government’s policy direction. 
Rawnsley noted that the real Leader of the Opposition to Blair was Brown, 
Brown was also concerned about his place in history.358 
 
Gould noted that the first sign of disagreement between Brown and Blair started 
after the 2001 election where they started to disagree over the pace of public 
service reform. Blair pushed for more dramatic reform, while Brown resisted.359 
Gould reflected that he often wondered in meetings if Brown’s resistance to Blair 
was personal or political.360 Brown started to pressure Blair for a departure date, 
he was concerned that the longer New Labour stayed in power, the shorter his 
own premiership would be.361 One cabinet minister confided in Rawnsley that ‘all 
their confrontations between 2001 and 2006 are about Gordon saying: ‘Why 
haven’t you f**king gone?’362 Brown did not cooperate with Blair’s programme 
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and wanted to distance himself from Blair.363 Powell argued that one of Blair’s 
failure as a leader was not removing Brown from Cabinet earlier.364 
 
The conflict between Blair and Brown started when John Smith died in 1994, 
Brown agreed not to stand for the leadership on the condition that Brown would 
have greater power over domestic policy under a Blair Premiership. It was also 
agreed that within time Blair would resign as leader handing the premiership 
over to Brown. This agreement essential caused division in Blair’s premiership, 
Gould described this as ‘a massive mistake….There should have been a contest. 
Gordon should have stood against Tony. [The agreement] encumbered Tony with 
responsibilities to another member of the Cabinet which were not consistent 
with good Government. Gordon was encumbered with a sense of entitlement 
which was bad for his personality. It brought out the worst in both of them.’365 
 
Parliamentary Party 
In the previous parts of the life-cycle, Labour MPs were loyal to Blair and New 
Labour. However, in this cycle there were rebellions from Labour MPs over 
certain policies, as seen below: 
 
Figure 6.1 – Labour MP Rebellions  
Vote Labour MPs voting against the Government 
Iraq (2003) 139 
Trident (2007) 95 
Higher Education Bill (2004) 72 
Education and Inspections Bill 
(2006) 
69 
Health and Social Care Bill 
(2003) 
65 
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Delivery in the Maturity Cycle 
Gould observed that after the 2005 election, Blair was in his element because his 
reforms to the NHS were working, his education programme was the right way 
forward and he had been coming up with solutions to deal with immigration.366 
Likewise Blair was still passionate about public service reform. The irony about 
this is that Blair got a feel and understanding of how to govern as his time in 
office was drawing to an end. Gould observed that there were changes in the 
health and education system due to Blair’s policies, while a 2011 London School 
of Economics report suggest that giving greater autonomy to academy schools 
‘generates a significant improvement in the quality of pupil intake and a 
significant improvement in pupil performance.’367 Another London School of 
Economics report also showed that between 1997 and 2007 waiting times for 
operations decreased.368 In a MORI poll in September 2007 (after the transfer of 
power from Brown to Blair) 31 per cent said Labour had the best policies in 
health care (compared to 20 per cent for the Conservatives).369 Likewise 32 per 
cent supported Labour’s education policy (compared to 19 per cent who 
supported the Conservatives).370 
 
This does not show if Labour’s health care and education policies were what 
political consumers were after. But it does show that Labour’s health and 
education policies after ten years, best fitted to what the political market 
wanted, compared to the others. However, the 2007 result showed a significant 
drop since 1997, when 51 per cent thought Labour’s health policies were the best 
so there had been a significant drop after 10 years in office.371 Support for 
Labour’s education policy also took a similar drop.372 
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It is hard to say if New Labour in the maturity cycle was still delivering market-
oriented policies. Blair stated in his biography regarding reform that New 
Labour had a specific vision in its first term, it was unable to deliver due to the 
public service but by the second term ‘we [had] fashioned a template 
of…reform’373 The template involved, according to Blair: 
 
• Introducing competition. 
• ‘Blurring the distinction between public and private sector.’ 
• Challenging the unions and ‘vested interest.’ 
• Freeing up the system so it can innovate.374 
 
Blair also stated that when reforming:  
 
It is an objective lesson in the progress of reform: the change is 
proposed; it is denounced as a disaster; it proceeds with vast 
chipping away and opposition; it is unpopular; it comes about; 
within a short space of time, it is as if had always been so. The 
lesson is also inevitable, but rarely is it unbeatable. There will 
be many silent supporters as well as the many vocal detractors. 
And leadership is all about the decisions that change. If you 
can’t handle that, don’t become a leader.375 
 
Even though the above passage was written by Blair after he had left office, it 
does suggest that Blair shifted away from a market-oriented approach. This 
could be because of his increased knowledge and understanding of government 
through personal experience. The passage says that despite protest and 
opposition the end product justifies the means. Likewise, Blair’s template does 
not include any dialogue with political consumers to find out what they are after. 
Only the opinion polls suggest that New Labour maintained a market-oriented 
approach because its policies were the closest to the political market. 
                                                          
373
 Blair (2011),p.481 
374
 Blair (2011) p.481 
375
 Blair (2011), p.481 
126 
 
Iraq 
Blair’s attention towards foreign policy shifted after 9/11. Immediately after the 
terrorist attacks in New York, Blair travelled across the world to drum up 
support for the United States’ campaign in Afghanistan. Blair effectively became 
‘Ambassador at Large for [US President George W.] Bush.’ Rawnsley observed 
that in this foreign policy role, Blair was enthusiastic and in his element. Blair’s 
role also benefited the United States because a British Prime Minister can travel 
to the capitals of the world much easier than the President of the United 
States.376 Blair’s appetite for the world stage had grown since involvement in the 
Kosovo conflict. This continuous shift suggests that as Blair became active and 
dominant on the world stage, his relationship with political consumers was 
downgraded while the relationship with the Americans and other world leaders 
received more attention and focus. 
 
The Iraq war was a turning point in Blair’s relationship with political 
consumers. In the build-up to the war, the government took a sales-oriented 
approach by arguing that there were weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in 
Iraq and it was a direct threat to Britain’s security. When it later emerged that 
there were no WMDs in Iraq this broke the trust between Blair and political 
consumers. This section is therefore divided into two parts. Firstly, I look at the 
sale-oriented approach to the Iraq war and then analyse the consequence of the 
sale-oriented approach on Labour’s support. For this section I only examine the 
build-up to the invasion of Iraq and its subsequent invasion. 
  
A sales-oriented approach 
In later years Blair was criticised for his relationship with the Republican 
President. At the beginning of the Bush administration the outgoing President 
Bill Clinton advised Blair to ‘hug him close’ and ‘make him your friend,’ Clinton 
explained to Rawnsley that ‘I told Tony to get close to Bush because that was the 
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way to have influence with him.’377 Later, as the Iraq War progressed Clinton 
feared that Blair had taken this advice ‘to extreme lengths.’378  
 
The British public were sceptical about the intentions of the US President 
George W. Bush in the lead up to the Iraq war. Bush had received negative 
coverage in the United Kingdom since the 2000 election when he ‘stole’ the 
presidency from Al Gore. Humphries argued that the British public would have 
been more likely to support the Clinton administration (or even a Gore 
administration) invading Iraq because they had doubts about Bush’s motives, 
especially due to Bush’s links to the oil industry.379 
 
The Government produced documents to convince people the case for war with 
Iraq shows that New Labour had a sales-oriented approach to war. When it 
comes to political marketing and war citizen-consumers would not seek war with 
another country unless: 
 
• It is under an imminent threat from an enemy nation. 
• It is retaliating against an enemy nation (or nations supporting terrorists) 
that has attacked them.  
 
The Government made its case for war in September 2002, when the Joint 
Intelligence Committee produced a document titled Iraq’s Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government. The document argued 
that: 
• Saddam Hussein maintained an active WMD programme. 
• Iraq had the capability of deploying WMDs ‘within 45 minutes.’380  
• Hussein had not complied with UN resolutions that had resulted from the 
first Gulf War.381 
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• Hussein’s human rights record to add another moral element to remove 
Hussein.382 
 
The dossier presented Saddam as a threat even though there was no evidence 
that Iraq was an immediate threat at all.383 Originally Alistair Campbell was not 
impressed with the earlier first draft of the dossier, he did not think it made a 
clear case that Saddam could attack at any minute, while Blair thought that the 
dossier did not focus enough on human rights.384  
 
A second dossier was released in February 2013, this was later known as the 
dodgy dossier, which was based from a 12 year old PhD thesis which was found 
on the internet and then reworded with stronger language.385 Rawnsley 
described it as a piece of propaganda that was developed by ‘the Campbell spin 
machine’, it was ‘given haphazardly to a few journalists on this basis that it 
would be a good new story for the next day.’386 O’Shaugnessy noted that: 
 
The [thesis] was not simply plagiarised, it was also altered. For 
example, the phrase ‘helping opposition groups’ was changed to 
‘supporting terrorist organisations’, and ‘monitoring foreign 
embassies’ became ‘spying on foreign embassies.’387 
 
Blair passed off this information as ‘further intelligence’ to support the case for 
war.388  
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Gould’s focus groups suggested that the ‘sales-oriented’ approach to the war was 
effective by convincing people that Hussein was a threat. In the lead up to the 
war, focus groups revealed that people had a ‘very high level of personal anxiety, 
insecurity and vulnerability. They felt a threat to Britain, to themselves and to 
their families was real.’389 Immediately before the outbreak of war, focus groups 
became more supportive, and they took ‘comfort in [Blair’s] strength and 
conviction.390 When the war began there was ‘a strong hardening of support 
towards the government, if also a sense of domestic neglect.’391 
 
At the conclusion of the war focus groups shifted again. Groups were ‘insistent 
that [Blair] refocus on domestic issues immediately’392. A focus group in North 
London showed that: 
 
The dominant mood in this group was frustration that they do 
not feel he is prioritising their needs. Iraq, asylum seekers and 
benefit cheats were getting preferential treatment at the 
expense of hard-working families. But still ‘a high level of 
response for [Blair].393 
 
There was opposition to the war with massive street protests in London. Robin 
Cook, Blair’s Foreign Secretary in his first term resigned from the government. 
There was a massive protest in London, with 750,000 demonstrators taking part 
(according to police reports) or two million demonstrators taking part (according 
to the organisers).394 
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Figure 6.2 Approval and Disapproval for the Iraq War 
 
The above graph shows that disapproval to the war was higher than approval for 
the war. However, more people supported the war when forces were actually 
deployed and disapprove fell. As the war continued disapproval increased.  
 
There was a sale-oriented approached to the war in Iraq at this time. The 
government made considerable effort to convince the public to support the war, 
this was done through the publication of the dossiers and a narrative that Iraq 
had WMDs. Gould’s focus groups suggested that there were concerns about Iraq. 
 
Shift in Blair’s reputation 
Damage to New Labour’s primary brand agent and the product itself took place 
after the invasion of Iraq. In May 2003, BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan alleged 
that the government had ‘sexed up’ the dossier by making false claims that Iraq 
could deploy WMDs in forty-five minutes, this ultimately led to the suicide of 
David Kelly, the government scientist who leaked this information to Gilligan. In 
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reaction to Kelly’s death, Blair set up the Hutton Inquiry.395 Hutton’s report gave 
the appearance that the government had an ‘obsession with process rather than 
policy, the cynical media manipulation, the ruthless brutality – and, with all 
that, a notable lack of success achieving his objective.’396 
 
The failure to find WMDs during the war had consequences on Blair and New 
Labour. Gould noted that there was a change in the mood in his focus groups 
once it was established that there was no WMDs in Iraq, people ‘suspect[ed] that 
[Blair] misled them to ensure the legitimacy of the war.’397 There were also 
concerns that Blair would ‘imitate Thatcher’s pattern of turning from a strong 
visionary leader to an out of touch dictator.’398  
 
Gould observed that there was a shift in public opinion once it was discovered 
that there were no WMD in Iraq: ‘the political landscape after the war changed. 
The public were less trusting, more sceptical of politicians, and perhaps above all 
felt a sense of powerlessness in a world that was clearly subject to global forces 
that nation states could scarcely control.’399 Gould’s observation about global 
forces does present a limitation to political marketing. Nation states are 
interdependent and emerging forces such as the global war on terror mean that 
political products, like Blair, get side tracked from their relationship with the 
political market to focus on international situations.  
 
Rawnsley noted that there was a popular view that ‘the Prime Minister had lied 
his way into the war. As countless banners, placards, T-shirts and web posts had 
it, he was a ‘Bliar’. Even some who were originally supporters of the war came to 
the conclusion that they were manipulated by a mendacious Prime Minister.’400 
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Rawnsley added that he believed that Blair did ‘genuinely believe that the Iraqi 
dictator was intent on possessing the most horrific weapons.’401 
 
Even though Blair might have believed he was doing the right thing by invading 
Iraq, New Labour’s sales-oriented approach to convincing the British public to 
support the invasion ultimately failed because the central argument that Iraq 
had WMDs turned out to be false. As a result of this misconception Blair became 
a liability to New Labour and there was considerable effort made in the lead up 
to the 2005 election to repair Blair’s reputation (discussed in the Brand 
Narrative section of this chapter). Gould’s focus groups showed that people 
wanted a government that delivered on domestic issues. 
 
6.2 Positioning 
As with the previous cycle New Labour was still the market-leader in the 
political market. Its strategy was to defend its market position from other 
challengers in the political market. This section looks at the 2005 election and 
how New Labour maintained its market-lead. Then this section examines how 
David Cameron, as the new Conservative Party leader managed to shift the 
Conservative towards a more competitive position to become market leader. 
 
The 2005 Election 
New Labour won the 2005 election. However, its vote decreased from 40.7 per 
cent in 2001 to 35.2 per cent. Under first past the post this gave the party 55.2 
per cent of the seats in the House of Commons. Downing Street staffer Matthew 
Taylor stated that ‘[Labour] didn’t win the 2005 election because the people loved 
us, we won the 2005 election because people were willing to tolerate us and they 
didn’t really fancy the look of the Tory party.’402 But since New Labour won the 
election, it maintained its position as market leader. 
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In this part of the cycle, the challenger did manager to take back some ground 
from the market leader. The Conservative opposition was initially weak under 
Iain Duncan Smith between 2001 and 2003, but his successor Michael Howard 
managed to take back some ground at the 2005 election.  
 
During the 2005 election the Conservatives as the challenger to the market-
leader were able to win back support on some key issues. As stated in the 
previous chapter, in 2001 the Conservatives tried to win an election based in 
Britain’s role in the European Union. In this election, the Conservatives gained 
leads in traditional right-wing issues. Gould’s pre-election focus groups showed 
that ‘Labour was ahead on the economy, education and the NHS, but only by 
relatively small margins (5 to 8 per cent); the Conservatives were ahead on 
asylum (by 17 per cent), crime and Europe.’403 Gould commented that ‘the 
Conservative lead on these traditional right-wing issues reduced them into 
fighting a right-wing, populist asylum campaign, which was a mistake. This got 
them heard but would never get them a victory.’404 
 
This implies that as the challenger in the 2005 election, the Conservatives did 
not take the market-leader head-on, it instead focused on winning back right 
leaning supports who in previous elections did not vote, or voted for more right-
wing parties such as the British National Party. As Blair observed, between 2001 
and 2005 there was a four per cent swing to the Liberal Democrats, yet the 
Conservatives did not gain any significant swing, to New Labour ‘this was…a 
classic protest vote, easily recoverable in a third term in time for a fourth-term 
bid, provided we did not lose the core New Labour support that had stuck with 
us.’405 In political marketing terms, and Blair’s analysis, the 2005 election was a 
swing away from the market-leader, to a ‘follower’ party, the Liberal Democrats.  
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David Cameron 
In late 2005, David Cameron became the leader of the Conservatives. Cameron, 
like Blair was when he became Labour Leader in 1994, was youthful, dynamic 
and fresh. In one of his first major speeches as leader Cameron stated that: 
 
Tony Blair’s victory in that [1997] election created a problem for 
the Conservative Party. It was not the same sort of problem that 
Old Labour had faced. It was not a problem that arose out of a 
failure of ideas. It was, on the contrary, a problem that arose 
from the triumph of our ideas. There was in truth nothing 
fundamentally new about the New Labour analysis except that 
the party offering it was Labour.406 
 
Rawnsley observed that Cameron took an similar approach transforming the 
Conservatives to what Blair did to Labour, Cameron stated that ‘What I want to 
do with the Conservative Party is get it into the mainstream of British 
politics.’407 Cameron also stated ‘I’m not a deeply ideological person. I’m a 
practical person and pragmatic.’408 Rawnsley also observed that ‘the Cameron 
generation of Tories were mesmerised by Blair. He had dominated the formative 
years of their political lives….They regarded the Prime Minister with much more 
respect and awe than did many in the Labour Party.’409  
 
From late-2005 the challenger in the Political Market had changed leaders to 
someone who was more determined to challenge the market-leader head on. To 
do this David Cameron learnt from the successes of New Labour similar to the 
way the Blair learnt from the successes of Thatcher in the 1980s.  
                                                          
406David Cameron (2006) ‘Modern Conservatism,’ Conservative Party Website, Accessed 25 June 2006 
<www.conservatives.com/tile.do?def=news.story.page&obj_id=127560&speeches=1> 
407
 Quoted in Rawnsley (2011), p.344 
408
 Quoted in Rawnsley (2011), p.345 
409
 Rawnsley (2011), p.345 
135 
 
 
6.3 Brand Narrative 
This section examines at New Labour’s brand narrative during this part of the 
political cycle, focusing on two parts. Firstly, I add to my argument in the 
previous chapter that New Labour’s narrative was created through the use of 
symbolism. Secondly, the Blair brand and narrative was damaged during this 
part of the cycle and in the lead-up to the 2005 election, so New Labour did place 
considerable attention to improve his image.  
 
Continued use of symbolism 
Symbolic government continued in this part of the cycle. O’Shaughnessy 
described symbolic government as governments that ‘campaign permanently, 
and what is critical to them is the appearance of momentum. Symbolic 
government is also a government by narrative – small narratives by which 
governments account for their daily work, and the meta-narratives, the big 
themes that lend their many activities coherence and give them direction.’410 For 
example, in order to tackle the problem with crime, the Home Secretary, David 
Blunkett launched numerous initiatives to bring down the crime rate: 
 
• June 2001: £15m to drive crime out of shopping centres. 
• July 2001: a task force to protect children on the internet. 
• September 2001: online campaign to cut car crime. 
• October 2001: extending the use of anti-social behaviour orders 
and top firm sign-up to hi-tech drive to cut crime. 
• December 2001: national rethinking crime and punishment 
initiative. 
• February 2002: security boost for 3,000 shops in deprived areas. 
• March 2002: further extension of anti-social behaviour orders; 
new guidelines for tackling drug dealers on housing estates; 
action on street crime through robbery reduction initiatives; 
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10 Downing Street crime summit; new advisory panel for 
victims. 
• April 2002: video identification parades in robbery hot spot 
areas.411. 
 
O’Shaughnessy’s article suggested that New Labour in government was a 
symbolic government, it was a government of intention rather than delivery. It is 
easier to sell intentions and initiatives rather than delivering them. As 
O’Shaughnessy stated: ‘Initiatives fill a role in a symbolic state. They give the 
appearance of dynamism, a riposte to critics who decry official inactivity.’412 
O’Shaughnessy does make a cynical assessment of New Labour implying that it 
was too focused on its perception of delivery rather than actual delivery. While it 
is fair to say from O’Shaunessey’s research that the government did focus more 
on its intention to deliver rather than actual delivery, in an environment where 
delivery was difficult due to the relationship between Blair and Brown, and other 
restraints within the public sector, it is easy to see why it focused on incentives. 
As Lees-Marshment stated, even when a government delivers improvements, 
voters do not always appreciate it,413 an ongoing narrative of incremental 
improvements, initiatives, task forces may be an ideal way for a government to 
communicate.  
 
Re-Connecting Blair 
Using Vincent’s brand narrative analysis, like Clinton, Blair moved away ‘from 
the sacred beliefs that gave his campaign its brand foundation.’414 Over time 
with war, and the lack of delivery Blair did move away from those ‘sacred beliefs’ 
that got him elected to office in 1997. 
 
According to Gould in late 2003, when Blair was starting to wonder whether or 
not he should depart as leader, polling showed ‘there were doubts about trust 
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and delivery, and increased concern with asylum and immigration. War was not 
at the forefront of public concern but had clearly affected the mood.415 Gould’s 
focus groups observed that there was no desire for Blair to go; instead the 
electorate wanted him to re-engage.  
 
A new brand narrative was created that suggested that Blair has misled the 
British public in order to get their support for the Iraq War. In the lead up to the 
2005 election, effort was made to reconnect Blair with political consumers with 
the recruitment of Promise, a consultancy firm that specialised in brand 
building. Promises’ brief was to ‘reconnect’ Blair to the electorate.416  
 
In letters to Blair, Promise identified three key themes and phrases from its 
research: 
 
Theme One: You left me 
• ‘You should have come home’ [In response to the Boxing Day Tsunami]. 
• ‘You should put our people first.’ 
• ‘Your country needed you.’ 
• ‘All the promises you made that never came true.’ 
 
The underlying emotion behind these phrases are ‘abandonment and 
unimportant’ and the key desire is to ‘get back in touch’.417 
 
Theme Two: Too big for your boots 
 
• ‘A President with Cherie.’ 
• ‘Globe-trotting holiday maker.’ 
• ‘Celebrity hero worship.’ 
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The underlying emotion is that Blair was too focused on his self-importance and 
to get back in touch he needs to ‘get back to basics’.418 
 
Theme Three: Reflect and Change 
 
• ‘Take time to think.’ 
• ‘how foolish you have been.’ 
 
The underlying tone is that Blair was out of control and needed to reflect ‘are you 
still the bloke we elected or have you moved on to bigger things?’419 
 
Promise’s research showed that by 2005 the New Labour Brand was under 
threat because of Iraq and the media attacks. It argued that Blair and New 
Labour were at a point where ‘everything that they did was being distorted by 
this negative brand lens.’420 The research also demonstrated that Blair was so 
central to the New Labour brand that his negative perceptions had ‘reached the 
very core of the brand.’421  
 
Promise identified that: 
 
• ‘The New Labour brand – personified by Tony Blair – had stopped 
listening.’ 
• ‘The brand had become for too reliant on the figurehead – despite his 
failings, without Blair, New Labour seemed lightweight.’ 
• ‘The New Labour brand was hollow, many described this a the triumph of 
spin over substance.’422 
• There was ‘weakness of the brand – Blair didn’t listen over Iraq, media 
and infighting with Brown.’423  
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In the lead up to the 2005 election campaign, Blair took on the theme of ‘reflect 
and change’ at Labour’s 2005 Spring Conference with these certain phrases:  
 
• Connecting with people about Iraq - ‘I understand why some people feel 
angry - not just over Iraq but many of the difficult decisions we have 
made.’ 424 
 
• Showing growth as a leader ‘And, as ever, a lot of it is about me.’ 425 
 
• Re-engaging with the relationship with political consumers ‘I think a lot 
about my relationship with the country….and it's not a bad idea to think 
of it in terms of it being like any relationship: you, the British people and 
me, the person you chose as your Prime Minister.’ 426 
 
• Reflection on the slow pace of delivery, but notes improvements have been 
made – ‘We have delivered a lot, but no miracles. Politicians don't deliver 
miracles. And life is not about euphoric moments. It's about steady change 
for the better. So after the euphoria, came the steady hard slog of decision-
making and delivery.’427 
 
• Reflecting that there are other relationships with others in a political 
market – ‘And the events that tested me. And the media mood turning, 
and friends sometimes being lost as the big decisions mounted, and the 
thousand little things that irritate and grate, and then all of a sudden 
there you are, the British people, thinking: you're not listening and I 
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think: you're not hearing me. And before you know it you raise your voice. 
I raise mine. Some of you throw a bit of crockery.’428 
 
• Giving the British people a choice when with the election – ‘And now you, 
the British people, have to sit down and decide whether you want the 
relationship to continue. If you decide you want Mr Howard, that is your 
choice.429 
 
Over the course of the 2005 campaign the party used a ‘masochism strategy’ 
where Blair took part in interviews conducted by aggressive interviewers and 
contained audiences to question him, ‘the strategy, with its underlying analogy 
of a rocky marriage, provoked considerable press interest and no little contempt 
as the prime minister was subjected to some humbling encounters.’430 Rawnsley 
noted that Iraq was problematic for Labour, in an interview with the Observer, 
Blair acknowledged that ‘there is a question about the judgement of the decision,’ 
he ‘simply asked people to appreciate the dilemma that faced him at the time.’431  
 
There was a market-oriented approach to the way New Labour tried to reconnect 
Blair to the electorate. Promise’s research did identify Blair’s weaknesses, in the 
eyes of the political consumer, and then the party made an effort during 2005 
election to reengage with the electorate.  
 
6.4 Brand agent 
During the maturity stage of the product life-cycle, Blair was in decline as the 
Primary Brand Agent. As stated above, Promise’s research showed that due to 
the Iraq War Blair had become so damaged that it also impacted on the greater 
New Labour Brand. Even though the 2005 election was a victory for the Labour 
Party, it was a set-back for Blair. It showed that after taking part in an 
                                                          
428
 Tony Blair (2005) ‘Spring Conference Speech,’ The Guardian Accessed 28 March 2014 
<www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/feb/14/labour.speeches> 
429
 Tony Blair (2005) ‘Spring Conference Speech,’ The Guardian Accessed 28 March 2014 
<www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/feb/14/labour.speeches> 
430
 Scammell (2007), p.186 
431
 Rawnsley (2011), p.306 
141 
 
unpopular war and his long time in office, ‘his personal authority, which rested 
so heavily on the ability to win votes, was damaged by the results.’432 On top of 
that between 2006 and 2007 Blair was further tainted in the ‘cash for honours’ 
scandal where it was revealed that four individuals who loaned large amounts of 
money to the Labour Party, were nominated for peerages by Blair.433 The 
scandal dragged on and was subjected to a police investigation, hurting Blair. 
 
Blair stated that his final years in office (2005-2007) were a challenge because: 
 
Gordon [Brown] was in a perpetual state of machination; the 
anti-Blair media (most of it) had given up any pretence at 
objectivity; Iraq teetered on the brink; and when all else failed, 
there was a police inquiry into me and my staff that very nearly 
toppled the government without a charge ever being laid.434 
 
Blair’s authority was further diminished when he announced his intention of 
leaving Number 10 about a year before departure. In an interview for Australian 
Television Blair said ‘It was an unusual thing for me to say, but people kept 
asking me the question so I decided to answer it. Maybe it was a mistake.435  
 
The below MORI opinion polls for this period suggested that both the 
Government and Blair were unpopular.  
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Figure 6.3 Satisfaction for Blair and the Government 2006 - June 2007436 
  
Govt 
Satisfaction 
Govt 
Dissatisfaction 
Blair 
Satisfaction  
Blair 
Dissatisfaction  
9-23 January 
2006 
32 60 36 57 
16-20 February 
2006 
28 60 31 60 
16-21 March 2006 27 65 31 62 
27 April - 2 May 
2006 
22 68 29 64 
25-30 May 2006 22 69 26 67 
22-26 June 2006 27 64 32 60 
20-24 July 2006 23 68 23 67 
31 August-6 
September 2006 
24 67 26 66 
12-16 October 
2006 
27 64 32 60 
9-14 November 
2006 
22 69 27 65 
7-12 December 
2006 
26 64 30 64 
19-29 January 
2007 
24 69 25 68 
19-25 April 2007 27 66 28 66 
17-22 May 2007 30 60 35 57 
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14-20 June 2007 30 61 33 60 
 
Using Vincent’s Brand Narrative model, the brand narrative and the brand 
agent was no longer useful for the brand. From 2007, New Labour changed its 
primary brand agent when Gordon Brown became Prime Minister. 
 
6.5 Summary 
New Labour in the maturity cycle of the product life-cycle is summarised as: 
Product 
• Elements of a Market-Orientation. 
• Sales-Orientation becomes more dominant. 
• Division between key players in the government. 
 
Position 
• New Labour as the market leader defends its market share but does lose 
some of it. 
• The challenger, the Conservatives, was still weak at the beginning but by 
the end of the cycle it started to adopt the market-leader’s ideas. 
 
Brand narratives 
• Symbolism was used to show the brand narrative.  
• Attention was given to reconnecting Blair to the electorate after the Iraq 
war.  
 
Brand agent 
• Brand agent becomes a liability to the brand.  
• A new Primary Brand agent (Brown emerges). 
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7. Decline 
This chapter analyses the decline of New Labour in the product life-cycle model. 
For this chapter, I have identified the decline period of New Labour as between 
October 2007, when Brown’s credibility fell due to the aborted September 2007 
election, and May 2010 when New Labour was defeated at the general 
election.437  
 
Butler and Collins described the decline period as ‘when sales fall off and profits 
drop.’438 According to Rajagopal and Sanchez’s model, in the decline period a 
brand is redesigning itself, it is preparing for entry into the market, it modifies 
its weak features and educates consumers on its new features as it is preparing 
to re-enter the market.439 In terms of political marketing, parties go into decline 
when they are on the path to electoral defeat. Also, as illustrated with the 
Labour Party after it left office in 1979, decline can continue in opposition, until 
a new product is credible enough to be reintroduced into the political market. 
Rajagopal and Sanchez also suggested that a brand in decline may attempt to 
launch new features. In political marketing terms, this is where a political 
product does successful rejuvenate it may return to the maturity stage. Unlike 
Rajagopal and Sanchez’s analysis a political party cannot simply be reintroduced 
into the market, it needs to leave government and spend time in opposition.  
 
Timothy Heppell identified six symptoms of degeneration in governments, 
political products in the decline cycle experience these symptoms. The symptoms 
are:  
 
• Government being questioned about its competence (especially around the 
managing the economy). 
• Credibility of the leadership being questioned. 
• Ideological divisions and suspicions within the party. 
                                                          
437
 Please note, for this thesis, I will not discuss whether or the Labour product continued to decline under the 
leadership of Harriet Harman (acting leader) or Ed Miliband (current leader). 
438
 Kotler and Armstrong (2012), p.273 
439
 Rajagopal and Sanchez, (2004), pp.243-244 
146 
 
• Elements of corruption, sleaze or abuse of power. 
• Government haunted by past mistakes. 
• Regenerated and credible opposition party has emerged.440 
 
This chapter shows that New Labour in decline suffered from all of these 
symptoms. I hypothesise that it is possible for a party in decline to successfully 
rejuvenate and move back into the maturity stage. But once a party starts to 
decline momentum builds about the party’s eventual defeat it is difficult to 
successfully rejuvenate and prevent removal from office. Like the previous 
chapters, this chapter discusses New Labour’s product, position, brand narrative 
and brand agent in the decline phase of the life-cycle model. But firstly I outline 
how New Labour went from the maturity to the decline phase.  
 
7.1 From Maturity to Decline 
New Labour made the shift from the maturity cycle to the decline cycle between 
September and October 2007 when Brown aborted the so-called election of 2007. 
The New Labour product rejuvenated itself in 2007 when the leadership of the 
party and the government was transferred from Blair to Brown. During the first 
few months of Brown’s premiership the party was still in the maturity cycle 
because it appeared that Brown’s succession had successfully rejuvenated New 
Labour. In his first few months in office, Brown was tested with a small terrorist 
incident, by a natural disaster and by a bank run on the Northern Rock bank. 
Brown adopted the role of a ‘father of the nation’ who worked well under 
pressure.  
 
In July 2007, private polling suggested that Labour was eight points ahead of 
the Conservatives and that Brown was perceived as a stronger leader than David 
Cameron. Members of his inner circle suggested that Brown call an autumn 
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election.441 Not only would an early election give Brown his own mandate it 
would also destabilise the Conservatives who were not ready for an election.442 
Brown himself was divided over calling an election, but he liked the idea of 
having his own mandate. However, he had waited ten years to become prime 
minister and he did not want risk throwing that away after three months.443 An 
internal poll suggested that Labour would win with a majority of between 35-45 
seats.444  
 
During Labour’s conference there was speculation that an election would be 
called, Brown did nothing to dampen the speculation. The press began to 
speculate that an election was coming with headlines such as ‘Election fever 
rages as Brown’s lead grows’ and ‘Go for it Gordon.’445 At the time, the media was 
in praise of Brown’s strength while contemptuous about Cameron’s abilities.446 
Gould was called in to work with Saatchi and Saatchi on the adverting campaign 
which was going to focus on the slogan of ‘Not flash just Gordon’ (which was a 
word play on the superhero Flash Gordon).447 There were concerns, however, 
that there was no policy to back up this campaign.448 Weeks later, during the 
Conservative’s conference, Brown tried to upstage Cameron by making a 
surprise visit to Iraq. His aim was to appear like a statesman while the 
opposition was divided at its conference. Instead it made him look like a political 
opportunist using the troops to upstage the opposition at its conference.449 
 
Brown dithered on whether or not he was going to call an election and in early 
October 2007 he decided not to call an election. The polls were starting to shift 
away from Labour and the earliest possible election would have been in 
November, as Britain started moving into winter. With the election of 2007 not 
taking place a negative perception of Gordon Brown set in which he was never 
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able to shake. Gould stated that on becoming prime minister people were unsure 
about Brown in the role and that there were two opposing views about him, ‘the 
negative was uncharismatic, lacking leadership skills: a good Chancellor but a 
bad Prime Minister. The positive was a strong man, his own person, a leader 
who had started off well as Prime Minister.’450 Gould stated that by not holding 
the election in 2007 the negative view of him prevailed.451 Gould further argued 
that:  
 
If [Brown] had called the election and won, even by a small 
majority, he would have been transformed, the survivor of a 
hugely difficult rite of leadership passage, the winner of a fourth 
term. The image of him, and the reality too, would have 
changed.452 
 
Cameron mocked him saying that ‘He’s the first Prime Minister in history to 
flunk an election cos he thought he was going to win it!’453 Likewise journalists 
‘taunted Brown to admit that he had run away from the country because of the 
turn in the polls. They were mocking to his face when he claimed that he was so 
keen to ‘deliver my vision’ that he would have called off the election even if his 
pollsters had told him he would have won with a majority of 100.’454 
 
Despite the hype about the election, Brown denied political consumers an 
opportunity to give its view on Brown’s New Labour. On reflection, this was the 
turning point in Brown’s leadership, the negative perceptions of a poor leader 
who dithered set in for the rest of his term in office. Using the product life-cycle, 
I pinpoint this as the moment where New Labour went from the maturity stage 
to the decline stage. Compared to the transition from growth to maturity phases, 
after 9/11 when there was a change of tone in the government, the New Labour 
transition from maturity to decline started from a defining event. 
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7.2 Product  
In this section I examine the New Labour product during the decline stage. I 
focus on three aspects of the product. First, there were questions about the 
legitimacy of Brown as party leader. Secondly, I examine the policies of Brown’s 
New Labour. Finally I look at the scandals and divisions that appeared during 
this cycle that damaged the product’s reputation.  
 
Brown’s Legitimacy  
One criticism of Brown from political consumers was that he was not a 
legitimate leader. He became leader about two years into a parliamentary term. 
By winning the 2005 election, Blair was seen as the leader that had the backing 
of political consumers. After Blair stood down, Brown faced no challengers when 
he stood for the leadership of the party. Likewise, as outlined above, by aborting 
the autumn 2007 election, when expectations had been set, there was a 
perception that Brown denied people the right to give their verdict on his 
leadership. In political marketing terms, he did not have a dialogue with political 
consumers, and they felt left out because they were not involved.  
 
Even with a challenger in the 2007 Labour Party leadership ballot, it was likely 
that Brown would have won the leadership. However, a contest would have given 
Brown an opportunity to define his vision for the party and the government. At 
the beginning, when Labour was in opposition, New Labour would use battles 
within the party to define itself, such as the abolition of clause four, and Brown 
missed an opportunity to replicate this type of manoeuvre. Political consumers 
might have felt more at ease about Brown’s legitimacy after such a contest. 
 
Before Blair stood down, Gould wrote a letter to Brown and Blair warning that 
‘The absolutely key period is the new leader’s first few months. The window of 
opportunity for the next leader is huge….A top-down handover will feel 
undemocratic and undermine the chance of renewal. There needs to be a rite of 
150 
 
passage into the new leadership.’455 Gould’s focus groups also showed that people 
felt that Blair should not have been forced out against his will, as he was elected 
by the people in 2005.456 This shows that legitimacy is important to political 
consumers, and when a party changes its leader mid-term there can be a 
backlash. After Brown became Prime Minister, Gould noted in his focus groups 
that he had ‘lost count of the number of times voters said in focus groups that he 
was unelected, that he did not have the right to the job.’457  
 
The above example shows that political parties that want to rejuvenate in the 
maturity or decline stages by changing their leader need to be careful about how 
to approach this. This issue could have been controlled better by at least a 
Labour leadership election or at best an early general election. The way the 
previous leader departs is an important factor, if there is a perception that 
he/she was forced out against their will, this may also shape the minds of 
political consumers.  
 
Production Orientation in Policy 
An assessment by Seldon and Lodge found that Brown had limited policy 
achievements, apart from his policies to combat the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC). They argue that he made small improvements in health by appointing a 
surgeon as one of the health ministers, but failed to take any real big decisions. 
School improvement stalled. He began to reverse some of the Blairite approaches 
to law and order, not making it a priority until before the 2010 election.458 This 
section focuses on New Labour’s approach to the GFC and its shift away from 
New Labour policies in the lead up to the 2010 election. 
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The GFC 
In response to the GFC of 2007-08, where large financial institutions collapsed 
and governments intervened by bailing them out, Brown took on a world 
leadership role by encouraging governments to take an interventionist approach 
to their own economies to prevent a greater world recession.459 One of Brown’s 
biggest selling points as Chancellor was that he was able to put an end to ‘boom 
and bust’ economics and this argument collapsed with the fall in the British 
economy.460 In saving the financial institutions and the British economy Brown 
‘intervened massively in the economy, thereby throwing its finances deeply into 
the red.’461 This was a contrast to Brown the Chancellor who exercised economic 
prudence.462 
 
Aspects of old Labour that political consumers did not like crept back into the 
government’s response to the GFC. By Blair’s own analysis, Brown’s early 
approach to the GFC was correct, Brown had ‘acted at his best, intellectually 
rigorous, totally driven, sure in his touch.’463 However, as the GFC developed 
there was a shift away from New Labour’s market-orientation to something that 
resembled old Labour. For example the government increased the highest tax 
rate to 50p.  
 
Blair’s analysis further stated that the Government took an ‘Old Labour way out 
of the financial crisis’ by using a ‘traditional Keynesian analysis of how to 
stimulate the economy’. Blair stated that there were halts on key aspects of New 
Labour halted, public service reform slowed and law and order policies were not 
as strong as they were earlier.464 ‘[New Labour] did ‘lose touch’, not with ‘our 
roots’ but with a public whose anxieties over tax, spending, immigration and 
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crime were precisely the opposite of those on the left criticising New Labour. As a 
result, we did not seem like the party of the future.’465 
 
As Fielding noted, commentators, and especially the Murdoch press, argued that 
Brown’s shift in policies represented the death of New Labour: 
 
In November 2008, the Sun pictured a tombstone on its front 
page on which was carved ‘RIP New Labour.’ The accompanying 
story surveyed ‘The life and death of Blair’s baby’ which had, it 
claimed, finally succumbed to ‘socialism.’466 
 
Gould stated that the change in tactic made voters nervous about Labour. He 
argued that at the end, the Government was not a New Labour government 
because it had slowed down its reform agenda and was too slow to make the shift 
from a government that was stimulating the economy to a government that was 
finding ways to cut the deficit.467 It had not moved ‘early enough to balance a 
focus on spending with efficiency, reducing waste, and a new conception of the 
state and how it serves people.’468  
 
Likewise, Rawnsley argued that even though voters generally supported the idea 
of the wealthy taking on more responsibility for the GFC and recession, it was a 
‘symbolic retreat from the original New Labour prospectus. [Labour] was back to 
where they were before Blair won over aspirational voters.’469 
 
2010 Manifesto 
Relationship marketing is about a relationship of trust between the supplier and 
consumer. At this stage of the product life-cycle it is fair for political consumers 
to question New Labour’s ability to deliver on its promises. Rawnsley observed 
that the 2010 election manifesto promised some ‘radical reforms to the 
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constitution, the financial sector and public services.’470 However, people were 
right to point out that Labour has been in power for 13 years, why had they not 
done these reforms in the past. Rawnsley observed that the ‘manifesto often read 
like a list of things they regretted not doing earlier.’ 471 Mandelson’s criticism of 
the manifesto was that it ‘seemed to have been road-tested more with Guardian 
columnists than Philip’s groups of voters.’472 He also argued that the manifesto 
lacked a ‘coherent or compelling vision for the future that would set pulses 
racing.’473 
 
The above example gives an indication that in the decline stage, New Labour 
shifted its concerns away from the political consumers to a product-oriented 
party. While at the beginning it did take what was regarded as the right 
approach towards the GFC, in later failed to understand political consumers 
concerns about its shift away from New Labour and their anxieties about the 
increased deficit.  
 
Division and scandal 
During this period the government faced division from amongst Labour MPs, 
division from other brand agents within the Labour Party. The party and the 
whole British Parliament was also caught up in the expenses scandal. The strong 
New Labour product from earlier cycles had shifted towards a party of disunity. 
Seldon and Lodge noted that ‘the 2005 Parliament, during which Brown was 
Prime Minister for 60 per cent of the time, proved to be the most rebellious in the 
post-war era.’474 They noted that the longer the party remained in office ‘the 
more truculent become the backbenches.’475 They also argue that Brown’s made 
matters worse for himself with his ‘often graceless management of Labour MPs’ 
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which was a contrast to Blair’s politeness.’476 Opposition from Labour MPs 
included opposition to a third runway for Heathrow Airport, part privatising 
Royal Mail. 
 
As well as a divisive Parliamentary Labour Party, questions were also raised by 
ministers about Brown’s performance. There were three failed leadership coups 
in autumn 2008, spring 2009 and January 2010. During the spring 2009 attempt 
Foreign Secretary David Miliband was mentioned as a possible successor to 
Brown, but at this time he was considered too inexperienced. He had also 
declined the opportunity to stand against Brown in the 2007 leadership 
contest.477 He wrote an article in the Guardian that acknowledged the mistakes 
that New Labour had made in the past as well as the need to adapt to the key 
policies issues of the day such as energy efficiency and global climate change.478 
 
Brown was also the prime minster during the 2009 parliamentary expenses 
scandal where the expenses of MPs were made public. MPs from all parties in 
parliament were exposed for making dodgy claims which lead to a number of 
resignations, de-selections and retirement announcements. Seldon and Lodge 
described the expenses scandal as the ’biggest parliamentary crisis in Modern 
British history, when public anger with politicians reach unprecedented heights 
and public trust in the political system all but collapsed.’479 While Brown was not 
guilty of expense abuses himself, Seldon and Lodge criticised him for poorly 
managing the crisis and not providing leadership, which ‘diminished his own 
standing.’480 They argued that he could have used the crisis to produce a 
settlement that would have resolved the issue and made progress on the 
constitutional agenda that he had promised to make progress on.481 
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In summary, the New Labour product in decline had issues with the credibility 
of its leader. Its policies during the GFC represented a shift away from the New 
Labour model and had elements of a product-orientation. In fairness to Brown he 
did face a major economic crisis in his premiership, while the New Labour 
product in the other cycles of the product life-cycle model enjoyed a stronger 
economy. Likewise Brown also faced a parliamentary expenses scandal that 
questioned the political market’s confidence in all politicians. The unity of the 
New Labour product in the early parts of the cycle had vanished.  
 
7.3 Positioning 
In the decline cycle, Labour made the transition from the market leader to the 
challenger when it lost the 2010 election. The challenger, the Conservatives, was 
a much stronger challenger to New Labour than it had been previous cycles. The 
position of market-leader is a defensive position insomuch as it is defending and 
protecting the support gained in previous elections, so in the decline phase it had 
lost enough support to return to the status of challenger. As outlined above, the 
product lost support by shifting back to an ‘old’ Labour view on economic policy 
and by having a leader who was unpopular. On the other hand, the 
Conservatives had lifted its game and was in a position to take Labour’s support.  
 
The Conservatives were in a stronger position in this part of the product life-
cycle because it had become more disciplined and it had been repositioned in the 
centre.482 It had modelled itself on New Labour in its early days, Mandelson 
observed that: 
 
Cameron and his team ‘strategy sculpted around New Labour 
precepts: fiscal responsibility; a belief in strong, reformed public 
services; a commitment to combat poverty among the ‘have-nots’ 
as well as to give the ‘have-somethings’ more in life; toughness 
on both crime and the causes of crime….Cameron knew where 
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he needed to locate his party to win. In a series of speeches and 
advertising campaigns early on in his leadership, he attacked 
health inequalities to show his commitment to the NHS. He 
championed environmental issues, not natural Tory territory.483 
 
The Conservatives was able to become the market leader. Mandelson also 
commented that the changes the conservatives made to the party ‘did not 
amount to a fundamental, New Labour-scale shift.’484 The fact that the 2010 
election resulted in a hung parliament does suggest that the changes the 
Conservatives made was tiny in comparison to the changes that New Labour 
made between 1994-1997 when the product was being develop. 
 
Like in the introduction stage of the product life-cycle, the Conservatives tried to 
better Labour on core centrist areas, such as health, education and the economy. 
 
Labour found it difficult to defend its market share during this phase of the 
cycle; more importantly, the Conservative Party was seen as a better economic 
manager than Labour in opinion polling. 485 The below table shows that in the 
top determining issues such as managing the economy, healthcare, education 
and asylum, the Conservatives had a lead in the economy, education and asylum. 
Labour was still stronger in the social issues like healthcare. 
 
Table 7.1. Issue Salience Leading up to the 2010 General Election486 
Looking ahead to the next General Election, which, if any, issues do you think 
will be very important to you in helping you decide which party to vote for? 
Managing the Economy 32 
Healthcare 26 
Education 23 
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Asylum and immigration 14 
Taxation 12 
Unemployment 11 
Crime and anti-social behaviour 8 
Benefits 7 
Care for older and disabled people 7 
Pensions 6 
 
Table 7.2. Issue Identification by Party (2010) 487 
Which party do you think has the best policies on…. the Conservatives, Labour, 
Liberal Democrats or some other party? 
 Labour Conservative Liberal Democrats 
Asylum and 
Immigration 
17 28 9 
Crime and 
Antisocial 
behaviour 
23 33 8 
Education 28 29 10 
Healthcare 33 24 9 
Managing the 
economy 
26 29 12 
Taxation 25 26 13 
Defence 18 29 7 
Unemployment 30 24 10 
Benefits 30 24 10 
Reforming MPs 
expenses 
13 24 14 
Climate change 15 11 15 
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Hung parliament 
The 2010 election resulted in a hung parliament where the Conservatives 
became the market-leader by winning 306 seats (36.1 per cent of the popular 
vote) and by forming a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. Labour 
won 258 seats (29 per cent) and the Liberal Democrats won 62 seats (23 per 
cent). The hung parliament gave Labour the option to maintain its status as the 
market leader, but in a coalition or in a minority government. However, the 
Conservatives plus the Liberal Democrats had enough seats to form a majority 
government, while Labour plus Liberal Democrats could only produce a minority 
government dependent on the support of nationalist parties and other small 
parties in House of Commons.  
 
If Labour and the Liberal-Democrats had the numbers to form a majority 
coalition government, this could have been the rejuvenation that New Labour 
needed to move back into the maturity cycle of the product life-cycle. A coalition 
of Britain’s two progressive parties, or in Collins and Butler’s terms, the market-
leader and the follower could have been formed. A new Labour leader and the 
inclusion of the Liberal Democrats could have stopped the decline and brought in 
renewal. This move could have been bold enough for New Labour to become a 
government responsive to the political market. Nick Clegg, who was the 
‘discovery’ of the 2010 campaign due to his performance in the leaders’ debates 
would have brought new blood into the government.  
 
7.4 Brand Narrative  
During the decline stage a ‘time for a change’ narrative emerges. For example, 
Barack Obama tuned into this narrative in the 2008 US Presidential election 
arguing that he was the candidate of change and shift the direction of the United 
States after the presidency of George W. Bush. Likewise, during the last years of 
New Labour in government a ‘time for a change’ narrative emerged. 
 
When a ‘change’ narrative begins, a political product’s brand narrative becomes 
defensive. Also there is a tipping point when the ‘time for a change’ argument 
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becomes accepted by the political market and so it becomes difficult to reverse 
the trend. The narrative of decline includes elements of Heppell symptoms of 
degeneration in governments.488 As outlined above the government handling of 
the economy was being highlighted by the GFC; Brown leadership abilities were 
being questioned; there were divisions within the party over the government’s 
direction; there were implications of abuse of power with the expenses scandal; 
and political consumers were still being reminded of the government’s past 
mistakes with the Chilcot Inquiry on Britain’s role in Iraq taking place.  
 
In this section focuses on the economic and weak leader narratives that emerged 
during New Labour’s decline. Once there was momentum in the change 
narrative then there was little that the New Labour brand could do to overcome 
it. Gould’s focus groups observed that they did give Brown credit for his handling 
of the GFC in its early days, but a couple of weeks of Brown showing valuable 
leadership skills was not enough to change people’s long held opinions of Brown: 
 
Brown was felt to have done well in the crisis, surpassing 
expectations: ‘It sounds like he is doing a good job, and every 
other country is following his lead…’; ‘I am amazed he’s doing 
so well.’ But [Brown] was not able to turn this success into 
enduring popularity. He had been a strong Chancellor but was 
not yet seen to be a Prime Minister. A lot of this was emotional: 
‘People see that he has done well but are not yet willing to 
allow this success to change their view of him. They are held 
back from doing so by feelings of resentment and a lack of 
empathy.’ In a sense Gordon was unable to escape from his 
past, good or bad.489  
 
Voters stuck to the basic position that ‘Labour’s time was up’ and they ‘are not 
going to allow a good week or two to change this perception, they are too 
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committed to it.’490 The commitment to this position was probably created when 
Brown aborted the 2007 election, but it had been accumulating since the Iraq 
War. During the GFC blame was mainly aimed at the banks and the ‘culture of 
excessive credit they had fostered.’491 Gould’s focus groups also showed that 
during the beginning of the GFC a perception emerged that ‘Labour had 
contributed to this crisis, particularly in relation to debt and credit.’492  
 
Part of the narrative of change is that the government, especially the primary 
brand agent has lost touch with ordinary voters. This was contrasted with the 
differences between Brown and Cameron in the lead up to the 2010 election. 
Cameron, who was pushing the change narrative, had a personal story was 
removed from that of political consumers. Rawnsley observed that Cameron is 
‘the son of a stockbroker…(and) lived a life remote from the experiences of most 
ordinary Briton.’493 But in contrast to Brown he was able to project the ‘concerns 
of [the voters] daily struggles. Cameron responded to voters angst about raising 
fuel prices by talking about how much it costs to fill up the car.’494 In contrast 
Brown’s approach was to ‘theorise on the workings of the international oil 
market.’495 
 
Once a narrative of change takes grip it is very hard to reverse it. Brown was not 
the right primary brand agent to shift New Labour away from this narrative. 
One observation about brand narratives during the product life-cycle is that at 
the beginning, New Labour did have more control of its narrative. In the decline 
stage the brand itself has a more difficult time shaping its own narrative. Once 
the symptoms of degeneration set in then it is hard to reverse or halt the 
narrative of decline. 
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7.5 Brand agent 
Vincent’s model, discussed in chapter two, illustrates the relationship between a 
primary brand agent and a brand. However, his model is a basic model and does 
not take into account the transition between one primary brand agent to another 
one. In the case of New Labour the dominance of the previous and much stronger 
primary brand agent, Tony Blair. New Labour in the decline cycle both the party 
and the leader was weak. In 2013 Blair even said ‘Frankly, if I'd had a fourth 
election, I would have given Cameron a run for his money. I'm not saying I would 
have won, but it would have been tighter than it was.’496 
 
Rawnsley questioned why New Labour did not change its primary brand agent in 
the lead up to the 2010 election given its recent history of changing itself to gain 
power.497 Rawnsley also observed: 
 
In late 2009 the party’s advertising agency had warned that 
‘Gordon is a walking magnetic field for everyone’s negative 
feelings: their anger, anxiety, their broken washing machine or 
their kids’ disappointing school results. They don’t like the 
Tories. But given the choice, it seems they won’t have Gordon.’498 
 
During the 2010 election campaign the campaign was concerned about Brown’s 
toxic image and reputation. Before the campaign Brown tried to connect with 
voters but these attempts never came across as genuine. Brown attempted to 
engage with the electorate by using YouTube to speak to young people, however 
these videos were ridiculed, even Brown’s attempt to smile was mocked by the 
former Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott.499 Brown was interviewed by 
celebrity journalist Piers Morgan on ITV’s Life Stories. Morgan told Brown that 
he ‘wanted to achieve a miracle. I’m going to try and make you sound Human. 
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Even vaguely human would be an improvement.’500 However, the format did 
reveal parts of Brown’s personality, but he was out of his comfort zone.501 
 
Brown’s behaviour in the lead up to the 2010 election reinforced people’s 
negative perceptions of him. For example, there were allegations that Brown 
terrified his staff. The Observer ran the headline ‘Civil service chief warned 
Brown over abusive treatment of staff.’502 Brown stated on Channel 4 news that 
‘I have never, never hit anybody in my life.’ Peter Mandelson defended Brown on 
the Sunday Morning television shows by saying ‘I don’t think he so much bullies 
people as he is very demanding of people.’503 
 
One key moment where Brown’s negative perceptions were highlighted during 
the 2010 election campaign was in Rochdale. Brown went on a walkabout where 
he met 65 year-old, life-long Labour supporter, Gillian Duffy. Duffy expressed to 
Brown her concerns about immigration, Brown answered her questions with 
respect and stated to her, in front of the cameras ‘You’re a very good woman, 
you’ve served your community all your life....It’s been very good to meet you.’ 
While Duffy was telling the cameras that Brown had won back her vote, Brown 
had left his microphone on and was recorded saying, ‘That was a disaster. You 
should never have put me with that woman. Who’s idea was that?...She was just 
a sort of bigoted woman. She said she used to be Labour. I mean, it’s just 
ridiculous.’504 This incident showed Brown being two-faced, nice in public but a 
bully in private. 
 
Simply Brown was a primary brand agent representing a party that political 
consumers did not want in office. They were not keen on the opposition coming 
back into power either, but they were more willing to tolerate a David Cameron 
premiership over Brown’s. New Labour was forcing the political market to accept 
a brand agent that had a toxic reputation. It was the first televised election 
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debate in the UK; Brown thought that he could use the debates to overcome his 
‘toxic personal image’.505 But he also failed to shine in this forum as well with 
‘poorly timed jokes and his presentational shortcomings.’506 In the decline cycle 
of the product life-cycle model, the primary brand agent is a liability. The 
primary brand agent also resigned as leader once the party moved from 
government to opposition.  
 
7.6 Summary 
Product 
• New Labour’s product shifted further away from a market-orientation and 
reverted to ‘old’ Labour style policies due to the GFC. 
• There were questions about the legitimacy of Gordon Brown as Prime 
Minister. 
• Greater divisions within the party and cabinet. 
 
Position 
• New Labour failed to defend its position as market-leader. 
 
Brand narratives 
• A ‘time for a change’ narrative became dominant. 
 
Brand agent 
• The Primary Brand Agent was unpopular and had a toxic reputation. 
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Conclusion 
The New Labour case study shows that the product life-cycle model does have 
application for political parties. Labour journeyed through the model’s classic 
phases: New Labour’s development through introduction, growth, maturity and 
decline phases were all seen in this study. Over the period of the cycle New 
Labour lost its hardly acquired market-orientation, as well as its strongest 
assets such as its leaders. Also, its perceived economic strength during its 
ascendant phases later became one of its chief weaknesses during its decline 
phase.  
 
Lessons from the case study about the Product Life-Cycle model 
The New Labour case study confirmed my hypothesis that ‘product development 
and re-introduction’ is a more appropriate term for the first cycle in the product 
life-cycle for a political party. That is, its development coincided with its 
introduction into the political market. Labour did experience a shift during the 
‘growth’ cycle because it had entered office and was more accountable for its 
policies. However, the term ‘growth’ implies a further increase in support, which 
did not happen in the New Labour case study: ‘consolidation’ or ‘market 
acceptance’ could be more appropriate terms.  
 
The case study also showed that the transition from the ‘product development 
and re-introduction’ cycle to the ‘growth’ cycle and the ‘maturity’ cycle to the 
‘decline’ cycle was triggered by very specific events, showing the influence of 
situations which come to represent a tipping point for movement from one phase 
of the cycle to another. In this study, the transition to the growth cycle was the 
result of winning the 1997 election while the transition to the decline cycle was 
the moment when Brown failed to call the autumn 2007 election. Yet, the 
transition from the growth cycle to the maturity cycle did not start after a 
defining moment. Rather, a more subtle process that began after September 
2001 was viewed as the starting point for this cycle, but it could also be argued 
that the Iraq War was the legitimate starting point, or, perhaps, even Labour’s 
re-election in 2001.  
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The case study also confirms that a political product in the earlier stages of the 
product life-cycle model is more market-orientated and this market-orientation 
shifts as the product moves through the life-cycle. Duration in office seems to 
diminish the appeal of an incumbent government as it becomes subsumed by the 
demands of governing while beginning the process of becoming more remote and 
less sensitive to the electoral market.  
 
Lessons that the Product Life-Cycle Model about the New Labour case study 
The product life-cycle model also offers an opportunity for political scientists to 
look at the whole life of a political product. The model can also offer an 
opportunity to explain why political products fail and why they then get removed 
from office. For example the model does show that New Labour shifted into 
decline and was removed from office because it failed to rejuvenate itself 
properly and it was not offering a product and a leader that the political market 
wanted anymore. The market’s expectations about New Labour changed and the 
party failed to meet these new expectations. Nor did the party adequately 
respond to changing perceptions about the New Labour product. 
 
The same argument could be applied to the Australian Labor Government (2007-
2013). When it disposed of Kevin Rudd as leader in 2010 it attempted to 
rejuvenate under Julia Gillard but, because she was not the leader that the 
political market wanted, that government experienced a very short maturity 
cycle and then went into decline after Gillard’s government introduced a carbon 
tax after the 2010 election. This suggests that a long maturity period, with 
constant renewal and rejuvenation is what is needed if a government wishes to 
stay in power for a long time. The John Key-led National Government in New 
Zealand appear to be a better example of prolonging the maturity phase of the 
product life-cycle through constant and significant regeneration. However, as the 
New Labour case study shows, renewal and rejuvenation is not always possible 
due to conflicting personalities and constant involvement in world events. The 
case study shows that the following significant factors lead to decline: 
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• A ‘Time for a Change’ narrative; 
• Unpopular decisions already taken that the government cannot escape 
from; 
• An unpopular leader. 
 
The case study also suggests that the following factors may prevent, or at least 
stall, decline: 
 
• A renewed electoral mandate; 
• A new leader that is more responsive to the political market and one who 
is viewed by the electoral market as a legitimate successor, and; 
• A real effort to stay connected or to reconnect with political consumers. 
 
The case study also showed that the role of the opposition is also important: 
when the opposition party is unelectable then a political product like New 
Labour is a dominate market player. This situation changed once the opposition 
became more competitive. At that point, the market leader’s internal 
contradictions and other weaknesses became more exposed, making them more 
vulnerable to change narratives.  
 
Further areas of research  
During my research, I found a lot of marketing literature that addresses how to 
revive a dying brand and rejuvenate it. This material could be used in future 
research into how to rejuvenate a political brand as the current literature is still 
limited on this aspect of the product life-cycle model.  
 
An individual politician’s career could also go through the product life-cycle 
model on their own according. While Blair’s career followed Labour’s progression 
through the model, Gordon Brown, viewed as a product, in his own right, became 
leader of the party when he was in his own maturity cycle, so too late to arrest 
the decline in the overarching New Labour product. Another area of research 
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could focus on this relationship between the life-cycle of the party verses the life-
cycle of the politician. For example in New Zealand when Helen Clark’s 
government entered office in 1999 and when it was in its own growth cycle, 
Clark herself was a politician in the maturity cycle as she had experience in the 
previous Labour government and had managed to rejuvenate her own personal 
brand. As revealed by the case study, during New Labour’s decline or maturity, a 
primary brand agent that was going through their own personal ‘introduction’ or 
‘growth’ phase in the political market, rather than Brown, might conceivably 
have been enough to rejuvenate the party. 
 
The product life-cycle is considered, in summary, a very good lens in which to 
chart the progress and then decline of a political party as it positions itself for 
government, as it achieves electoral success, as it then attempts to maintain its 
position as the market leader, and then as it finally collapses under the weight of 
changed perceptions and failures to continually respond to changed market 
conditions. Complementing other, more traditional methods of analysis, the 
product life-cycle model and the political marketing perspective shines an 
interesting and informative additional prism onto the problems of political 
parties seeking and holding onto power.  
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